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note were signed) or any other date within the 1995 and 1996 calendar years. This 
exercise would require an exhaustive review of the books of original entry and ledgers 
along with performing a detailed valuation of the assets and liabilities to be disposed of in 
AlA's discontinuation of its insurance underwriting operations. The valuation provided 
by Mr. Hooper is cursory in nature based upon an estimated mathematical allocation and 
not supported by actual documents. Mr. Hooper also does not address the significant 
"write ups" in asset values that I discussed above that accounted for over $9,000,000 in 
profits in 1996 and 1997. At this time, I have not determined the financial status as of 
July 22, 1995 or any other date within the 1995 and 1996 calendar years as we have never 
been provided full and complete access to the necessary documents. Such a review is not 
possible based upon the documents produced to date and would require an exhaustive 
review of the AlA's books of original entry and ledgers, all of which have not been done 
by Mr. Hooper. 
17. As discussed above, the magnitude of the 1995 write-off, closely followed 
by substantial write-ups in 1996 and 1997 totaling $9,720,505, demonstrate the arbitrary 
nature of estimating the net impact of discontinued operations and invalidates the net 
deficit amount calculated on a pro rata basis by Mr. Hooper as of July 22, 1995. Based 
upon our retrospective look at the impact of discontinued operations on AlA's financial 
statements, it is apparent that they significantly overestimated the impact of discontinued 
operations in 1995, thereby resulting in an inflated deficit amount as of December 1995. 
18. Practically, it is very difficult to determine the net impact of discontinued 
operations and its effect on the net deficit amount in 1995. This is further complicated by 
the fact that after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, new management was 
responsible for making operational and financial decisions. The net impact of these 
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decisions may have further negatively impacted the resultant end-of-year net deficit 
amounts. 
19. Even if a business entity's overall book value is negative, this may not be 
indicative of the entity's ability to maintain normal operations into the future or indicate 
that the entity has no significant net value. Additional factors include its ability to obtain 
credit and/or produce future positive operating results and cash flow. Likewise, an entity 
can have asset book values that are sizably less than fair market values, which, upon 
liquidation, can reduce or eliminate equity deficits. 
20. Mr. Hooper also notes that the 1995 Auditor's Report raised doubt as to 
AlA's ability to continue as a Going Concern. The Going Concern issue was removed 
prior to issuance of the Auditor's Report for AlA's 1997 audited financials. This fact 
further undermines any insolvency argument attributable to the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares. 
21. In the Affidavit of Drew E. Voth, CPA, CFE, CV A, ClRA in Support of 
Intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for Reconsideration of 
Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Voth comes to 
many of the same conclusions as Mr. Hooper. Namely, that AlA was insolvent as of July 
22, 1995, and had insufficient earned surplus. For the same reasons that apply to Mr. 
Hooper's opinions, Mr. V oth' s opinions are not supported by the review and 
investigation of all the required documents necessary to form his opinion. 
22. It appears that neither Mr. Voth nor Mr. Hooper address capital surplus in 
their opinions as to the financial ability of AlA to redeem Reed Taylor'S shares in 1995 
or 1996. Neither Mr. Voth nor Mr. Hooper addressed any consideration and due 
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diligence considered by the Board of Directors of AlA when determining the financial 
condition of AlA in 1995 or the fair market value of its assets. 
23. With the passage of 13 Yz years since the date of the 1995 Agreement, one 
is now afforded the opportunity to take a more practical and realistic approach as to the 
question of solvency. As noted above, for the II-year period from 1996 through 2006, 
AlA generated Operating Income after Interest Expense of $3,867,584 and Net Income of 
$10,194,714. These financial results, including the ability to continue to operate for no 
less than an additional eleven (11) years, should resolve any issue regarding whether or 
not AlA was solvent in 1995 as a result of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. I note 
that AlA started paying Reed Taylor reduced amounts contemporaneously with the 
formation and operation of CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. (flkla AlA Crop Insurance, 
Inc.). 
24. Mr. Voth notes as evidence of AlA's inability to pay its debts the failure 
of the AlA to pay the $1.5 million down payment at closing or within 90 days. In fact, it 
was not paid until 2001. Mr. Voth fails to note that as part of the restructuring plan in the 
1995 Private Placement Memorandum, AlA was to sell 150,000 shares of Series C 
Preferred Stock and receive $1,500,000 from a group of investors. This $1.5 million was 
to be used as the down payment on Reed Taylor's $7.5 million stock repurchase deal. 
AlA received this money, but never paid the agreed upon down payment amount of 
$1,500,000 to Reed Taylor. 
25. Mr. Voth has not attempted to perform a valuation or determined the 
financial status, either on an asset valuation model or calculating earned surplus of AlA 
as of July 22, 1995 or any other date within the 1995 and 1996 calendar years. He simply 
states "there was not sufficient Earned Surplus in order to fund such an obligation based 
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upon how that term is used in Idaho Code 30-1-6 and 30-1-46." As stated above, such a 
valuation and opinion would require an exhaustive review of AlA's books of original 
entry and ledgers, which Mr. Voth and Mr. Hooper have not done. In addition, to 
properly opine on the amount of AlA's earned surplus in 1995 or 1996, one would need 
to review all financial statements, journal entries, general ledgers, supporting documents, 
auditor and accountant workpapers, and the other documents listed below. 
26. Mr. Voth also notes AlA's failure to payoff the $6.0 million note as 
evidence of AlA's inability to "pay its debts as they became due in the usual course of its 
business." As noted in my previous Affidavit, dated September 8, 2008, our review of 
AlA accounting and financial records disclosed a number of questionable and/or 
inappropriate related party transactions. These transactions began started with the arrival 
of new leadership at AlA in 1995 and have continued through December 2006, the end 
date of records that we have thus far reviewed. Generally, these transactions have had 
the effect of increasing AlA's general and administrative costs and decreasing net income 
and available cash to pay Reed Taylor. A summary of transactions follow: 
a AlA and CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA") engaged in a 
number of transactions to the detriment of AlA creditors and 
shareholders: 
• AlA Crop Insurance Inc. is incorporated on November 18, 1999. It 
appears that this is a subsidiary of AlA. Articles of Amendment filed 
November 13, 2000 changed the name to Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc. CropUSA apparently became an independent company 
at some point in time, although I have been unable to conclusively 
make an opinion as to when that event transpired. Mr. John Taylor's 
involvement in CropUSA is questionable especially given the non-
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compete provisions in the Executive Officer's Agreement with AlA 
signed August 1, 1995. 
III AlA subsidized expenses related to CropUSA from 1999 and on by 
providing general and administrative support and either undercharging 
CropUSA for this support, or not charging them at all. For example, 
for years 1999 through 2004, none of John Taylor's total 
compensation, which ranged from $196,536 to $250,000, was 
allocated to CropUSA. Due to the types of accounting records that 
were maintained in 1999 and 2000 when CropUSA was an AlA 
subsidiary, and based upon the records that have been produced to 
date, it is impossible to determine the amount of dollars that should 
have rightfully been allocated to CropUSA without an exhaustive 
review of the financial records of both entities. Based upon what has 
been provided though, costs appear to have been allocated on a very 
subjective basis with no documentation to support the allocation logic. 
It appears other costs or expenses paid by AlA for CropUSA may 
never be known. With respect to the labor allocations, no substantive 
documentation was provided to support the arbitrary allocation of time 
between AlA and CropUSA. According to 2001 and 2002 financial 
records as represented in the known accounting entries, the unallocated 
cost total was approximately $500,000. This amount was never 
allocated to CropUSA. 
III In 2004, AlA Insurance, a subsidiary of AlA, purchased CropUSA's 
ownership shares of AlA Services for approximately $1.5 million in 
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cash. According to CropUSA's financial records, these shares had a 
book value of $21,850. This appears to be a thinly veiled attempt to 
capitalize CropUSA while depleting the financial resources of AlA. I 
also note that AlA Insurance was responsible for the income taxes on 
the $1.5 million transferred to CropUSA. 
II AlA Insurance became the guarantor on a loan with AGM, LLC for 
$15,000,000. AlA received no consideration for this loan guarantee 
and it further demonstrates that the Defendants were utilizing AlA for 
the benefit of CropUSA without any compensation or return benefit to 
AlA. 
II According to a letter to shareholders dated August 18, 2008, certain 
CropUSA assets were to be sold to Hudson Insurance Company 
("Hudson"). The representation disclosed in the letter indicates "the 
sale of the current block will result in a gain in excess of $10 million." 
There is a legal question as to whether Reed Taylor should have been 
entitled to a security interest in the assets that were sold to Hudson 
based upon our identification of significant amounts of money that 
were transferred to CropUSA by AlA and the fact that this entity was 
initially operated as a subsidiary of AlA. 
b AlA engaged in a number of transactions where stock was redeemed and 
payments were made to ESOP for put contracts: 
II Based upon my understanding, AlA is specifically prohibited from 
engagmg m paying any dividend to the Series C Preferred 
Shareholders or redeeming any other shares m 
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AlA Services 
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Corporation until it has satisfied the outstanding obligations of Reed 
Taylor and redeemed all of the Preferred A Shares in ALA Services 
Corporation. Based upon the limited records reviewed, below is a 
listing of the transactions: 
.. Payments made to employees for stock redemptions: 
.. 1997-2002 - $405,658 
II 2003-2006 - $14,963 
.. Payments made to the ESOP for put contracts: 
.. 1999 - $49,626.90 
.. 2000 - $37,531.88 
.. 2001 - $42,487.81 
II 2002 - $31,914.18 
II 2003 - $58,114.89 
II 2004 - $16,671.68 
.. 2005 - $8,901.13 
III 2006 - $2,945.98 
c AlA paid dividends to Preferred C Stock shareholders from 1995 through 
1998: 
.. ALA's payment of dividends is hardly the action of an insolvent 
corporation. These payments are made despite the fact that the 
obligations of Reed Taylor and the Preferred A Shareholder had not 
been satisfied. Based upon the limited records reviewed, amounts paid 
in dividends by year total: 
.. 1995 - $67,123 
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II 1996 - $249,888 
III 1997 - $289,702 
II 1998-$74,375 
d AlA engaged in a number of transactions with Pacific Empire Radio 
Corporation ("PERC"). PERC was at one time a related party with AlA: 
II From December 1997 through December 2001 AlA engaged in a 
series of transactions where 219,044 shares of PERC common stock 
were purchased. The total book value of stock held was $411,844. In 
December 2001 and the third quarter of 2004, AlA transferred all of its 
ownership shares of PERC to John Taylor at a transfer price that may 
or may not have been at fair market value. 
III A receivable in the amount of $95,000 owed by PERC to AlA was 
transferred to Crop USA on December 31, 2006. 
II Transactional activity reflects an ongoing back and forth transfer of 
cash between AlA and PERC, even though AlA was no longer an 
owner of PERC stock after the third quarter of 2004. 
II Emails and other documents produced by AlA also show that AlA 
personnel were providing services for Pacific Empire Radio 
Corporation and related entities. 
e John Taylor received total compensation ranging between $196,536 and 
$250,000 per year from 1995 through 2006: 
One can question the validity of the reasonableness of both the amount of John 
Taylor's total compensation and as to why AlA was required to absorb these costs, as his 
salary was not allocated to CropUSA until 2006 (his total compensation appears to have 
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been allocated after John Taylor testified on March 1, 2007, that his salary was not 
allocated to CropUSA and that he spent half of his time working for CorpUSA). 
f John Taylor is charging AlA an excessive amount for the rental of a 
parking lot: 
• Prior to John Taylor's purchase of a parking lot in 2001, AlA was 
being charged $5,000 per year in rent for the lot. Amounts paid in 
2004,2005 and 2006 were $15,750, 15,000 and $30,000 respectively. 
The $30,000 amount paid in 2006 includes $15,000 of "prepaid 
parking lot rent for 2007." 
g AlA purchased vehicles on behalf of John Taylor: 
II In January 2004, AlA purchased John Taylor's BMW for $41,450. 
II In September 2004, AlA purchased John Taylor's Ford Excursion for 
$18,770. 
27. Currently our investigation is incomplete because documents requested 
during the discovery process have not yet been produced. The above examples of 
questionable transaction are not exhaustive and our investigation in this regard remains 
ongoing and incomplete. Upon production of the necessary documents and answers to 
questions from various past and present accounting personnel in and outside of AlA, we 
will need additional time to review the records of AlA and related parties to scrutinize 
investments, transfers and other transactions from 1995 through the present time to 
confirm that AlA actually produced sufficient cash flow to pay Reed Taylor. Without 
gaining full and unencumbered access to additional financial records and accounting 
information, it is impossible to measure the full extent of funds that have been drawn out 
of AlA for the benefit of others. With the added complexities of locating historical 
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financial records and other documents from over 13 Yz years ago, we may never be able 
to measure the full amount of the financial impact or to fully rebuild the financial status 
of AlA on certain dates in 1995 or 1996. 
28. The previously noted financial transactions identified to date represent 
deliberate instances of self-dealing and questionable business transactions involving the 
use of AlA as a financial platform to fund other umelated or competing opportunities. 
Without doubt, these transactions were detrimental to AlA and are subsumed in the 
balance sheet and operating results for the respective periods in which they occurred; 
although as previously mentioned, for the period from 1996 through 2006, AlA generated 
positive Operating Income after Interest Expense of $3.8 million. The cumulative effect 
of these transactions impacted AlA's ability to meet its existing debt obligations to Reed 
Taylor, including amounts owed as a result of the 1995 and 1996 Agreements. Based 
upon my understanding of the priority of the various shareholders and creditors of AlA, 
the $l.5 million transferred/paid to CropUSA for the Series C Preferred Shares in AlA 
Services should have been paid to Reed Taylor or the Preferred A Shareholder before 
being transferred/paid to CropUSA. 
29. Based upon our review of the documents that have been produced to date 
in this matter, my findings are summarized as follows: 
a Neither of the financial consultants in this matter (Mr. Hooper and Mr. Voth) 
has provided a thorough and accurate financial status of AlA as of July 22, 
1995 or August 1, 1995. 
b AlA was not rendered insolvent in 1995 or 1996 as a result of the redemption 
of Reed Taylor's shares as evidenced by the following: 
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III Positive cumulative operating results from 1996 through 2006, and no 
evidence that any creditors besides Reed Taylor had not been paid. 
iii With the exception of Reed Taylor, no creditors have been impaired by 
AlA through non-payment or failure to fulfill financial obligations. 
c From 1995 through present, the management of AlA has engaged in a series 
of questionable and prohibited transactions with the net effect of diminishing 
the value of AlA and Reed Taylor's asserted security interest therein. 
d Given the magnitude of AlA's pattern of questionable and prohibited 
transactions and transfers of capital that have occurred over a 13 Y2 year 
period, it is conceivable that the remaining obligation owed to Reed Taylor for 
surrendering his AlA stock presumably could have been satisfied in 
accordance with its tenns. 
30. As indicated above substantial amounts of financial documents have not 
been produced or made available in this action. In order to detennine and render a full 
and complete opinion on the amount of earned surplus available at AlA in 1995, the 
following documents for AlA need to be produced 
(a) All journal entries, general ledgers, supporting documents, income 
statements, check registers, tax returns, financial statements, 
accounting notebooks (monthly, quarterly and year-end), 
workpapers, and account analysis for AlA and all Subsidiaries 
from the date of incorporation through the end of 1996; 
(b) All workpapers and notes from all internal and outside 
accountants/auditors for AlA and all Subsidiaries from the date of 
incorporation through the end of 1996; 
(c) All record for all dividends, distributions, redemptions and other 
corporate transactions for AlA and all Subsidiaries from the date of 
incorporation through the end of 1996; and 
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(d) All due diligence information relied upon by the Board of 
Directors of AlA and all Subsidiaries for all material transactions 
(including the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares) from the date 
of incorporation through the end of 1996. 
This information is required to reconstruct and ddcrmine the amount of 
adjusted earned surplus for AlA in 1995 or 1996. This efrort will require sufficient 
time onee the documentation has been provided. along \vith an allowance oftil1le for 
tollow up with any other information and/or supporting documents which may have 
been omitted and/or may be required to fully reconstruct an adiusted earned surplus 
for AlA in 1995 and 1996. 
DATED this 9th day of April 200 . 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORt\' to on this 9th day' of April 2009. before me. a 
Notary Public for the State of Montana. by Paul E. Pederson. known to me to be the 
person whose name is subscribed to the \vithin instrument and ackncnvlcdged that he 
executed the same. 
M 0 n tan a. res i din gat ~--"'-"""'~~'r"''--''::''-'"'7''-''-''''-..:r.JIV 
My Com miss ion Ex pires: . .....L.-='<A."'f.?-~:...=:..:'--"7~ 
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Exhibit A 
Paul E. Pederson 
Paul E. Pederson is the President of Pederson Associates, Inc., establishing the firm in 1995. His 
past experience includes approximately ten years with "big five" accounting firms and another 
five years with a national consulting firm. 
As part of his experience, Mr. Pederson has performed financial analysis work for bankruptcy 
and breach of contract matters in industries such as construction, real estate development, forest 
products, agriculture, fishing, retailing, restaurant, and agency relationships, addressing such 
issues as increased costs, wrongful termination, lost profits, diversion of funds and business 
devastation. He has periodically been asked and has provided valuations of closely held 
businesses in the construction, restaurant and sign industries. He has also extensively reviewed 
partnership records in real estate matters involving both commercial and mixed-use projects and 
reviewed response action costs in environmental matters. 
Throughout the course of his career, he has reviewed financial agreements, stipulations or 
consideration sections contained within numerous contracts and the financial records of hundreds 
of companies involved in contract issues. In conjunction with these efforts, he has often been 
asked to evaluate and testifY to the meaning and interpretation of the financial agreements, 
stipulations or consideration in contracts, the potential direct financial impact of contractual 
relationships and any potential associated consequential financial impacts to the parties of the 
contracts such as lost profits and business devastation/destruction. As part of these efforts, he 
has been asked to offer opinions in a variety of industries on the value of a particular contractual 
relationship and the value of a business based upon anticipated future income. Mr. Pederson has 
also been engaged in matters involving the valuation of trademarks, impacts due to trademark 
and trade dress infringement and copyright infringement. 
He has provided testimony as an expert in a variety of matters through affidavit, deposition and 
oral testimony in cases before State and Federal courts and arbitrators. 
In addition to claims analysis, Mr. Pederson has performed organizational management reviews 
for both public and private organizations. This work included addressing such items as contract 
formation, contract language, contract administration policies and procedures, project 
organization, project reporting and identification of key areas of risk in the contracting process. 
Mr. Pederson's previous experience also includes six years in the construction industry working 
for a concrete construction company. 
Mr. Pederson earned his Bachelor of Arts in Business Administration, Accounting, from the 
University of Puget Sound. He holds a certificate as a Certified Public Accountant, is a member 
of the Washington Society of Certified Public Accountants and a past member of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
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Exhibit B 
Pederson Associates, Inc .. 
Representative Client List 
Law Firms: 
Abbott, Davis, Rothwell, Mullin & Earle 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
Allen, Yazbeck, O'Halloran & Hanson 
(Portland, OR.) 
Arnold, Gallagher, Saydeck, Percell 
Roberts & Potter (Eugene, OR) 
Ater Wynne, LLP 
Betts Patterson & Mines 
Blankenship Law Firm 
Bogle & Gates 
Barokas, Martin, Ahlers & Tomlinson 
Brown Lewis Janhunen & Spencer 
(Aberdeen, WA.) 
Bush Strout & Kornfeld 
Cairncross & Hemplemann, P.S. 
Camp vonKallenbach O'Sullivan 
Carney Badley Smith & Spellman 
Carley & Rabon, PLLC (Charlotte, NC) 
Christensen, O'Connor, Johnson & Kindness 
Chism, Thiel, McCafferty & Campbell 
Connor & Chung, PLLC 
Cushman Law Firm (Olympia, WA.) 
Dann & Meacham 
Davis Wright Tremaine 
Edwards Frickle Anner-Hughes & Culver 
(Billings, MT) 
Farella Braun + Martell, LLP (San Francisco) 
Ferring Nelson LLP 
Field Jerger LLP (Portland) 
Foianini & Sears (Ephrata, W A.) 
Foreman Arch Dodge & Zimmerman PS 
(Wenatchee, W A.) 
Foster Pepper & Shefelman 
Gibbons & Whyte, PLLC 
Graham & Dunn 
Groff Murphy PLLC 
Hacker & Willig, Inc., P.S. 
Hale Lane Peek Dennison and Howard (Reno, NV) 
Hanemann, Bateman & Jones (Olympia, WA) 
Hanson Baker Ludlow Drumheller P.S. 
Harold A. Thoreen, P.S., Inc. 
Hattery Schwartzenburg, LLC 
Hedeen & Caditz 
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Representative Client List 
Public Agencies (cont.): 
City of Seattle 
East Side Union High School District, 
San Jose, California 
Eastern Washington University 
PUD No. I of Chelan County 
PUD No.2 of Grant County 
King County 
LOTT Wastewater Alliance 
(Lacey, Olympia, Tumwater, Washington and 
Thurston Co.) 
Magadan Science and Research Institute (Russia) 
Manson School District 
Mercer Island School District 
Montana Department of Transportation 
Olympus Terrace Sewer District 
Oregon State Department of Environmental 
Quality 
Oregon State Department of Justice 
Oregon State Lottery 
Pierce County 
Port of Port Angeles 
Port of Everett 
Seattle Housing Authority 
Sherwood School District (Oregon) 
Skagit County 
Snohomish County 
Tacoma School District 
The Evergreen State College 
Thurston County Dept. of Water and Waste 
Management 
U.S. Department of Energy 
Washington State Convention and 
Trade Center 
Washington State Department of 
Corrections 
Washington State Department of Ecology 
Washington State Department of 
Transportation 
Washington State Ferry System 
Washington State Penitentiary 
Washington State University 
Whatcom County Water District #10 
Yakima Air Terminal 
Business Enterprises: 
360networks USA 
Abbey Land LLC (California) 
Advanced Technology Construction 
Aldergrove LLC 
Aleutian Spray Fisheries 
Armada West Campus, Inc. 
ANCOICAICO's JV 
Artic Slope Regional Corporation 
ASRC Energy Services (Alaska) 
Aztec Electric of Spokane 




Berschauer Phillips Construction Company 
BIE Aerospace 
Bridgewood Joint Venture 
Bruce Dees & Associates 
Bechtel Hanford, Inc. 
Cadman, Inc. 
Caicosl Anco JV 
California Track & Engineering 





City Transfer, Inc. 
CLEANPAK Systems Co. 
Clear Brook Construction 
CNA Insurance 
Colliers International 
Construction Enterprises & Contractors, Inc. 
Copperwood Properties, LLC (Montana) 
Cortex Medical Management Systems, Inc. 
Creekwood Lots, LLC (Montana) 
Cupertino Electric (California) 
David Evans Associates 
DPIC Insurance Companies 
E. Kent Halvorson, Inc. 
Easters & Kittle 
Eastwood Environmental, Inc. 
Edgewood Properties, LLC (Montana) 
Elcon Corporation 
Emerald Outdoor Advertising 
ENRON Corporation 
Evergreen International Aviation, Inc. 
Falcon West Helicopters, Inc 
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F. E. Ward Constructors 
Filtration Development Company, LLC (California) 
First Pacific Development Ltd. 
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Fletcher General Construction 
Frank L. Veninga, Architect, PC. 
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George E. Masker Painting (California) 
G. F. Atkinson General Construction 
General Electric (Real Estate and Construction) 
George Gill Construction, Inc. 
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Business Enterprises (coni.): 
Leo A. Daly 
Les Schwab Tire Centers of Oregon 
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Lloyd's of London 
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Lunde Construction 
Lydig Construction (Spokane) 
Magnum Drywall (California) 
Marco Two Union Square 
Matheus Lumber Company 
Mead Gilman & Associates 
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Glacier Construction Partners, LLC (Montana) 
Hanson Pipe & Products, NW 
Harnell Green & Abrahamson, Inc. 
Harrington Construction & Development, LLC 
HDR Engineering, Inc. 
MEECO Manufacturing Company, Inc. 
Medical Asset Management, Incorporated 
Merritt + Pardini 
HDRITurner JV 
HealthCare Systems, Inc. 
Holaday-Parks-Fabricators, Inc. 
Holiday ReSales Group 
Horton Dennis & Associates 
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Hyundai Telecom, Inc. 
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Insurance Company of the West 
Industrial Properties, Inc. 
1. Harper Contractors, Inc. 
Jacobs Engineering Group 
Janssen Contracting Company, Inc. (Alaska) 
J. E. McAmis, Inc. (California) 
Jones Quarry 
J.M. RAFN Company 
Kegel & Associates 
Kiewit Construction Group 
Kitsap Community Federal Credit Union 
Klukwan, Inc. (Alaska) 
KMD Architects 
KPFF Engineers 
Laser Underground Utilities 
Lease Crutcher Lewis 
Ledcor Industries, Inc. 
Lehigh Portland Cement Company 
Metromedia Fiber Network 
Mithun Architects 
Millers Mutual Fire Insurance Company 
Mills, John & Rigdon 
Mosier Creek LLC (Oregon) 
Multi Concepts of America, Inc. 
Neir & Associates 
New Lines Construction 
Noble House Hotels, LLC 
North Coast Enterprises, Inc. 
Northern Cheyenne Indian Tribe 
Northwest Cascade, Inc. 
Oasis Events 
Olympic Blvd. Partners 
Olympic Coast Investment Inc. 
Olympic Western Company 
Olson Bros. Excavating, Inc. 
Osborne Construction Company, Inc. 
PACCAR 
PACE Systems Company 
Pacific Coast Coal Company 
Pacific Pluming Supply Co. LLC 
PAPE Group 
Parametrix, Inc. 
Paul Bros., Inc. (Oregon) 
PCL Construction Services 
PCY Corporation, Inc. 
Pinnacle Realty Management Company 
Powell Homes 
ProteoTech, Inc. 
Rakoz Electric, Inc. 
Questech 
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Business Enterprises (cont.): Business Enterprises (cont.): 
R. C. Hedreen Vision One LLC 
VW & R Corporation 
W. A. Botting Company, Inc. 
Reliance National Insurance Companies 
Riverside Properties, LLC (Montana) 
Roll Manufacturing, Inc. I Franklin Mint 
S. A. Gonzales Construction, Inc. (Spokane) 
Safeco Property and Casualty Insurance 
XL Specialty Insurance Company (Surety) 




Seattle Gourmet Foods, Inc. 
Scott Wall Construction 
S.D. Deacon Corporation 
Shea Construction, Inc. (Spokane) 
Shelton Presbyterian Church 
Singleton Associates 
Signal Electric 
S. 1. Amoroso Construction (California) 
Smith-Kern Ellensburg, Inc. 
Specialty Restaurant Group, Inc. 
Sound Design Engineering, Inc. 
South Central Concrete, Inc, 
South Coast, Inc. 
St. Paul Insurance Companies 
Standard Steel RDfRA PRP Group 
Star Track Systems (Wisconsin) 
Starfire Sports Complex 
State Farm Mutual Insurance Group 
Stewart Foods 
Strand Hunt Construction 
Streeter & Associates 
Sverdrup Corporation 
T-Mobile 
Tacoma Mall Townhouses, LLC 
Takisaki Inc. Contractors 
Target Corporation 
Tesoro Petroleum Company 
Texaco Marketing and Refming 
The Hotsy Corporation of Denver 
The Scott Company (California) 
Thermion, Inc. 
Timberland Construction LLC (Montana) 
Timberland Properties, LLC (Montana) 
Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America 
TyDiCo Construction, Inc. 
United of Omaha Life Insurance Company 
Universal Land Construction Company 
US WEST, Inc. 
Valley Electric ofMt. Vernon 
Zurich American Insurance Company 




• AlA Services Corporation and Subsidiaries Consolidated Financial Statements for 
Years Ended: 
o December 31, 1994 and 1995 [AIA0028658 - AIA002870 1 ] 
o December 31, 1995 and 1996 [AIA0025034 - AIA0025076] 
o December 31, 1996 and 1997 [AIA0025181 - AIA0025223] 
o December 31, 1998 and 1999 [AIA000080 - AIAOOOI10] 
o December 31, 2000 and 2001 [AIA000049 - AIA00007 4] 
o December 31, 2001 and 2002 [AIA000021 - AIA000048] 
o December 31, 2003 [AIAOOOO 16 - AIA000020] 
o December 31, 2004 [AIAOOOO 11 - AIAOOOO 15] 
o December 31, 2005 [AIA000006 - AIAOOOO 1 0] 
• CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. Financial Statements for Years Ended: 
o December 31, 2002 and 2003 [AIA000450 - AIA000462] 
o December 31, 2003 and 2004 [AIA0004 37 - AIA000449] 
• AlA Insurance Workpapers for Years: 
o 2001 [AIA0021853 -AIA0022083] 
o 2002 [AIA0022225 - AIA0022427] 
o 2003 [AIA0022925 - AIA0023184] 
o 2004 [AIA0022552 -AIA0022872] 
o 2005 [AIA0023087 - AIA0023517] 
o 2006 [AIA0023656 - AIA0023795] 
(I AlA Services Workpapers for Years: 
o 1999 [AIA0024165 - AIA0024237] 
o 2000 [AIA0024086 - AIA0024165] 
o 2001 [AIA0023956 - AIA0024068] 
o 2002 [AIA0023874 - AIA0023955] 
o 2003 [AIA0024631 - AIA0024 737] 
o 2004 [AIA0024738 - AIA0024822] 
o 2005 [AIA0023543 - AIA0023655] 
o 2006 [AIA0024823 - AIA0024875] 
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e AlA Insurance Accounts Payable Account #2460-00-0 dated December 31, 2005 
[AIAOOO 1460] 
I) AlA Insurance, Inc. Due To/From John Taylor Account dated December 31,2006 
[AIA0001563 -AIAOOOI564] 
I) AlA Insurance, Inc. General Ledger Detail Listing dated December 20, 2004 
[AIA0012844] 
I) Letter from Richard A. Riley of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen to 
w. Frank Taylor of Cairncross & Hempelmann regarding AlA Services 
Corporation dated July 1, 1996 [AIA0029010 -AIA0029014] 
\II AlA Services Corporation Confidential Private Placement Memorandum dated 
June 1, 1995 [AIA00280 15 - AIA0028059] 
.. Articles ofIncorporation of AlA Crop Insurance, Inc. [AIAOOI121 - AIA001123] 
• Articles of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation of AlA Crop Insurance, 
Inc. dated November 13,2000 [AIAOOI124 - AIA001125] 
I) Executive Officer's Agreement for R. John Taylor dated August 1,1995 [9 pages] 
I) AlA Inc. Trust Mark 3Q2004 Journal Entries dated 9/30/04 [AIA0001415 -
AIAOOOI418] 
I) Loan and Security Agreement between CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. and 
AGM, LLC dated October 27,2006 [AIAOOI157 - AIA001239] 
• Letter to Shareholders from CropUSA dated August 18,2008 [AIA0027471] 
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Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor submits this Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Connie 
Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Bryan Freeman, JoLt:e 
Duclos, ALA Services Corporation ("AlA Services"), ALA Insurance, Inc. ("AlA Insurance"), 
R. John Taylor ("John Taylor"), and ALA Services Corporation 401(k) Plan's ("Plan") Joinders 
and in Support of Granting Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of Reed Taylor: l 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to the Defendants and Plan's assertions, ALA Services had sufficient capital 
surplus to redeem Reed Taylor's shares in 1995 and the redemption did not render ALA Services 
insolvent in violation of I.C. § 30-1-6, as evidenced by the significant appraisals conducted for 
ALA Services and the millions of dollars in commissions and related receivables. ALA Service~' 
only insolvency arose years later in or around 2001, after the redemption agreements were 
executed, by the Defendants' corporate malfeasance and mismanagement-facts which are not 
denied by the Defendants. The Defendants created the insolvency in 2001 when they elected to 
not pay Reed Taylor and instead to steal the money? ALA Services' later insolvency has 
effected only one known creditor-Reed Taylor. 
Assuming ALA Services was insolvent or had insufficient capital surplus as a result of the 
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, the redemption agreements were not illegal. Contracts to 
I For convenience of the Court, Reed Taylor submitted his Statement of Facts as a separate pleading, however, Reed 
Taylor incorporates by reference his Statements of Facts dated April 9, 2009, into each and every section below. 
The Statement of Facts and Memorandum of Law dated April 9, 2009, supersede and replace Reed Taylor's 
Response dated February 26,2009. 
2 Reed Taylor has alleged and maintains that AlA Services has been insolvent since 2001, but such insolvency was 
not caused by the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, but instead by the Defendants' malfeasance and 
mismanagement. 
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redeem shares in a corporation are not illegal. Contracts promising to pay a creditor over time 
for the redemption of shares are not illegal. Contracts granting a creditor a security interests in 
collateral as terms of a stock redemption agreement are not illegal. Contracts promising to allow 
a creditor to vote the shares of a corporation as security for redeeming the creditor's shares are 
not illegal. Moreover, the Idaho Legislature did mandate that any agreements that violate I.e. 
30-1-6 are void or voidable and did not even mention a violation as being "unlawful." 
Instead, the Defendants are attempting to draw the Court away from the undisputed 
corporate malfeasance, the facts and appraisals, and the applicable case law cited by Reed 
Taylor. Indeed, I.C. § 30-1-6 does not violate a criminal code nor does not contain the operative 
"buzz" words of "illegal" or "unlawful" or "prohibited" acts, which are found in Farrell v. 
Whitman, WL 198516 (Idaho 2009) (the Defendants' key case dealing with an unlicensed 
architect violating Idaho Code stating that it is "unlawful" to not be licensed and the companion 
code section making such violation a criminal misdemeanor). 
Irrespective of the legal nature of stock redemptions, AlA Services' assets exceeded all of 
its liabilities (including the debt owed to Reed Taylor) by over $2.5 Million on December 31, 
1995 (based upon a reduced "minority interest" valuation), which was after the redemption of 
Reed Taylor's shares and after AlA Services' businesses had declined as asserted by the 
Defendants. As of December 31, 1996, the "minority interest" valuation of AlA Services (after 
all obligations, including the debt owed to Reed Taylor) increased to over $4.2 Million. In other 
words, regardless of whether the Court utilizes "surplus" or "insolvency" as the basis for the 
redemption of Reed Taylor'S shares as provided under I.C. § 30-1-6, sufficient surplus existed 
and AlA Services was not rendered insolvent by the redemption in 1995 or 1996. 
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Assuming AlA Services was rendered insolvent or had insufficient surplus to redeem 
Reed Taylor's shares, Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motions for Partial Summary Judgment 
should be denied for many reasons, without the need of even addressing the factual issue of the 
financial status of AlA Services in 1995 or 1996. The same holds true for the Joinders filed by 
the other parties in this action. The Defendants and the Plan are not intended beneficiaries of 
I.e. § 30-1-6. The Defendants and the Plan are not innocent creditors or innocent shareholders. 
In fact, there are no innocent creditors or innocent shareholders. The Defendants and the Plan 
lack standing to attack the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and are time barred from 
attacking the redemption. Moreover, the Defendants and the Plan have acquiesced in the 
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares for over 13 years. The Court should deny the Defendants 
and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Joinders, and grant partial summary judgment in 
favor of Reed Taylor. 
II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
A. Summary Judgment Standard. 
1. The Summary Judgment Standard for an Affirmative Defense. 
When a party moves for summary judgment based upon an affirmative defense, the party 
asserting the defense bears "the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact 
material to ... [the] defense." Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 437, 871 P.2d 846 
(Ct. App. 1994). 
The party seeking summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense must 
conclusively prove all elements of the defense. Franklin v. JD. Jackson, 847 S.W.2d 306, 308 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993). 
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Here, the burden is on the Defendants to prove all elements of any affirmative defenses 
and that there is no genuine issue of fact. The Defendants have failed to meet their burden. 
2. The Summary Judgment Standard For the Moving Party 
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c). 
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the 
moving party. Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy, Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 625, 115 P.3d 713 (2005). 
The court must liberally construe all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record will be drawn in favor of the nonmoving 
party. Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 160 P.3d 743 (2007). 
Summary judgment is improper "if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw 
conflicting inferences from the evidence presented." McPhheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 394, 
64 P.3d 317 (2003). 
On summary judgment, the Court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving parting, including questions of credibility and the weight to be accorded particulflr 
evidence. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991) (quoting Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986». 
3. The Summary Judgment Standard for the Nonmoving Party 
The district court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the party 
has not filed its own motion with the court. Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d 
612 (2001). Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
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file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c). 
B. I.C. § 30-1-6 Governed the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares In 1995 and 
1996 and the Redemption Agreements and Promissory Notes Were Not Illegal. 
On February 26, 2009, the Defendants for the first time asserted that I.C. § 30-1-46 is 
inapplicable and that I.C. § 30-1-6 was the appropriate code section.3 See I.C. § 30-1-6; I.C. § 
301-46 (both sections remained the same in 1995 and 1996). 
Idaho Code has a savings provision that requires the provision in place as of the date of 
the transaction to govern transactions occurring prior to the repeal of the Idaho Business 
Corporations Act: 
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the repeal of a statute by this 
chapter does not affect: 
* * * 
(c) Any violation of the statute, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred 
because of the violation, before its repeal. 
I.C. § 30-1-1703 (emphasis added). 
Thus, I.C. § 30-1-6 applies to any violations in 1995 and 1996. I.C. § 30-1-46 has no 
application. Moreover, only payment terms were modified in 1996-Reed Taylor'S shares were 
already redeemed and he became a secured creditor on July 22, 1995, pursuant to the terms of 
the redemption agreements. 4 
III 
3 Although inapplicable, I.C. § 30-1-46 illustrates the illegality of over $600,000 in unlawful dividends paid to the 
Preferred C Shareholders by the Defendants when the payments should have gone to Reed Taylor and Donna 
Taylor. Reed Taylor objects to hearing the Defendants Motions and Joinders because they asserted I.C § 30-1-6 as 
authority for the first time on February 26, 2009. They have thwarted Reed Taylor's discovery and prejudiced him 
by not complying with numerous discovery requests in this action. 
4 See Hearing, Ex. A, Z, AA-AD. 
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C. AlA Services Had Sufficient Capital and Earned Surplus to Redeem Reed 
Taylor's Shares. 
1. AlA Services Had Sufficient Surplus to Redeem Reed Taylor. 
The parties agree that I.C. § 30-1-6 is the applicable code section to the redemption of 
Reed Taylor's shares for any violations in 1995 and 1996. The pertinent parts of I.e. § 30-1-6 
(1995) state: 
30-1-6 Right of a corporation to acquire and dispose of its own shares. 
A corporation shall have the right to purchase, take, receive or otherwise acquire, hold, 
own, pledge, transfer or otherwise dispose of its own shares, but purchases of its own 
shares, whether direct or indirect, shall be made only to the extent of unreserved and 
unrestricted earned surplus available therefor, and, if the articles of incorporation so 
permit or with the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of all shares entitled to 
vote thereon, to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available 
therefor. 
To the extent that earned surplus OR capital surplus is used as the measure of the 
corporation's right to purchase its own shares, such surplus shall be restricted so long as 
such shares are held as treasury shares, and upon the disposition or cancellation of any 
such shares the restriction shall be removed pro tanto . 
.. . No purchase of or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when the 
corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make it insolvent. 
I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995). Thus, when ascertaining the financial condition of a corporation to redeem 
its own shares, a corporation may rely upon one or more of the following: (1) Earned Surplus; 
(2) Earned Surplus and Capital Surplus; or (3) Capital Surplus. See I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995) 
(emphasis added); see also LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 125, 369 P.2d 45 (196~) 
(the fair market value of a corporation's assets over its debts is applicable to a stock redemption). 
When determining the application of I.C. § 30-1-6, interpretation must be based upon the 
definitions set forth in I.C. § 30-1-2 (1995). 
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"CAPITAL SURPLUS" is defined as "the entire SURPLUS of a corporation other than 
its earned surplus." See I.C. § 30-1-2(m) (emphasis added). 
"SURPLUS" is defined as "the excess of the NET ASSETS of a corporation over its 
stated capital." See I.e. § 30-1-2(k) (emphasis added). 
"NET ASSETS" is defined as "the amount by which the TOTAL ASSETS of a corporation 
exceed the TOTAL DEBTS ofthe corporation." See I.C. § 30-1-2(i) (emphasis added). 
Thus, after applying the definitions set forth in I.C. § 30-1-2 to the references to "Capital 
Surplus" in I.C. § 30-1-6, the test for determining a corporation's ability to purchase its own 
shares, when "Earned Surplus" is not used, is the net value of all of the corporation's assets. 
The Idaho Legislature's departure from the strict reliance of only "earned surplus" and 
using other valuation methods has been adopted by the American Jurisprudence and other 
treatises: 
Directors have reasonable latitude to depart from the balance sheet to calculate surplus, 
for the purpose of determining whether the corporation can redeem shares, so long as 
they evaluate assets and liabilities in good faith, on the basis of acceptable data, by 
methods that they reasonably believe reflect present values ... 
See 18B Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 1777 (2008) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added); 19 
C.J.S. Corporations § 664 (2008). 
Balance sheets are not conclusive indicators of surplus or the lack thereof, for the purpose 
of determining compliance with the requirement that a corporation may redeem its shares 
only out of surplus or as expressly authorized by statute. This is because unrealized 
appreciation and depreciation can render book numbers inaccurate; regardless of what a 
balance sheet that has not been updated may show, and though unrealized, appreciation 
reflects real economic value that the corporation may borrow against or that creditors 
may claim or levy upon. Accordingly, corporate directors have reasonable latitude to 
depart from the balance sheet to calculate surplus ... so long as they evaluate assets and 
liabilities in good faith ... 
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19 C.J.S. Corporations § 664 (2008) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added) . 
... the existence or nonexistence of an adequate surplus that the corporation has to apply 
to the purchase of its own shares is not determined solely on the corporation's financial 
statement, but rather the authorities have suggested that actual values, not book values, 
are determinative of the existence of surplus. 
A statutory restriction that if the purchase was for cash or property made only to the 
extent of unreserved or unrestricted earned surplus did not prohibit a corporation from 
purchasing its own shares on credit ... 5 
The relevant time to evaluate whether a corporation's capital has been impaired is the 
time when the challenged obligation was entered into ... 
... the board of directors may base a determination that a distribution is not so prohibited 
either on financial statements prepared on the basis of accounting practices and principals 
that are reasonable in the circumstances, or on a fair valuation or other method that is 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
6A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 2849 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Significantly, however, in 1997 (1 Yz years after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares), 
the Idaho Legislature clarified Idaho law even further by removing the confusing "Earned 
Surplus" and "Capital Surplus" standards when it adopted I.C. § 30-1-640. This is significant 
and cannot be underemphasized. 
Therefore, contrary to the assertions made by the Defendants and the Plan, they must 
produce all appraisals, valuations or other means of providing an analysis of the fair value of 
AlA Services assets are at issue and subject to discovery in this action. Indeed, the value of AlA 
Services assets strikes at the heart of the Defendants and Plan's alleged "illegality" arguments 
The appraisals of assets, shares and businesses of AlA Services and/or its subsidiaries directly 
pertains to the pending motions filed by the Defendants and Plan and impacts Reed Taylor's 
5 This provides yet another independent basis to deny all of the Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment 
without reaching the issue of surplUS. 
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ability to respond. These documents and information are all discoverable and should be ordered 
produced. 
In fact, although previously requested over one year ago, on March 5, 2009, AIA 
Services and AlA Insurance finally produced appraisals conducted in 1995 and 1996 to value a 
minority interest in AlA Services (after considering the over $7 Million owed to Reed Taylor) at 
over $2 Million6 and $4 Million,7 respectively (meaning that after Reed Taylor's redemption,'a 
majority ownership interest was even more valuable). Moreover, on March 11,2009, additional 
appraisals were finally produced valuing AlA Services' commons shares at over $8 Million for a 
minority interest at year-end 1994 (in other words, Reed Taylor'S majority interest was worth 
significantly more)8 and an appraisal valuing the entire company at over $19 Million on October 
14, 1994.9 Finally, Reed Taylor valued the commissions and contractual relationships owned by 
AlA Services at over $24 Million in 1995.10 
2. AlA Services' Directors Obviously Relied Upon Projections for Future 
Business When Electing to Redeem Reed Taylor's Shares. 
When determining the solvency or insolvency of a corporation, the directors of a 
corporation may rely upon projections for future business: 
6 See Affidavit of Michael Bissell dated March 12,2009, Ex. A (valuing the common shares at a discounted 
minority interest value resulted in them being worth over$2 Million after considering the company's obligations to. 
Reed Taylor). 
7 See Affidavit of Michael Bissell dated March 12, 2009, Ex. B (valuing the common shares at a discounted 
minority interest value resulted in them being worth over $4 Million after considering the company's obligations to 
Reed Taylor). 
8 See Affidavit of Michael Bissell dated March 12, 2009, Ex. C. This valuation report was received issued to AlA 
Services on October 24, 1995-approximately three months after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and relied 
upon the June 1, 1995 Private Placement Memorandum attached to the Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, 
and other documents attached to this affidavit. This report, like the others, fell squarely within the information 
requested for over 1 Yz years from AlA Services and only produced within the past seven days. 
9 See Affidavit of Michael Bissell dated March 12,2009, Ex. D; Statement of Facts, ~~ QQ-RR. 
10 See Affidavit of Reed Taylor, ~~ 5-6. 
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In addition, in determining whether the equity insolvency test has been met, certain 
judgments or assumptions as to the future course of the corporation's business are 
customarily justified, absent clear evidence to the contrary. When directors are making 
judgments or assumptions about the future course of a corporation's business, they may 
utilize a cash flow analysis based on a business forecast and budget for a sufficient period 
of time in order to determine whether the corporation can reasonably expect to satisfy 
known obligations as they mature over that period. 
See 15A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 7363 (2009) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
3. A Corporation Need Not Consider A Corporation's Surplus When 
Payments Are Made Over Time. 
When a corporation acquires shares from a shareholder on credit, the amount of surplus 
that a corporation has available is not relevant: 
A statutory restriction that if the purchase was for cash or property made only to the 
extent of unreserved or unrestricted earned surplus did not prohibit a corporation from 
h ·· h d' 11 purc asmg Its own s ares on cre It ... 
6A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 2849 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Here, AlA Services acquired Reed Taylor's shares on for $7.5 Million in credit in 1995.12 
Accordingly, the amount of surplus available at AlA Services in 1995 is irrelevant and that 
extensive factual issue need not be determined. 
4. Even if AlA Services Utilized the Earned Surplus Standard, A Question 
of Fact Exists As To the Amount of AlA Services' Earned Surplus on 
July 22,1995. 
Significantly, AlA Services' shareholders specifically voted to approve the redemption of 
500,000 of Reed Taylor's shares for $7.5 Million (includes the $1.5 Million down payment and 
11 This provides yet another independent basis to deny all of the Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment 
without reaching the issue of surplus. 
12 See Hearing, Ex. A and Z-AB. 
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$6 Million Promissory Note ).13 Moreover, Paul Pederson testified that the shareholder deficit 
and earned surplus at year-end 1995 was over reserved, as evidenced by a $8,820,000 "write up" 
in 1997 and a $900,505 "write up" in 1996.14 
D. The Defendants and Plan Have Failed to Prove The Redemption of Reed 
Taylor's Shares Rendered AlA Services Insolvent. 
A corporation's solvency is presumed: 
As a general rule, solvency is presumed, especially where a going concern is involved, 
and if shows to have existed as of a certain date, it will be presumed to have continued 
until the contrary is shown. Furthermore, if a corporation ceases to do business; such fact 
does not raise a presumption of insolvency prior to the time of cessation of business; nor 
does the mere appointment of a receiver raise such a presumption. Similarly, an 
adjudication of bankruptcy has been held to raise no presumption of insolvency prior to 
the filing of the petition seeking such adjudication. 
The presumption in favor of solvency is to be considered III connection with the 
circumstances of the case and the object of the suit ... 
Generally, a person challenging a transfer of property has the burden of proving that the 
transferor was insolvent at the time of the conveyance ... 
15A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 7364 (2009) (internal foot notes and citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also discussed the factors used to determine the insolvency 
of a corporation: 
The cases very generally agree that a corporation is not insolvent within the meaning Of 
the rule which prevents a preference to directors merely because it cannot meet its 
obligations as they become due or because its assets are not equal to, or would not pay 
all, its liabilities, where it is still a going concern-that is, continuing its business with 
13 It is unknown whether shareholders approved the other 113,464 shares (which were redeemed in exchange for 
airplanes (including Reed's assumption of debt owed on planes) and other consideration. However, AlA Services 
was obligated to obtain all necessary consents, represented it had obtained all necessary consents and its counsel 
even provided Reed Taylor an opinion letter stating that all necessary approvals and consents had been obtained. 
14 See Affidavit of Paul Pederson dated April 9, 2009; Hearing, Ex. AM, p. 5. 
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some expectation and a reasonable prospect of being able to continue the corporate 
enterprise. 
LaVoy Supply Co., 84 Idaho at 126-27 (citing 13 Am.Jur., Corporations, § 1261) (emphasis 
added). 
1. The Burden Is On The Defendants and the Plan To Prove The 
Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares Caused AlA Services' Insolvency. 
The burden to prove insolvency rests upon the party asserting that a corporation is 
insolvent. See LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127,369 P.2d 45 (1962). 
Thus, the Defendants and Plan must carry the burden of proving that AlA Services was 
insolvent in 1995 or that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares made it insolvent in 1995 
through expert witness testimony. They have failed in their burden. 
2. The Defendants and Plan Are Estopped From Asserting Insolvency. 
The purpose of restricting a corporation's ability to redeem its own shares is to protect 
creditors and minority shareholders: 
So-called stock repurchase statutes are designed to protect creditors and minority 
stockholders from corporate mismanagement of assets ... 
A corporation and shareholders who develop an improper scheme to acquire the 
corporations' stock lack standing to raise, and are estopped from raising, the issue of 
insufficiency of the corporation's earned surplus ... 
See 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 663 (2008) (citing Minnelusa Co. v. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d l321 
(Colo. 1996); American Family Care, Inc. v. Irwin, 571 So.2d 1053 (Ala. 1990) (emphasis 
added». 
Here, even if the redemption rendered AlA Services insolvent, the Defendants and Plan 
are estopped from asserting insolvency because they participated in the scheme. 
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3. The Defendants Represented that AlA Services Was Not Insolvent In 
1995 By the Terms of the Redemption Agreements and Are Judicially 
Estopped From Now Asserting Otherwise. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes parties from taking inconsistent positions, 
whether legal or factual, absent newly discovered evidence or fraud. McKay v. Owens, 130 
Idaho 148, 155,937 P.2d 1222 (1997). The policies underlying judicial estoppel 
are general considerations of the orderly administration of justice and regard for 
the dignity of judicial proceedings ... Judicial estoppel is intended to protect 
against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts ... Because it is intended to 
protect the dignity of the judicial process, it is an equitable doctrine invoked by a 
court at its discretion. 
Id., 130 Idaho at 152, quoting Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343,94 F.3d 597, 601 
(9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). 
Here, the Defendants have all asserted in pleadings that AlA Services was not insolvent. 
The Defendants are judicially estopped from asserting insolvency. 
As the Court is well aware and as argued by the Defendants, AlA Services defaulted on 
its obligations to Reed Taylor in 1995 and 1996. In 1995 and 1996, Richard Riley was AlA 
Services' counsel who negotiated the redemption agreements, drafted the redemption 
agreements, issued of an opinion letter to Reed Taylor, and negotiated the restructure of the 
redemption agreements. Mr. Riley, obviously quite persuasively, argued that appraisals 
conducted by AlA Services confirmed that the value of AlA Services' exceeded all of its debts 
(including the over $7 Million owed to Reed Taylor) by over $2.5 million on December 31, 
1995.15 It is noteworthy that neither AlA Services nor its counsel has provided this appraisal to 
15 See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12,2009, Ex. 30, p. 3. 
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Reed Taylor for obvious reasons. In addition, Mr. Riley also provided Reed Taylor an opinion 
letter stating that the transaction was legal and AlA Services had the authority and power to enter 
. h d' 16 mto t e re emptIOn agreements. 
Nevertheless, the valuation of AlA Services alleged by it in 1996 and Mr. Riley's opinion 
letter dated August 15, 1995, create issues of fact that denying the partial summary judgment 
requested by the Defendants and the Plan. 17 
4. On December 31, 1995, AlA Services' Appraised Value Exceeded Its 
Liabilities to Creditors and Its Obligations To Reed Taylor By Over $2.5 
Million and Over $4 Million As Of December 31, 1996. 
In order to determine the insolvency of a corporation pertaining to a stock redemption, 
the court must determine the financial status of the corporation on the date of the redemption. 
LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 125,369 P.2d 45 (1962). The burden is on the party 
asserting insolvency. Id. 
In LaVoy Supply Co., the trial court concluded that that the corporation was insolvent on 
the date of the redemption agreement after considering evidence from audits performed by each 
party's accountant. Id. at 125 (although the issue of whether future creditors have standing was 
also addressed, which they don't). 
However, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the factors used to determine the 
insolvency of a corporation: 
III 
16 See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9,2008, Ex. I; Statement of Facts, , 
17 Mr. Riley's individual knowledge was expressly included in the opinion letter, even though the opinion letter was 
issued by Eberle Berlin. Id It is also noteworthy that Mr. Riley is also a factual witness and his knowledge is 
imputed on all of the attorneys at Hawley Troxell and his opinions and factual statements are counter to the very 
arguments being asserted by Hawley Troxell on behalf ofthe Defendants. 
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The cases very generally agree that a corporation is not insolvent within the meaning of 
the rule which prevents a preference to directors merely because it cannot meet its 
obligations as they become due or because its assets are not equal to, or would not pay 
all, its liabilities, where it is still a going concern-that is, continuing its business with 
some expectation and a reasonable prospect of being able to continue the corporate 
enterprise. 
LaVoy Supply Co., 84 Idaho at 126-27 (citing l3 Am.Jur., Corporations, § 1261) (emphasis 
added). 
The insolvency principal set forth in LaVoy Supply IS sound, particularly when 
determining the insolvency of a corporation for purposes of determining whether a stock 
repurchase scheme orchestrated by the Defendants in this action violates I.C. § 30_1_6.18 
On July 1, 1996, Richard Riley, attorney for AlA Services, specifically discussed the 
value of AlA Services in 1995 when he was attempting to persuade Reed Taylor to not exercise 
his contractual rights to retain the collateral when AlA Services defaulted in 1996: 
As your client [Reed Taylor] is aware, the value of the Pledged Collateral [the collateral 
granted to Reed Taylor for the redemption of his shares] greatly exceeds the obligations 
owed to him by AlA. This value is evidenced by the annual appraisals of the 
Company ... The preliminary appraisal value of the Company as of December 31, 1995, 
net of all liabilities including the Company's obligations to Mr. Taylor, exceeds $2.5 
million. The principal component of this value is the value of the Company's subsidiary, 
AlA Insurance, Inc. Information supporting the long-term value of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
in substantial excess of amounts due Mr. Taylor. .. AIA has a material interest in ensuring 
that the Pledged Collateral is sold for its fair market value so that the Company's equity 
in its operating subsidiaries is preserved. 19 
Regardless of the approach utilized by the Court to determine insolvency, the Defendants have 
18 The insolvency test for determining a corporation's ability to repurchase its own shares and the principals behind 
such a test has no application to the insolvency test pertaining to creditors. Defrauding creditors constitutes 
defrauding creditors, which is precisely what has transpired in this case to the detriment of Reed Taylor. Moreover, 
the Defendants have intentionally paid Reed Taylor less than AlA Services was able and in the process unlawfully 
diverted funds which should have been paid to Reed Taylor to others. The Defendants have breached their fiduciary 
duties owed to Reed Taylor. In fact, Paul Pederson testified in his affidavit that it is quite plausible that Reed Taylor 
would have been paid in full but for the acts ofthe Defendants. See Affidavit of Paul Pederson dated April 9, 2009.· 
19 See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12, 2009, Ex. 30, p. 3 (emphasis added). 
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failed to provide any credible evidence as to the financial status of AlA Services on July 22, 
1995, or any other date. Moreover, the Defendants are estopped from now asserting that AlA 
Services was insolvent, when they argued that the assets exceeded all debts (including Reed's 
debt) by over $2.5 Million on December 31, 1995.20 
5. In 1995, AlA Services Was Not Insolvent Under the I.e. § 30-1-2(n). 
The definition of "insolvent" under I.C. § 30-1-2 is the "inability of a corporation to pay 
its debts as they become due." See I.e. § 30-1-2(n) (1995). 
Here, AlA Services has paid its debts over the past 13 years with the exception of its 
obligations to Reed Taylor.21 In fact, AlA Services has produced over $3.5 Million in earnings 
over and above all payments made to Reed Taylor and all inappropriate deductions and use of 
assets and funds for CropUSA and other entities to the determinant of Reed Taylor.22 The only 
person who has been prejudiced in this action has been Reed Taylor, and the Defendants' 
intentional failure to pay the obligations owed to Reed Taylor. 
6. Even though The Defendants Themselves Raise An Issue of Fact Which 
Precludes the Court from Making a Finding of Insolvency, The Court's 
Analysis Should Continue Because Reed Taylor Is Entitled to Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
Although issue of facts raised by the Defendants preclude granting their motion for 
partial summary judgment, the Court's analysis must not stop here as Reed Taylor is entitled to 
partial summary judgment barring the Defendants and the Plan from attacking the redemption of 
20 Id.; Statement of Facts, , RR. 
21 Reed Taylor has maintained, and still maintains, that AlA Services became insolvent in 2001 as a result of the 
unlawful actions and mismanagement of the Defendants. 
22 The fact that AlA Services was not insolvent for purposes of I.e. § 30-1-6 has no application to the future 
insolvency which resulted in harm to Reed Taylor. Significantly, Reed Taylor is also an innocent creditor who has 
been harmed. 
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his shares for the reasons set forth below. 
Moreover, even if the Court does not grant partial summary judgment in favor of Reed 
Taylor, then he is still entitled to immediate possession of the collateraL See La Voy Supply Co. 
v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 369 P.2d 45 (1962) (while the trial court initially restrained the creditor 
from selling pledged assets in light of allegations of an illegal corporate act, the court later 
permitted the creditor to sell the pledged assets even though at trial the court held the transaction 
was illegal). 
7. The Defendants and the Plan Have Failed to Provide Any Credible 
Evidence As to the Insolvency of AlA Services on July 22, 1995. 
As explained above, the burden is on the Defendants and the Plan to prove insolvency, 
not Reed Taylor to prove solvency. The Defendants and Plan have failed to submit any credible 
evidence as to the financial status of AlA Services on July 22, 1995, the only date in question. 
Instead, the Defendants utilize mathematical estimations to "guess" at what the number would 
have been on July 22, 1995, without looking at the accounting journal entries and work papers. 
They have failed to meet their burden. 
8. Reed Taylor Has Been the Only Creditor Not Timely Paid. 
As noted above, the intent of stock redemption statutes is to protect innocent creditors 
and minority shareholders who have not knowledge of an improper redemption or timely oppose 
an improper redemption. 
Here, Reed Taylor is the only creditor who was owed money on July 22, 1995, and is till 
owed money today. Paul Pederson testified that he was unable to find any creditors who were 
owed money on July 22, 1995, who have not been paid. The Defendants and Plan's arguments 
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make no logical sense. Under their theory, the can intentionally not pay a creditor and, 
consequently, ask a court to rule a redemption was illegal (while waiting 13 years to do so) and 
only after siphoning off millions of dollars that could have satisfied the obligations to the 
creditor. The alleged "illegality" in this case is a misapplication of I.C. § 30-1-6 and is against 
bl ' l' 23 pu IC po ICy. 
E. The Defendants and the Plan Are Not Intended Beneficiaries ofI.C. § 30-1-6. 
"Stock redemption statutes are designed to protect creditors and minority stockholders 
from corporate mismanagement of assets." See The Minnelusa Company v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 
929 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Col. 1996) (citing Naples Awning & Glass, Inc. v. Cirou, 358 So.2d 211, 
213 (Fla. 1978)); Lewis v. Powell, 203 So.2d 504, 506 (Fla. 1967); American Family Care, Int:. 
v. Irwin, 571 So.2d 1053, 1060 (Ala. 1990); Hawkins v. Mall, Inc., 444 S.W. 2d 369, 386 (Mo. 
1969); see also In re Reliable Manufacturing Corporation, 703 F .2d 996, 1001 (7th Cir. 
1983)(The purpose of stock redemption statutes is to protect creditors); Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 
F.3d 657, 675 (5th Cir. 1997) ("LivingWell...was insolvent when the assumed redemption 
occurred ... The issue, however, is whether LivingWell redeemed the stock to defraud creditors.") 
(emphasis added); see also 40-APR Advocate (Idaho) 24 (1997) (by Richard Riley) ("The 
current statute imposes legal capital requirements which were originally intended to protect 
creditors and senior security holders ... "); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 824 (2008) ("The purpose of 
a statute prohibiting a corporation from redeeming its own shares .. .is to protect creditors ... "); 
18A Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 458 (2008) (" ... neither existing creditors nor its later creditors 
23 See 27 A Am.Jur.2d Equity § 99 (2008) (Relief in equity may be obtained where there is an inequality of position 
between the wrongdoers, or where public policy dictates such, despite the doctrine of equal fault")(citing Choquette 
v. Isacoff, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 1,836 N.E.2d 329 (2005). 
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can complain."). 
Moreover, only creditors who were owed money on the date of the transaction have 
standing to challenge a transaction, while future creditors get the corporation as they find is and 
lack standing to challenge any past transactions. LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127, 
369 P.2d 45 (1962) 
Idaho has also construed statutes to only benefit the intended beneficiaries. See e.g., 
Willis v. Realty Country, Inc., 121 Idaho 312, 316-17, 824 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding 
that extending anti-deficiency statute protection to others is for the Legislature to decide). 
Here, none of the defendants in this action and none of the shareholders in AlA Services 
are intended beneficiaries of the stock redemption statute, specifically, I.e. § 30-1-6. They all 
took part in the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, they all had knowledge of the terms of the 
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, and they all are precisely the parties that stock redemption 
d · d 24 statutes are not eSlgne to protect. 
Had the Idaho Legislature intended I.C. § 30-1-6 to be extended to parties who acquiesce 
or engineer stock redemption that later turn sour, the Legislature would have made such a 
provision in I.C. § 30-1-6, but the Legislature didn't. Nowhere in I.C. § 30-1-6 did the 
Legislature state that persons behind an allegedly illegal redemption were entitled to wait 13 
years and then attack the redemption as if they were innocent shareholders. Thus, the 
24 Under the Defendants' theory, they could simply sit back and wait 13 years to see whether or not AlA Services 
ever when public before acting. If AlA Services went public and they made millions, then they would happily pay 
Reed Taylor off and go on their merry way. However, if things didn't work out, such as what has happened in this 
case, then they can siphon off millions of dollars to other corporations and then demand that the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares be held illegal because they have been unable to timely pay Reed Taylor. The Defendants' 
arguments are not only a misapplication of the applicable law, but they are disingenuous arguments. Or, in the 
alternative, the Defendants could mismanage the business and misappropriate assets (which they have done) and 
then assert that it was illegal to redeem Reed Taylor's shares some 13 years later to avoid liability for their actions. 
Such a position is preposterous. 
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Defendants are not intended beneficiaries of I.C. § 30-1-6. However, the Legislature did intend 
to bar actions against stockholders and directors to three years, thereby preventing the precise 
argument now being asserted by the Defendants. 
1. James and Corrine Beck Are Not Intended Beneficiaries. 
James and Corrine Beck did not become shareholders in AlA Services until August 15, 
1995, after the July 22, 1995, date of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. See Affidavit of 
Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. G. Moreover, James and Corrine Beck conditioned the 
purchase of their shares on the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares on terms that were 
"satisfactory" to them. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9,2008, Ex. E, p. 10, § d. Then, 
to make matters even worse, James and Corrine Beck unlawfully converted their Series C 
Preferred Shares in AlA Services to common share in CropUSA, an entity that was wrongfully 
spun off from AlA Services. See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12,2009, Ex. 26. 
J ames and Corrine Beck are not only the type of parties that stock redemption statutes are 
not intended to benefit from redemption statutes, but they are the type of parties that I.C. § 30-1-
46 requires to return their CropUSA shares to AlA Services. They are not intended beneficiaries 
of I.C. § 30-1-6. 
2. Connie Taylor and John Taylor Are Not Intended Beneficiaries. 
John Taylor was intimately involved in the negotiation and redemption of Reed Taylor's 
shares. As the Court is well aware, John Taylor executed all of the redemption documents and 
restructure documents on behalf of AlA Services. See Hearing, Ex. A-F, Z, and AA-AD. 
Moreover, John and Connie Taylor received a direct benefit from the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares in that they obtained "operational and financial control" of AlA Services and 
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transitioned from minority shareholders to majority shareholders. See Affidavit Roderick Bon? 
dated September 3, 2008, Ex. 45. John and Connie Taylor are not intended beneficiaries of I.C. 
§ 30-1-6. They have no right to attack the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares.25 
3. Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos Are Not Intended Beneficiaries. 
Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos have never been shareholders of AlA Services. See 
Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12,2009, Ex. 20-22. They are not creditors of AlA 
Services. Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos are not intended beneficiaries of I.C. § 30-1-6. 
They have no right to attack the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. 
4. AlA Services and AlA Insurance Are Not Intended Beneficiaries. 
AlA Services and AlA Insurance were involved in the redemption and are not innocent 
shareholders or innocent creditors. See e.g., LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127,369 
P .2d 45 (1962)("A corporation itself cannot have a stock repurchase agreement declared illegal, 
nor can creditors who are not injured have a right to complain."). AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance are also not intended beneficiaries of I.C. § 30-1-6. They have no right to attack the 
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares under Idaho law. Moreover, Richard Riley and Eberle 
Berlin provided Reed Taylor a direct opinion letter that represented AlA Services had the 
authority to enter into the redemption agreements, had obtained the necessary shareholder 
2S "Either the husband or the wife shall have the right to manage and control the community property, and may bind 
the community property by contract..." I.C. § 32-912. Moreover, " ... it has been flatly held that any defense 
applicable against a husband in an action for the protection of the community property is similarly applicable against 
the wife." Yokochi v. Yoshimoto, 44 Haw. 297, 353 P.2d 820, 825 (Haw. 1960). This same authority applies to 
every argument against Connie Taylor, as her and John Taylor were married until 2005 and AlA Services' shares 
were held in John Taylor's name, and to Corrine Beck and James Beck. This footnote is incorporated by reference 
into every argument pertaining to John Taylor and Connie Taylor and James Beck and Corrine Beck (or any other 
shareholder). 
REED TAYLOR'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO 
CONNIE TAYLOR AND JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE DEFENDANTS AND PLAN'S JOINDERS - 22 
approval, and that the redemption agreements did not violate any laws.26 
5. The Plan Is Not An Intended Beneficiary. 
Like all of the other Defendants, the Plan is not an intended beneficiary of I.C. § 30-1-6. 
The Plan was not owed any money at the time of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and the 
Plan was not a shareholder of AlA Services until after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares .. 
6. Reed Taylor Is An Intended Beneficiary. 
Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed in 1995 by the request of the very Defendants in 
this action seeking to invalidate the redemption agreements. In the years following the 
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, the Defendants declared unlawful dividends, redeemed 
other common shares, and misappropriated millions of dollars in funds and assets belonging to 
AlA Services and its Subsidiaries. Reed Taylor is the intended beneficiary of I.C. § 30-1-6. 
F. The Defendants Do Not Have Standing To Attack the Redemption of Reed 
Taylor's Shares. 
The majority of jurisdictions, including Idaho, prohibit corporations from using stock 
repurchase statutes to void stock repurchase agreements. The Minnelusa Company v. A. G. 
A ndrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Col. 1996) (citing American Family Care v. Irwin, 571 
So.2d 1053, 1060 (Ala. 1990); Rainford v. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252, 451 P.2d 769, 771 n. 5 (Utah 
1969); LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127,369 P.2d 45 (1962)("A corporation itself 
cannot have a stock repurchase agreement declared illegal. .. "); Triumph Smokes, Inc. v. Sarlo, 
482 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1972) (emphasis added»; see also 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 663 
(2008). 
26 See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. L 
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So-called stock repurchase statutes are designed to protect creditors and minority 
stockholders from corporate mismanagement of assets ... 
A corporation and shareholders who develop an improper scheme to acquire the 
corporations' stock lack standing to raise, and are estopped from raising, the issue of 
insufficiency of the corporation's earned surplus ... 
See 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 663 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
In The Minnelusa Company, the Colorado Supreme Court explained the purposes of 
stock redemption statutes in an En Bane decision: 
We agree with the majority view [including Idaho] that the validity of a corporate stock 
repurchase may be attacked only by persons who are injured or prejudiced thereby and 
not by the corporation itself. Allowing corporations to void these transactions through the 
application of a statute designed to protect creditors and minority shareholders would, in 
effect, sanction corporate development of improper repurchasing schemes. Such a resuit 
is a misapplication of the statute and circumvents its intended purpose. For this reason, 
we hold that Minnelusa many not use the Florida stock repurchase statute to void its 
obligations under the stock repurchase agreement. 
The Minnelusa Company v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321, 1324-25 (Col. 1996) (internal 
citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Swafford v. Berry, 382 P.2d 999, 1002 (Colo. 
1963) ("a shareholder who, with knowledge of the material facts, has consented or acquiesced in 
the transaction of which he complains ordinarily cannot attack the transaction on behalf of the 
corporation"). 
A shareholder may not commence or maintain a derivative proceeding unless the 
shareholder "[w]as a shareholder ofthe corporation at the time of the act or omission complained 
of..." See I.C. § 30-1-741. 
The United States Supreme Court first adopted the contemporaneous ownership rule in 
1974, under the contemporaneous ownership rule: 
III 
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a stockholder bringing suit after acquiring his shares has sustained no injury because he 
received what he paid for ... to permit such an action would result in a windfall to the 
subsequent stockholder. .. permitting such an action would allow the stockholder to reap a 
profit from wrongs done to others, thus furthering such speculation. 
Ettridge v. TSIGroup, Inc., 314 Md. 32, 548 A.2d 813, 817 (Md. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Bangor 
Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2578,2583 
(1974)) (emphasis added). The other applicable principal holds: 
that those who acquired their shares from one who participated or acquiesced in the 
allegedly wrongful transactions, is not only grounded in the same consideration as the 
[contemporaneous ownership rule], but also in the equitable doctrine of unclean hands ... 
Id. at 817 -818 (emphasis added). 
The contemporaneous ownership rule and the rationale behind its application is also 
discussed in Federal Practice and Procedure: 
raJ plaintiff cannot complain of acts occurring prior to the time he or she became a 
shareholder, but only of acts occurring after becoming a shareholder. .. 
A primary purpose of the contemporaneous ownership requirement is to curtail strike 
suits by prohibiting potential plaintiffs from buying into a lawsuit through the purchase of 
shares of stock in a corporation after an alleged wrong has occurred ... 
See 10 Fed. Pro., L.Ed. § 25:74 (2008). 
The Defendants and the Plan are all attacking the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares a~d 
are asking the Court to find that the redemption agreements violated statutes and were illegal. 
They also argue that the money and assets already paid to Reed Taylor should be returned to 
AlA Services. The individual Defendants and the Plan are seeking derivative relief, i.e., asking 
the Court to rule the redemption was illegal and require Reed Taylor to pay back the money. 
However, as discussed below, they have no standing to attack the redemption of Reed Taylor's 
shares. 
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1. James Beck and Corrine Beck Purchased Their Preferred C Share After 
The Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares. 
James Beck and Corrine Beck purchased their Preferred C Shares in ALA Services after 
Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed on August 16, 1995.27 Not only were they not shareholders 
at the time Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed, but they conditioned their purchase of shares o!l 
Reed Taylor's shares being redeemed.28 However, although the Becks later acquired common 
shares in ALA Services through unlawful means, they acquired their common shares in ALA 
Services over 5 years after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares with full knowledge of the 
terms of the redemption transaction. Moreover, the Preferred C Shares that they initially 
purchased were unlawfully transferred to CropUSA wherein the Becks became significant 
common shareholders of CropUSA, and then had knowledge of the scheme to unlawfully 
transfer over $1.5 Million to CropUSA in an alleged stock purchase. 
Thus, James Beck and Corrine Beck were not shareholders at the time of the redemption 
of Reed Taylor's shares and they have no standing to attack the redemption of his shares. 
2. JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman Have Never Been Shareholders and 
Have Never Had Standing. 
Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos are not shareholders of ALA Services and have never 
been shareholders of ALA Services. The only shares that Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos own 
are in Crop USA-the same corporation that they served as board members and the same 
corporation that has been the recipient of millions of dollars of ALA Services assets, funds, labor 
and trade secrets. 
27 See Affidavit of Michael BisseIl dated February 26, 2009, Ex. 39-40 and 57. 
28 See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9,2008, Ex. E, p. 10, § d.; Ex. G; Statement of Facts, ~ R. 
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Bryan Freeman and J oLee Duclos do not have standing to attack the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares.29 
3. John Taylor and Connie Taylor Were Involved In the Transaction and 
Have Unclean Hands. 
Shareholders who participate in a questionable transaction have unclean hands and may 
not later attack it. See e.g., Ettridge v. TSI Group, Inc., 314 Md. 32, 548 A.2d 813, 817 (Md. Ct. 
App. 1988) (citing Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 
711,94 S.Ct. 2578, 2583 (1974)). 
John Taylor and Connie Taylor are the only persons who were actually shareholders at 
the time of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. However, John Taylor (and Connie Taylor 
through their community property) negotiated and executed the redemption agreements on behalf 
of AlA Services?O Their hands are unclean, they were behind the transaction, they used the 
redemption to gain "operational and financial control" of AlA Services and its subsidiaries, and 
they are barred under equity from attacking the redemption.31 Moreover, Connie Taylor is not 
even listed as a shareholder and her interest is simply of a community property nature. 
4. AlA Services and AlA Insurance Lack Standing Because a Corporation 
May Not Attack a Stock Redemption Agreement. 
AlA Services and AlA Insurance have no standing to attack the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares.32 LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127, 369 P.2d 45 (1962)("A 
corporation itself cannot have a stock repurchase agreement declared illegaL."). 
29 See Statement of Facts, ~ BB. 
30 They are estopped from asserting any defenses, particularly insolvency. 
31 See doctrine of unclean had discussed above as it pertains to shareholder transactions. 
32 Counsel for Reed Taylor has consistently objected to AlA Services and AlA Insurance's actions asserting the 
defense of violation of a statute and illegality. Reed Taylor is not permitting AlA Services and AlA Insurance to 
assert these defenses by acquiescence or any other waiver. 
REED TAYLOR'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO 
CONNIE TAYLOR AND JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE DEFENDANTS AND PLAN'S JOINDERS - 27 
5. James Beck, Corrine Beck, JoLee Duclos, and Bryan Freeman Also Lack 
Standing Under the Contemporaneous Ownership Rule. 
James Beck and Corrine Beck did not become shareholders in AlA Services on August 
15, 1995, which was after the date Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed on July 22,1995.33 They 
have no standing under any scenario. 
JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman were not shareholders of AlA Services when Reed 
Taylor's shares were redeemed and they have never been shareholders of AlA Services.34 They 
have no standing under any scenario. 
6. The Plan Does Not Have Standing To Attack the Redemption of Reed 
Taylor's Shares. 
The Plan acquired its shares in AlA Services in 1996 and 1997, well after the redemption 
of Reed Taylor's shares on July 22, 1995.35 The Plan has no standing. 
G. The Defendants and Plan Are Barred From Attacking The Redemption Of 
Reed Taylor's Shares Because They Have Acquiesced for 13 Years. 
"Stock redemption statutes are designed to protect creditors and minority stockholders 
from corporate mismanagement of assets." See The Minnelusa Company v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 
929 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Col. 1996) (citing Naples Awning & Glass, Inc. v. Cirou, 358 So.2d 211, 
213 (Fla. 1978)); Lewis v. Powell, 203 So.2d 504, 506 (Fla. 1967); American Family Care, Inc. 
v. Irwin, 571 So.2d 1053, 1060 (Ala. 1990); Hawkins v. Mall, Inc., 444 S.W. 2d 369, 386 (Mo. 
1969); State v. Helen Shop, Inc., 211 Tenn. 107, 362 S.W.2d 787 (1962); see also 40-APR 
Advocate (Idaho) 24 (1997) (by Richard Riley) ("The current statute imposes legal capital 
33 As noted above, James Beck conditioned the purchase of his Preferred C Shares on the requirement that Reed 
Taylor's shares be redeemed under terms "satisfactory" to him. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, 
Ex. F, p. 10, § d; Statement of Facts, ~ R. 
34 See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12,2009, Ex. 20; Statement of Facts, ~ BB. 
35 See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 5,2009, Ex. A-B. 
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requirements which were originally intended to protect creditors and senior security holders ... "); 
19 C.J.S. Corporations § 824 (2008) ("The purpose of a statute prohibiting a corporation from 
redeeming its own shares of capital stock when its capital is or would become impaired is to 
protect creditors ... "). A stockholder who acquiesces or consents to a questionable transaction 
may not thereafter attack the transaction. The Minnelusa Company v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 
P.2d 1321, 1323 (Col. 1996). 
In The Minnelusa Company, the Colorado Supreme Court explained the purposes of 
stock redemption statutes: 
Similarly, Gower [a shareholder] raises the Florida stock repurchase statute as a defense 
to his obligations under the promissory notes. A shareholder who is fully aware of, and 
consents to, a questionable transaction may not thereafter attack that transaction by 
requesting it be declared illegal.. . Gower [a shareholder] is not an intended beneficiary of 
the Florida stock repurchase statute, we hold that Gower [a shareholder] may not use the 
Florida stock repurchase statute to relieve him of his personal guarantee on the 
promissory notes. 
The Minnelusa Company, 929 P.2d 1321, 1324-25 (Col. 1996) (internal citations omittedi6 
(emphasis added); see also Swafford v. Berry, 382 P.2d 999, 1002 (Colo. 1963) ("a shareholder 
who, with knowledge of the material facts, has consented or acquiesced in the transaction of 
which he complains ordinarily cannot attack the transaction on behalf of the corporation"). 
Here, the similarities between the Defendants' assertion of the illegality defense and The 
Minnelusa Company are almost identical, except that the Defendants in this action are requesting 
the transaction be rescinded some 13 years after the fact. 37 Shareholders who approved and/or 
acquiesced in the redemption of Reed's shares are now attempting to attack the redemption to 
36 Significantly, Minnelusa declined to follow any of the key cases cited by the Defendants and the Plan. 
37 The undersigned was unable to find a single case where a court went back 13 years to undo a stock redemption 
transaction, regardless of how "illegal" the transaction may have been. This does not even take into consideration 
that there are no innocent creditors or shareholders. 
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relieve themselves of their "personal guarantee," i.e., the significant claims against them for 
fraud, breach of fiduciary duties and other claims pertaining to their acts of corporate 
malfeasance in transferring millions of dollars of AlA's cash and assets to CropUSA and the 
individual defendants. However, the Defendants are barred from asserting violations of I.C. § 
30-1-6, I.C. § 30-1-46, and illegality as defenses or counterclaims, regardless of the merit of such 
arguments. 
1. John Taylor and Connie Taylor Have Acquiesced in the Redemption of 
Reed Taylor's Shares for 13 Years and May Not Attack the Transaction 
John Taylor and Connie Taylor were shareholders (through John Taylor) before, during 
and after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. John Taylor had more knowledge of the books 
and records of AlA Services Corporation and its financial status than any other party. John 
Taylor and Connie Taylor not only acquiesced in the redemption of Reed Taylor'S shares, they 
were one of the driving forces behind the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. John Taylor 
approved, consented and acquiesced in the redemption and so too did Connie Taylor by way of 
her community property interest in the shares. Moreover, John Taylor and Connie Taylor are the 
largest shareholder of CropUSA, a corporation unlawfully spun off from AIA.38 They not only 
acquiesced, but their hands are unclean. They are barred from attacking the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares. 
2. Even if James Beck and Corrine Beck Had Been Shareholders at the 
Time Reed Taylor's Shares Were Redeemed, They Acquiesced for 13 
Years and May Not Attack the Transaction 
Although the Becks did not become shareholders until after Reed Taylor's shares wer'e 
38 See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12, 2009, Ex. 26. 
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8431 
redeemed and they required the redemption as a condition precedent to investing in AlA 
Services, they too have acquiesced for over 13 years. James Beck was a board member of AlA 
Services from 1995 through part of 2001. Corrine Beck has the imputed knowledge of James 
Beck for her acquiescence. James Beck and Corrine Beck are barred from attacking the 
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. 
3. Even if JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman Were Shareholders at the Time 
Reed Taylor's Shares Were Redeemed, They Have Acquiesced for 13 
Years and May Not Attack the Transaction 
JoLee Duclos attending board meetings, typed letters to shareholders pertaining to the 
terms of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and drafted board meeting minutes. JoLee 
Duclos assisted John Taylor in unlawfully transferring over $1.5 Million of funds from AlA 
Insurance to CropUSA. Both Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos were employees at AlA 
Services from the time Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed through the time they became 
employees of CropUSA. In fact, the only shares they own are in CropUSA, which such shares 
were unlawfully acquired. Thus, even if they were ever shareholders, Bryan Freeman and JoLee 
Duclos are both barred from attacking the redemption of Reed Taylor'S shares. 
4. AlA Services and AlA Insurance Have Acquiesced in the Redemption of 
Reed Taylor'S Shares for 13 Years and May Not Attack the Transaction;· 
Although AlA Services and AlA Insurance do not have standing to attack the redemption 
In the first place under any possible scenario, both corporations have acquiesced in the 
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and both corporations have acquiesced in the transaction for 
13 years. ALA Services and AlA Insurance are barred from attacking the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares. 
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5. The Plan Has Acquiesced in the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares for 
Over 12 Years. 
The Plan acquired shares in AlA Services in 1996 and 1997-after Reed Taylor's shares 
were redeemed. Even so, the Plan failed to complain or challenge the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares. The Plan, like the other Defendants, has acquiesced in the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares. 
H. The Statute of Limitations Bars The Defendants From Asserting Their 
Counterclaim and Declaratory Judgment Action. 
There is a difference between a claim and a defense, a "claim" seeks affirmative relief, 
where a "defense" seeks to diminish or defeat relief sought by a claim. Idaho Dept. of Labor v. 
Sunset Marts, Inc., 140 Idaho 207, 208,91 P.3d 1111 (2004). 
Here, Connie Taylor and James Beck are the only parties with a counterclaim against 
Reed Taylor pertaining to the "illegality" of the redemption of his shares.39 
1. Connie Taylor and James Beck's Counterclaim Is Barred By the Statue 
of Limitations. 
The statute of limitations applies to claims pertaining to illegal corporate acts. See e.g., 
In re Lake Country Investments, LLC v. Noyes, 255 B.R. 588, 602 (Idaho Dist. Ct. 2000) 
(discussing the application of the statute of limitations for actions against shareholders and board 
members, but holding that it did not apply because recording a mortgage was insufficient notice). 
Actions against directors and stockholders of a corporation are governed by the three year 
statute oflimitations set forth in I.C. § 5-237, while actions for other relief are governed by the 
39 The Plan has asserted no claims against Reed Taylor. lfthe Plan were to do so, it too is barred under the statute of 
limitations. Moreover, Reed Taylor has no claims against the Plan and no other party to this action has any claims 
against the Plan. Thus, the Plan should be dismissed from the action as previously requested by Reed Taylor 
pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(6). Reed Taylor's Motion to Dismiss the Plan has not been filed but not heard. 
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four year statute oflimitations set forth in I.C. § 5-224. Specifically, I.C. § 5-237 provides: 
This chapter does not affect actions against directors or stockholders of a corporation to 
recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed, or to enforce a liability created by law; but such 
actions must be brought within three (3) years after the discovery by the aggrieved party 
of the facts upon which the penalty or forfeiture attached, or the liability was created. 
I.C. § 5-237 (emphasis added). In addition, I.C. § 5-224 provides: 
An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for must be commenced within four (4) 
years after the cause of action shall have accrued. 
I.C. § 5-224 (emphasis added). 
The pertinent code section applicable to the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares is I.C. § 
30_1_6.40 This Section is unchanged in 1996. See I.C. § 30-1-6 (1996). 
Idaho Code has a savings provision that require the provision in place as of the date of the 
transaction to govern transactions occurring prior to the repeal of the Idaho Business 
Corporations Act: 
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the repeal of a statute by this 
chapter does not affect: 
* * * 
(c) Any violation of the statute, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred 
because of the violation, before its repeal. . 
See I.C. § 30-1-1703 (emphasis added). 
Here, it is undisputed that Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed and canceled in 1995.41 
It is undisputed that Reed Taylor became a secured creditor of AlA Services on July 22, 1995. 
Id. It is undisputed that in 1995 and thereafter R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck and 
Corrine Beck had full knowledge of the details of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares in 
40 Connie Taylor and James Beck previously relied upon I.C. § 30-1-46 as the authority for their Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment filed in April 2008, however, they now concede that I.C. § 30-1-6 is the proper Code Section. 
41 See Hearing, Ex. A, Z and AA-AD; Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. H. 
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1995. It is undisputed that the 1996 restructuring did not increase the amount of debt issued for 
Reed Taylor's shares or result in the cancelation of any further shares, and the $6 million 
promissory note remained unchanged.42 Thus, any claims and defenses regarding attacking the 
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares accrued in 1995, and the statute of limitations ran in 1999 at 
the latest under any possible scenario. 
Likewise, the statute of limitations for any modification of the agreements would have 
accrued in 1996 and ran in no later than 2000. Even if AlA Services was insolvent at the time 
Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck are barred 
from asserting any counterclaims or defenses against Reed Taylor. 
Accordingly, partial summary judgment is appropriate and warranted, and the Court 
should dismiss the Defendants' Counterclaims and request for Declaratory Judgment pertaining 
to the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares violating I.C. § 30_1_6.43 
2. The Defendants and The Plan Are Barred By the Statute of Limitations 
From Attacking the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares. 
The statute of limitations ran years ago for any violations of I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995), I.C. § 
30-1-6 (1996), I.C. § 30-1-46 (1995) and I.C. § 30-1-46 (1996). Under any applicable statute of 
limitation, the Defendants are barred from asserting counterclaims or defenses based upon the 
violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 or I.C. § 30-1-46. This argument would hold true regardless of 
whether the claims accrued on the redemption date of July 22, 1995, whether the claims accrued 
42 See Hearing, Ex. A-F. 
43 The statute of limitations does not necessarily bar AlA Services or AlA Insurance from asserting a compulsory 
defense or claim based upon a violation of I.e. § 30-1-6; however, as noted above, the corporations do not have 
standing the attack the redemption in the first place and, therefore, the issue is moot. See e.g., The Minnelusa 
Company v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Col. 1996) (citing LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 
120, 127, 369 P.2d 45 (l962)("A corporation itself cannot have a stock repurchase agreement declared illegal, nor 
can creditors who are not injured have a right to complain.")) 
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on the date AlA Services executed the $6 Million Promissory Note on August 1, 1995, or 
whether the date the redemption agreements were restructured and amended on July 1, 1996. 
Under any possible date, the statute oflimitation has ran at the very latest on July 1,2000.44 See 
I.e. § 5-237; I.C. § 5-224. The Defendants and the Plan are barred under the statute of 
limitations. 
I. Assuming AlA Services Was Insolvent or Had Insufficient Surplus, the 
Defendants and Other Shareholders May Not Attack the Redemption Because 
They Developed An Improper Scheme To Acquire Reed Taylor's Shares. 
It is impermissible for a corporation and shareholders to develop a stock redemption 
scheme and then later assert insolvency as a defense: 
A corporation and shareholders who develop an improper scheme to acquire the 
corporations' stock lack standing to raise, and are estopped from raising, the issue of 
insufficiency of the corporation's earned surplus. A shareholder who personally 
guarantees promissory notes issued to effectuate a stock repurchase is precluded from 
asserting a statute prohibiting insolvent corporations from repurchasing their own stock 
in order to void his or her obligations. 
See 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 663 (2008) (citing Minnelusa Co. v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 
1321 (Colo. 1996); American Family Care, Inc. v. Irwin, 571 So.2d 1053 (Ala. 1990) (internal 
footnotes omitted) (emphasis added». 
Here, the Defendants have failed to submit any admissible evidence that Reed Taylor did 
anything inappropriate. Reed Taylor agreed to sell his shares back to AlA Services at the request 
of the Defendants. Instead of paying Reed Taylor as required, the Defendants decided to 
unlawfully transfer and utilize millions of dollars of AlA Services funds and assets to the benef~t 
of the Defendants and to the detriment of Reed Taylor. Thus, assuming AlA Services was 
44 Nevertheless, the July 1, 1996, restructure date has no application because Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed 
on July 22, 1995, and he became a creditor after his shares were redeemed. See Hearing, Ex. A-E, Z, and AA-AD; 
Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. H. 
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insolvent, the Defendants are barred from utilizing an improper share buyback scheme to raid the 
coffers of AlA Services and void its obligations to Reed Taylor in order for the individual 
defendants to avoid liability for their unlawful acts. 
J. Assuming AlA Services Was Insolvent or Had Insufficient Surplus, the 
Defendants, Plan and AlA Services Are Not Entitled to Any Relief Becaus'e 
AlA Services Released Reed Taylor and Agreed to Indemnify and Hold Him 
Harmless. 
Releases bar parties from asserting claims for claims which have accrued through the 
date of the release: 
[nn the absence of fraud in obtaining such general release, [a release] will be sustained, 
even though the parties did not have in mind the alleged wrongs complained of. ., 
Heath v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 89 Idaho 490, 495-96,406 P.2d 341 (1965) (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
1. AlA Services Released Reed Taylor From All Claims On July 1, 1996. 
On July 1, 1996 (the date the redemption agreements were signed), AlA Services entered 
into a mutual release with Reed Taylor as a portion of the consideration for the Stock 
Redemption Restructure Agreement: 
III 
III 
Each of Companies and Creditor hereby releases the other from any and all claims 
(whether known or unknown, anticipated or unanticipated, contingent or liquidated) such 
party may have arising out of the previous agreements (including, without limitation, the 
Original Documents) or other business arrangement between Company and Creditor or 
arising out of Creditor's ownership of or employment by Company prior to the date of 
this Agreement. 45 
45 See Hearing, Ex. B, p. 6, § 3 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, AlA Services released Reed Taylor from any and all claims accruing through July 1, 1996. 
The released claims would include any violations of any law or code through July 1, 2006.46 
This release applies to the claims and defenses being asserted by the Defendants in this action 
because the Defendants are all asserting derivative claims for the voiding of the redemption of 
Reed Taylor'S shares. 
2. AlA Services Released Reed Taylor on August 15, 1995 and Agreed to 
Hold Reed Taylor Harmless. 
When Reed Taylor agreed to sell his shares to AlA Services, the corporation agreed to 
indemnify him and hold him harmless.47 This indemnification was later promised through a 
separate and distinct document.48 
On August 16, 1995, AlA Services agreed to release, indemnify and hold Reed Taylor 
harmless in a separate and distinct document: 
Reed 1. Taylor is hereby fully and forever released, discharged and indemnified by the 
Company from all claims, causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs expenses, 
fees, compensation, liabilities and other obligations to the Company or any of its 
Subsidiaries of whatever kind or nature now possessed by or which may hereafter accrue 
to the Company or any of its Subsidiaries, on account of or arising out of any agreement 
with or any act or omission by Mr. Taylor at any time prior to the date hereof. .. 49 
Thus, AlA Services and AlA Insurance released Reed Taylor and agreed to indemnify him on 
August 15, 1995, over two weeks after the $6 Million Promissory Note was signed and over 
three weeks after the redemption agreements and $1.5 Million Promissory Note were signed.50 
Indemnification includes all damages incurred by Reed Taylor or damages Reed Taylor would 
46 See Hearing, Ex. B, p. 6, § 3. 
47 See Hearing, Ex. Z, p. 11, § 6.1. 
48 See Hearing, Ex. AC. 
49 See Hearing, Ex. AC, pp. 1-2, ~ U) (emphasis added). 
so See Hearing, Ex. A, Z, and AA-AD. 
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be forced to pay others. 
3. AlA Services Would Be Required to Return All Funds Recovered to Reed 
Taylor Under Either the Release Provision or the Indemnification 
Agreement. 
Because AlA Services is required to indemnify and hold Reed Taylor harmless from any 
claims that accrued up to and after August 15, 1995, and again released Reed Taylor from all 
claims on July 1, 1996, the defenses and counterclaims asserted by the Defendants are futile and 
moot.51 All damages would simply be required to be returned to Reed Taylor, along with any 
lost security interests, lost payments, attorneys' fees, costs and any other expense.52 
K. AlA Services' Insolvency or Surplus Is Irrelevant Because Reed Taylor 
Became A Secured Creditor. 
There is an exception to the general rule that a corporation cannot purchase its stock 
when insolvent: 
An exception to the rule [that a corporation cannot redeem its own shares when insolvent 
or be required to make payment when insolvent] exists when security interests are given 
to secure payment, as the rights of the sell to the proceeds of the property given as 
security vest when the security interest is given and cannot be voided by resort to the 
general rule ... The same result was also reached under a statute providing that a 
corporation which has purchased its own shares out of surplus may defer payment, the 
obligation so created constitutes an ordinary debt, and the validity of any payment made 
on the debt is not affected by the absence of surplus at the time of payment. 
See 18B Am. JUL 2d Corporations § 1785 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Here, Reed Taylor transitioned from being a shareholder of AlA Services to a secured 
creditor on July 22, 1995.53 Because Reed Taylor became a secured creditor, with security 
interests in all revenues and stock in AlA Services' subsidiaries, the statutory requirements are 
51 See Hearing, Ex. AC, pp. 1-2, ~ 0); Hearing, Ex. B, p. 6, § 3. 
52 See State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 91 P.3d 1127 (2004)(moot); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 579, 582 
(6th Cir. 1982) (futile). 
53 See Statement of Facts, ~ L. 
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not relevant. 
(2008): 
L. The "Illegality" Standard. 
The principals of justice and equity are nicely illustrated in 30A C.J.S. Equity § 96 
Equity courts are not bound by strict common law rules, and, further, they have the 
power, where necessary, to pierce rigid statutory rules to prevent injustice. They possess 
broad powers and should exercise them so as to do substantial justice. 
Id (internal footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Contracts made between competent persons should not be set aside lightly on public 
policy grounds. Smith v. Idaho Hospital Services, Inc., 89 Idaho 449,504,406 P.2d 696 (1965). 
Each case wherein it is contended that a contract is void as against public policy must necessarily 
depend upon its own facts and circumstances, and analogous cases involving the same principals 
may be looked to by the court in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion. Id. 
Even so, the rule that an agreement in violation of a statute is illegal and void is not 
inflexible or inexorable. Not all contracts in violation of the provisions of a statute are 
void or necessarily void. Generally, although a contract is in violation of a statute, it will 
not be declared void unless such was the intention of the legislature. 
A contract made to further any matter or thing prohibited by statute is void. Thus,a 
contract for an object prohibited by a penal law is void. 
17 A Am. Jur.2d Contracts § 229 (2008) (internal foot notes and citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
Whether a contract is against public policy is a question of law for the court to determine 
from all of the facts and circumstances of each case; public policy may be found and set forth in 
statutes, judicial decisions or the constitution. Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 567, 944 P.2d 
695 (1997). Under Idaho law, a contract is not necessarily illegal simply because the contract 
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violates a statute. See Williams v. Continental Lift & Accident Company, 100 Idaho 71, 73-74, 
593 P.2d 708 (1979). 
Here, entering into a stock redemption agreement is not a prohibited act under I.C. § 30-
1-6 or a violation of an Idaho penal code or criminal ordinance. It follows that the only parties 
who may attack the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares as the transaction pertains to a violation 
of I.C. § 30-1-6 are innocent creditors and innocent shareholders, all of whom must not wait 13 
years to come forward. The redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was not illegal, even assuming 
all of the Defendants' allegations are true. 
1. The Burden Is Upon the Defendants and the Plan To Prove that the 
Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares Was Illegal. 
A contract is presumed to be valid and enforceable and proving that a contract is illegal 
rests upon the party asserting illegality: 
The presumption ordinarily is in favor or legality of a contract, and the burden of proving 
illegality, not apparent on the face of the contract, is on the party asserting it. 
A contract is presumed to be valid and enforceable. Accordingly, where the illegality of 
a contract is not apparent from its face, the burden of proof is on the party asserting it. 
The presumption is in favor of legality, and that the parties intended to make a lawful 
agreement. There is no presumption that the parties intended to make an illegal contract. 
Similarly, illegal action under the terms of the contract will not be presumed. If an 
agreement which does not provide for a method of accomplishing its purpose can be 
accomplished by any legal method, it must be assumed that such method was 
contemplated when the contract was made and will be pursued. 
In the application of the foregoing rules, the burden is on the party asserting that a 
contract is invalid as in contravention of public policy ... or the compounding of crime. 
The courts should focus on whether a contract could have been performed without 
anyone acting contrary to the public welfare. 
See 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 706 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
"The defendant, likewise, has the ultimate burden of establishing any defense based upon 
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a contention that the consideration for a negotiable instrument was illegal." See 12 Am. Jur. 2d 
Bills and Notes § 663 (2008). 
Here, the Defendants and Plan have not met their burden of proving that the redemption 
of Reed Taylor's shares was illegal. 
2. Even if the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares Violated I.C. § 30-1-6, 
the Redemption Agreements Should Be Enforced Because I.e. § 30-1-6 
Does Not Declare An Agreement Void that Violates I.e. § 30-1-6. 
A contract may not be illegal if the applicable statute does not declare the contract void 
upon a violation of the statute. See Williams v. Continental Life & Accident Company, 100 Idaho 
71, 73-74, 593 P .2d 708 (1979). Treatises have also embraced the principal that a contract that 
violates a statute is not necessarily an illegal contract: 
In general, unless an agreement necessarily contemplates violating a statute, it is 
enforceable, and if it is later performed in a way that involves some slight violation Of 
law, not seriously injurious to the public order, the person performing may recover. The 
principal stated more broadly: 
Where a bargain does not in terms necessarily involve a violation of law, the fact 
the plaintiff performs it in a way not allowed by law, does not preclude recovery, 
if not seriously injurious to the public order. 
See 8 Williston on Contracts § 19:51 (4th ed.) (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphaSIS 
added). 
In Williams, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention that the 
agreement was illegal: 
Inasmuch as there is no statute declaring the [insurance] policies in this case void, it 
seems only fair and just that the foregoing principals be applied and that appellant be held 
estopped from asserting the illegality of its bargained for [insurance] policies. 
See Williams, 100 Idaho 71, 74 (emphasis added). 
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Here, John and Connie Taylor are both licenses attorneys in Idaho and were licensed 
attorneys when Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed. 54 Moreover, John Taylor obtained a 
college degree in accounting and at one time was a C.P.A.55 Finally, John Taylor was in charge 
of AlA Services' finances, while Reed Taylor worked outside the office in sales.56 As such, the 
Defendants had an unfair advantage over Reed Taylor and, if the Court believes the redemption 
was illegal, they are more guilty parties and the agreements should be enforced. 
3. A Stock Redemption Agreement Is Not An Illegal Contract. 
Stock redemption agreements are not illegal contracts. I.C. § 30-1-6. Contracts made 
between competent persons should not be set aside lightly on public policy grounds. Smith v. 
Idaho Hospital Services, Inc., 89 Idaho 449, 504, 406 P.2d 696 (1965). "Whether a contract is 
illegal is a question of law for the court to determine from all of the facts and circumstances of 
each case." Farrell v. Whiteman, WL 198516 *2 (2009) (citing Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 
56 P.3d 765 (2002)). "Since the consequences of a court finding a contract to be illegal are 
harsh, only those contracts which involve consideration that is expressly prohibited by the 
relevant prohibitory statute are void." Id.; Maudlin v. Pacific Decision Sciences Corporation, 
137 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1017,40 Cal.Rptr.3d 724, 735 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (entering into a 
redemption agreement is not illegal nor are making payments under a redemption agreement 
illegal). 
Here, a corporation redeeming shares in not a per se violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 (such as 
conducting business as an unlicensed architect as in Farrell). Making payments under a valid 
S4 See Statement of Facts, ~ A. 
s5Id. 
S6 See Statement of Facts, ~ B. 
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and enforceable redemption agreement when it is proven that a corporation was insolvent could 
be a violation ofLC. § 30-1-6, but it is not an illegal contract. 
4. Even If the Court Were to Find that AlA Services Was Insolvent As 
Contemplated by I.e. § 30-1-2, The Pari Delicto Rule Is Inapplicable to 
the Facts in This Case And The Redemption Agreements Should Be 
Enforced. 
Even if a contract is found to be illegal, it may still be enforced by the less guilty party: 
Where the parties are not in pari delicto, or equally guilty, as to an illegal element ofa 
contract and where there are elements of public policy more outraged by the conduct of 
one than ofthe other, then relief in equity may be granted to the less guilty party. 
17 A C.J.S. Contracts § 282 (2008) (emphasis added); see also 17 A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 315 
(2008); Maudlin v. Pacific Decision Sciences Corporation, 137 Cal.AppAth 1001, 1017, 40 
Cal.Rptr.3d 724, 735 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); see also I.e. § 30-1-6 (1995). 
In Maudlin, the California Court of Appeals relied upon the holding from the California 
Supreme Court in Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp., 63 Ca1.2d 199, 45 Cal.Rptr. 878, 404 P.2d 486 
(1965): 
[T]he courts should not be so enamored with the Latin phrase 'in pari delicto' that they 
blindly extend the rule to every case where illegality appears somewhere in the 
transaction. The fundamental purpose of the rule must always be kept in mind, and the 
realities of the situation must be considered. Where, by applying the rule, the public 
cannot be protected because the transaction has been completed, where no serious moral 
turpitude is involved, where the defendant is the one guilty of the greatest moral fault, 
and where to apply the rule will be to permit the defendant to be unjustly enriched at the 
expense of the plaintiff, the rule should not be applied. 
Id. at 732 (quoting Tri-Q at pp. 218-29) (emphasis added). 
Here, even if the Court finds that AlA Services has insufficient surplus to redeem Reed 
Taylor's shares or that the redemption rendered AlA Services insolvent, the redemption 
agreements should be enforced because Reed Taylor is by far the least guilty party. Indeed, John 
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Taylor and Connie Taylor were attorneys and John Taylor was in charge of all financial aspects 
of AlA Services, while Reed Taylor was in the field selling insurance.57 AIA Services' 
attorneys, Eberle Berlin, approved the redemption agreements' representations that the 
transaction was legal and also provided an opinion letter to Reed Taylor representing the 
agreements were legal. Because there are no creditors with standing to complain and Reed 
Taylor is the least guilty party, Reed Taylor should be permitted to exercise all of his contractual 
rights. 
5. It Would Be Inequitable to Permit the Defendants to Purposely Not Pay 
Reed Taylor and Instead Siphon Off Millions of Dollars in Assets and 
Corporate Opportunities. 
When determining the illegality of an agreement, courts should balance competing public 
policies to determine the enforceability of an illegal transaction. Smith v. Idaho Hospital 
Service, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 990 P.2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Public policy would not be served to allow persons to unwind a stock transaction 13 
years after the fact. Public policy would not be served by permitting individuals to transfer 
millions of dollars out of a corporation, not pay a creditor, and then ask a court to rule that an 
agreement was illegal to avoid liability for extensive corporate malfeasance. Public policy 
would not be served by invalidating an agreement that is not per se illegal. Public policy would 
be best served by granting partial summary judgment in favor of Reed Taylor and stop the 
madness in this case. As demonstrated by the Affidavit of Paul Pederson, the Defendants have 
engaged in numerous inappropriate transactions that have diverted millions of dollars away from 
AlA Services to their benefit and to the detriment of Reed Taylor as the evidence shows he likely 
57 See Statement of Facts, ~'\I A-B. 
REED TAYLOR'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO 
CONNIE TAYLOR AND JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE DEFENDANTS AND PLAN'S JOINDERS 44 
could have been paid in ful1. 58 Public policy should not reward such conduct. 
6. Even If The Court Found That the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares 
Were Illegal, He Should Be Permitted To Recover Under Unjust 
Enrichment and Other Claims. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a party to an illegal contract may still recover in 
circumstances where denying a party relief would frustrate the pubic interest more than "leaving 
the parties where they lie" and that "barring the strict application of the illegality doctrine, the 
central focus must be whether the ends of the law will be furthered or defeated by granting the 
relief requested." Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 9, 56 P.3d 765 (2002); see also Farrell v. 
Whiteman, WL 198516 *5-6 (2009); Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. NW Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 
754, 767, 929 P.2d 627 (1999) (holding that quantum meruit and unjust enrichment are simply 
different measures of equitable recovery). 
Thus, Reed Taylor should still be permitted to recover from the defendants for their 
operational and financial control of AlA Services' over $65,000,000 in revenues from 1995 
through the present time. Of course, the foregoing amount excludes all of the other acts of 




58 See Affidavit of Paul Pederson dated April 9, 2009, ~~ 26 and 29. 
59 Should the Court find that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was iIIegal and elects not to enforce the 
redemption agreements, then Reed Taylor requests leave to amend and supplement his complaint pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 15(a)-(c) to include various new causes of action against the same defendants and others for quantum 
meruit, unjust enrichment, securities fraud, negligent issuance of an opinion letter, and other causes of action and 
relief. Thus, contrary to the Defendants' assertions, the alleged "iIIegality" is far from the "silver bullet" that the 
defendants would like the Court to believe. 
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7. Assuming the Court Finds Redemption Agreements Were Illegal 
Contracts, The Court Should Enforce The Redemption Agreements 
Based Upon The Necessary Balancing of Competing Public Policies. 
Contracts made between competent persons should not be set aside lightly on pUblic 
policy grounds. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 100 Idaho 883, 606 P .2d 987 (1980); Smith v. 
Idaho Hospital Services, Inc., 89 Idaho 449,504,406 P.2d 696 (1965). 
Here, it is not a violation to enter into a redemption agreement under I.C. § 30-1-6. It is 
not a violation of a criminal statute or code even if the redemption agreements had violated every 
provision set forth in I.C. § 30-1-6. There are no companion criminal codes for violating I.C. § 
30-1-6 and it does not hold that a contract made in violation results in a void contract. Based 
upon competing public policies, it would be unjust and inequitable for the Defendants to obtain 
control of AlA Services and its over $65 Million in revenues through 2005, siphon off millions 
of dollars of assets, convert assets in violation of security agreements and perfected security 
interests, and to avoid liability for the millions of dollars wrongfully transferred and substantial 
acts of corporate malfeasance. Finally, public policy would not be served by punishing Reed 
Taylor for the acts of others, particularly when he obtained an opinion letter from one of the 





60 See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9,2008, Ex. I. 
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M. Even If The Redemption Agreements Violated I.e. § 30-1-6 in 1995 and 1996, 
Reed Taylor Should Be Permitted to Enforce The Redemption Agreements 
Because I.e. § 30-1-640 Governs the Transaction After The Idaho Legislature 
Repealed I.e. § 30-1-6 in 1997. 
When Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed, the pertinent code section applicable to the 
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares is I.C. § 30_1_6.61 Idaho Code has a savings provision that 
require the provision in place as of the date of the transaction to govern transactions occurring 
prior to the repeal of the Idaho Business Corporations Act: 
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the repeal of a statute by this 
chapter does not affect: 
* * * 
(c) Any violation of the statute, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred 
because of the violation, before its repeal. 
See I.C. § 30-1-1703 (emphasis added). 
From 1997 to the present time, I.C. § 30-1-640 governs the redemption of shares and 
distributions made under any redemption agreement. See I. C. § 30-1-640. In 1997, the Idaho 
Legislature abandoned the earned surplus and capital surplus requirements when it adopted I.C. § 
30-1-640, the pertinent portion of which states: 
(3) No distribution may be made if, after giving effect: 
(a) The corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the 
usual course of business; or 
(b) The corporation's total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities 
plus, unless the articles of incorporation permit otherwise, the amount that would 
be needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved at the time of the distribution, 
to satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of the shareholders whose 
preferential rights are superior to those receiving the distribution. 
61 Connie Taylor and James Beck previously relied upon I.e. § 30-1-46 as the authority for their Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment filed in April 2008, however, they now concede that I.C. § 30-1-6 is the proper Code Section. 
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(4) The board of directors may base a determination that a distribution is not prohibited 
under subsection (3) of this section either on financial statements prepared on the basis of 
accounting practices and principles that are reasonable in the circumstances or on fair 
valuation or other method that is reasonable in the circumstances. 
(5) Except as provided in subsection (7) of this section, the effect of a distribution under 
subsection (3) of this section is measured: 
(a) In the case of distribution by purchase, redemption or other acquisition of the 
corporation's shares, as of the earlier of: 
(i) The date the money or other property is transferred or debt incurred by 
the corporation, or 
(ii) The date the shareholder ceases to be shareholder with respect to the 
acquired shares ... 
See I.C. § 30-1-640(3)-(5). 
Thus, even if the redemption agreements violated I.C. § 30-1-6 in 1995 and 1996, those 
payments have already been made. To the extent that any payments made after 1996 violate 
Idaho law, I.C. § 30-1-640 would be the controlling authority. Since earned surplus and capital 
surplus are not elements of determining the legality of a redemption under I.C. § 30-1-640, the 
fair-market-value of the assets on the date of the redemption would control, i.e., the value of the 
assets on July 22, 1995. As the Court is now well aware, appraisals conducted for AlA Services 
demonstrate millions of dollars over and above the amounts owed to Reed Taylor and he values 
AlA Services assets not listed on the financial statements at over $24,000,000 in 1995.62 
III 
III 
62 See Statement of Facts, "RR and UU. 
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N. Assuming the Redemption Agreements Violated I.C. 30-1-6, the Agreements 
Should Be Enforced Subordinated Only to Claims By General Creditors. 
Even if a redemption agreement rendered the corporation insolvent, the redemption 
agreements would remain valid and enforceable subject only to a subordinated position to 
general creditors with standing to complain. McConnell v. Estate of WH. Butler, 402 F.2d 362 
(9th Cir. 1968). 
Here, even if the Court finds that the redemption violated I.C. § 30-1-6 and/or was illega~, 
the redemption agreements should be enforced and Reed Taylor's claims should be subordinate 
only to claims by general creditors who were creditors in 1995 and who have not been paid. 
Significantly, however, no such creditors exist.63 Moreover, even if general creditors were owed 
money after the 1995 time frame with full knowledge of the redemption agreements and relate4 
security interests, then Reed Taylor should still be only subordinated to such claims and not 
eliminated as a creditor. Moreover, Paul Pederson testified that there is no evidence creditors 
who were owed obligations in 1995 have not been paid, other than Reed Taylor.64 
(2008): 
O. The Defendants and Plan Are Barred From Attacking the Redemption of Reed 
Taylor's Shares Based Upon Fraud, Estoppel, Unclean Hands, Laches, and 
Acquiescence. 
The principals of justice and equity are informatively discussed in 30A C.J.S. Equity § 96 
Equity courts are not bound by strict common law rules, and, further, they have the 
power, where necessary, to pierce rigid statutory rules to prevent injustice. They possess 
broad powers and should exercise them so as to do substantial justice. 
Id (internal footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
63 See Affidavit of Paul Pederson dated April 9, 2009, ~ 14. 
64 See Affidavit of Paul Pederson dated April 9, 2009, ~ 14. 
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Reed Taylor is the only innocent party and the only creditor affected by the acts and 
omissions of the Defendants. The Defendants should not be permitted to escape their significant 
acts of fraud and corporate malfeasance by asserting that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares 
was illegal because AlA Services had a significant negative shareholder equity balance. Such 
arguments are fundamentally unfair and violate the very reason this legal system was established, 
which is to prevent unjust and inequitable results. 
1. The Defendants and Plan Are Estopped From Attacking the Redemption 
of Reed Taylor's Shares. 
The legal defense of estoppel may be applied to stock redemption transactions: 
A corporation and shareholders who develop an improper scheme to acquire the 
corporations' stock lack standing to raise, and are estopped (rom raising, the issue of 
insufficiency of the corporation's earned surplus... . 
See 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 663 (2008) (citing Minneluse Co. v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 
l321 (Colo. 1996); American Family Care, Inc. v. Irwin, 571 So.2d 1053 (Ala. 1990) (emphasis 
added»; see also 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1745 (2008). 
Stock redemption statutes safeguard the rights of creditors and when no creditors have 
complained a corporation is estopped from denying the validity of the transaction. See e.g., 
Lanpar Company v. Stull, 405 S.W.2d 235,237 (Ct. App. Texas 1966). 
Here, the Defendants and Plan are estopped from attacking the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares. They are also estopped from asserting insolvency. They made representation of 
solvency to Reed Taylor as an inducement to have him agree to sell his shares. They are 
estopped. 
III 
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2. The Defendants and Plan Are Barred From Attacking the Redemption of 
Reed Taylor's Shares Based Upon Their Fraud and/or 
Misrepresentations. 
To successfully bring an action for fraud, a plaintiff must establish the existence of the 
following elements: 
(1) a statement or representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the 
speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the 
hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiabl.e 
reliance; and (9) resultant injury. 
Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007) (holding that misrepresentations 
and discrepancies in corporate financial statements precluded summary judgment in buyer's 
action for fraud). 
Idaho Courts have long recognized "constructive fraud" as an alternative cause of action 
to common law "fraud" and that "constructive fraud" does not require a plaintiff to plead the 
nine elements of common law "fraud." See e.g., McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367, 371, 353 
P.2d 760 (1960) (Recognizing constructive fraud as an alternative cause of action to fraud and 
that the requirement of pleading and proving all nine elements of fraud "is not the case"); 
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 61, 415 P.2d 698 (1966)(a promise to build a house to certain 
standards constitutes "constructive fraud" when the builder failed to do so). 
AlA Services and John Taylor made representations in all of the redemption agreements 
that the actions were authorized, legal and that all approvals had been obtained. 65 AlA Services, 
by and through John Taylor, also made numerous representations through an indemnification and 
65 See Statement of Facts, , Q. 
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release agreement dated August 16, 1995.66 Finally, AlA Services, by and through its attorney 
Richard Riley and Eberle Berlin, made representations to Reed Taylor through an opinion letter 
dated August 15, 1995.67 All of the representations contained in the foregoing documents were 
relied upon by Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor had a right to rely upon these representations and did 
in fact justifiably rely upon such representations. To the extent that Defendants and the Plan are 
successful with their arguments, the representations made to Reed Taylor were false and Reed 
Taylor has been damaged. 
3. The Defendants and Plan Are Barred From Attacking the Redemption of 
Reed Taylor's Shares Because Their Hands Are Unclean. 
Under the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, the court has the discretion to evaluate the 
relative conduct of both parties and to determine whether the party seeking equitable relief 
should in light of all the circumstances be precluded from such relief. Thomas v. Medical Center 
PhysiCians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 210, 61 P.3d 557 (2002). 
Shareholders who participate in a questionable transaction have unclean hands and may 
not later attack it. See e.g., Ettridge v. TSI Group, Inc., 314 Md. 32, 548 A.2d 813, 817 (Md. Ct. 
App. 1988) (citing Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 
711, 94 S.Ct. 2578,2583 (1974» (discussing the doctrine of unclean hand and its application to 
shareholder transactions as adopted by the United States Supreme Court). 
Shareholders who participate in a questionable transaction or acqmre shares with 
knowledge of a questionable transaction have unclean hands and may not later attack the 
transaction. See e.g., Ettridge v. TSI Group, Inc., 314 Md. 32, 548 A.2d 813, 817 (Md. Ct. App. 
66Id. at ~~ Q and V. 
67 Id. at~P. 
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1988) (citing Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 711, 
94 S.Ct. 2578, 2583 (1974) (discussing the doctrine of unclean hand and its application to 
questionable shareholder transactions as adopted by the United States Supreme Court)). 
Here, the Defendants and Plan's hands are unclean. They all were involved in the 
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. They all had intimate knowledge of the redemption of 
Reed Taylor's shares. The Plan, James Beck and Corrine Beck acquired their shares in AlA 
Services with specific knowledge of the terms of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and the 
reSUlting debt and security interests. They participated in the process in an attempt to take AlA 
Services public. They transferred millions of dollars from AlA Services to CropUSA and other 
. . d . 68 entItles an parties. Indeed, John Taylor was the trustee of the Plan who signed the 
subscription agreements to purchase the Series C Preferred Shares for the Plan. Then, the 
Defendants (including John Taylor and JoLee Duclos, the Co-Trustees of the Plan from 2001 
through 2008) elected to unlawfully transfer millions of dollars in assets and funds. The 
Defendants and Plan have no standing because their hands are not clean. 
4. Even If the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares Was Illegal, The 
Payment Terms Could Be Severed and The Court Should Order The 
Collateral Turned Over To Reed Taylor and That All Funds Exceeding 
the Cost of Operations Be Paid To Reed Taylor. 
Where a contractual transaction is composed of both benign and offensive components 
and the different portions are severable, the unobjectionable parts are generally enforced. 
Farrell v. Whiteman, 200 P.3d 1153 (Idaho 2009). 
III 
68 See Affidavit of Paul Pederson dated April 9, 2009, , 26. 
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This legal principal of severability was also specifically agreed upon by the parties in the 
various redemption agreements. See Hearing, Ex. Z, p. 16, § 9.6 ("The invalidity of all or any 
part of. .. this Agreement shall not render invalid the remainder of this Agreement ... "). 
Although this argument should not be applicable because the shareholders approved the 
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, severability would still prevent ruling that the redemption 
was illegal. 69 Because only payments made could be deemed the only illegal element of the 
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares during times in which AlA Services was unable to meet its 
obligations, then the Court could simply sever the required payments and order that payments be 
made from available funds only. This would also leave Reed Taylor to exercise his contractual 
rights to operate AlA Insurance and also prosecute claims against the Defendants for the millions 
of dollars unlawfully transferred out of AlA Services and AlA Insurance. 
5. The Defendants and Plan Are Barred Under the Doctrine of Laches From 
Attacking the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares. 
Laches is a type of equitable estoppel and may be applied in circumstances in which the 
trial court finds a lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted and the 
prejudice to the party asserting the defense. See Callenders, Inc. v. Beckman, 120 Idaho 169, 
174,814 P.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1991). Minority shareholders must act promptly and not wait an 
unreasonable amount of time when they are allegedly injured or their claims are barred by laches 
and acquiescence. See 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2001 (2008); 18B Am. Jur. 2d 
Corporations § 1745 (2008). 
III 
69 Based upon the documents that have been produced thus far, AlA Services' shareholders approved the redemption 
of 500,000 of Reed Taylor's shares for $7.5 million and the related security interests on March 7, 1995. See 
Affidavit ofJoLee Duclos notarized on February 11,2009, Ex. B-F. 
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Here, the Defendants and Plan have waited almost 13 years to attack the redemption of 
Reed Taylor's shares. Such a delay bars the Defendants and the Plan from attacking the 
redemption under the doctrine oflaches, regardless the merit of their claims. 
P. To The Extent that Shareholder Approval or Ratification Is at Issue, the 
Passage of 13 Years Constitutes Ratification. 
If shareholders waive formalities or acquiesce to a transfer made without ratification, 
they cannot later challenge the transfer and this rule also applies to minority shareholders. 
Philips Petroleum Co. v. Rock Creek Min. Co., 449 F.2d 664, 667-68 (9th Cir. 1971) (citing 19 
Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 1014) (emphasis added». 
"An affirmance of an unauthorized transaction can be inferred from a failure to repudiate 
it." See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 94 (2008). 
"Generally, a corporation which has received and retained the benefits and advantages of 
a contract or transaction may not raise the defense of ultra vires in order to escape its obligations 
under the contract." See 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 677 (2008). 
Thus, the Defendants and any other shareholders may not challenge the redemption of 
Reed Taylor's shares by asserting that proper shareholder or board approval was not obtained. 
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Q. The Defendants Are Judicially Estopped From Attacking the Redemption of 
Reed Taylor's Shares. 
1. AlA Services and AlA Insurance Are Judicially Estopped From 
Attacking the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes parties from taking inconsistent positions, 
whether legal or factual, absent newly discovered evidence or fraud. McKay v. Owens, 130 
Idaho 148, 155,937 P.2d 1222 (1997). The policies underlying judicial estoppel 
are general considerations of the orderly administration of justice and regard for 
the dignity of judicial proceedings ... Judicial estoppel is intended to protect 
against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts ... Because it is intended to 
protect the dignity of the judicial process, it is an equitable doctrine invoked by a 
court at its discretion. 
Id., 130 Idaho at 152, quoting Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343,94 F.3d 597, 601 
(9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Put another way, one who has "taken a particular position 
deliberately in the course of litigation, must act consistently with it; one cannot play fast and 
loose." Id., 130 Idaho at 152 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The doctrine was adopted in 
Idaho in Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 93-94,277 P.2d 561 (1954), wherein the court stated: 
where a litigant, by means of such sworn statements, obtains a judgment, 
advantage or consideration from one party, he will not thereafter, by repudiating 
such allegations and by means of inconsistent and contrary allegations or 
testimony, be permitted to obtain a recovery or a right against another party, 
arising out of the same transaction or subject matter. 
Id. The doctrine was expanded and clarified in McKay, which stated "the concept of 
judicial estoppel takes into account not only what a party states under oath in open court, 
but also what that party knew, or should have known, at the time the original position was 
adopted." McKay, 130 Idaho at 155. 
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Here, AlA Services, through its attorneys, argued in its Memorandum In Support of 
Motion to Dismiss filed on May 22,2007, that Reed Taylor's unjust enrichment claim should be 
dismissed because "various agreements govern the rights of respective parties in this action, and 
a claim for unjust enrichment is, therefore, precluded.,,7o John Ashby signed the document, 
thereby verifying that it was well grounded in fact (LR.C.P.ll(a)(1», and binding his client to 
the assertions therein. Jaquith v. A. G. Stanger, 79 Idaho 49, 53, 310 P.2d 805 (1957) (client is 
bound by attorney's actions according to ordinary rules of agency). Connie Taylor, John Taylor, 
Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos joined in the motion, thereby adopting those assertions. 
Notably, this Court granted the motion.71 In addition, John Taylor, in an affidavit relied upon in 
opposition to Reed Taylor's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (which the Court denied), and in 
support of Defendant AlA Services' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (which the Court 
granted), affirmatively stated that "AlA Services Corporation is indebted to the plaintiff under 
the terms of a written agreement."n 
Based upon the foregoing, the above defendants are judicially estopped from asserting 
illegality as a defense. 
2. AlA Services, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee 
Duclos May Not Assert Illegality as A Defense Because They Admitted 
the Validity of the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares. 
The same facts outlined in the preceding section constitute judicial admissions by AlA. 
Services, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman and Jolee Duclos that AlA Services is 
70 AlA Services and AlA Insurance's Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss at p. 19, dated May 22,2007. 
71 Although the Court's stated reason for doing so was the failure of Reed to confer a benefit on Defendants, that 
should not make any difference. The point is that Defendants took a position in support of their motion, they were 
successful, and now, to suit the circumstances resulting from their motion, they are taking an opposite position. ' 
72 Affidavit of John Taylor dated February 28,2007, at 4J 4, 
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indebted to Reed Taylor, and they cannot now assert a contrary position. In other words, they 
cannot now claim that the subject agreements with Reed Taylor were illegal. 
"A judicial admission is a formal act or statement made by a party or attorney, in the 
course of judicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing with the need for 
proof by the opposing party of some fact." Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616,618, 930 P.2d 
1361 (Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added; citations omitted). "The party making a judicial 
admission is bound by the statement and may not controvert the statement on trial or appeal." 
Id., 129 Idaho at 619. 
(1967): 
Furthermore, as stated in McLean v. Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 783, 430 P.2d 670 
It is settled law in this state that a formal admission made by an attorney at trial is 
binding on his client as a solemn judicial admission .. .It is well recognized that a 
judicial admission, applied to the judicial proceedings in which it is made, limits 
the issues upon which the cause is to be tried and obviates the necessity for proof 
of facts within the ambit of a distinct and unequivocal admission or stipulation so 
made. 
Id (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Here, the subj ect defendants, through their attorneys and adoptive admissions, are bound 
by their statement that the redemption agreements at issue "govern the rights of the respective 
parties in this action." As such, they cannot now claim that there are no such agreements. 
R. The Cases Cited By The Defendants Are Either Inapplicable Or Not on Point. 
1. The Stock Redemption Cases Cited By the Defendants Are All 
Distinguishab Ie. 
Idaho law is well settled that only persons who have been injured may attack an allegedly 
illegal corporate act. See e.g., In re Lake Country Investments, 255 B.R. 588, (D. Idaho 2000); 
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LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127,369 P.2d 45 (1962). 
As discussed above, stock redemption statutes cannot be used as schemes to repurchase 
shares and the Defendants and Plan are not intended beneficiaries of I.C. § 30-1-6 or any other 
provision of Idaho Code. 
The following table is an analysis of the facts and legal issues in this case compared to 
the cases cited by the Defendants and cases cited by Reed Taylor: 
Approx. Who Security 
Case Time Until Attacked Interests 
Transaction Transaction Granted 
Attacked to Seller 
Reed Taylor v. AlA Services, 12 years - Shareholders Yes 
et aL 10 months Corporation 
The Minelusa v. Co. v. A. G. 2 years- Shareholders No 
Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321 11 months Corporation 
(Col. 1996) 
LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 2 years Creditor No 
84 Idaho 120 (1962) 
American Family Care v. 1-3 years?? Shareholders No 
Irwin, 571 So.2d 1053 (Ala. 
1990) 
Triumph Smokes v. Sarlo, 482 2 years?? Corporation No 
S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1972) 
Naples Awning & Glass, Inc. Not more Creditor Yes 
v. Cirou, 358 So.2d 211 (Fla. than 2Yz 
App.1978) years 
American Heritage Inv. Corp. 1 year Corporation No 
v. Illinois Nat. Bank of 6 months 
Springfield, 386 N.E.2d 905 
(Ill. App. 1979) 
Baird v. McDaniel Printing 7 months Officer No 
Co., 153 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn. Corporation 
App. 1941) 
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McGinley v. Massey, 525 A.2d 8 months Sellers of No Defendants 
1076 (Md. App. 1987) Stock 
In re Trimble, 339 F.2d 838 4 years- Creditors No Defendants 
(3rd Cir. 1964) 3 months 
Stevens v. Boyes Hot Springs ?? Creditors No Defendants 
Co., 298 P. 508 (Cal. App. 
1931) 
White v. Lorimer's City Dye ?? Shareholder No Defendants 
Works, 269 P. 90 (Idaho 1928) 
Brown v. T.R. Reed & Co., 174 2 years Yes Defendants 
P. 136 (Idaho 1918) 6 months 
2. Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc. Is an Example of an Illegal Contract Because It 
Violates a Criminal Ordinance and Idaho Code that Expressly Prohibits 
An Act. 
Connie Taylor and James Beck argue that if a violation of a criminal statute constitutes 
an illegal contract, then doing the lawful act of redeeming shares should also be illegal. 73 A 
contract that violates a criminal statute is far different than a legal and binding redemption 
agreement. See Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 612, 990 P.2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(holding that a contract that violates a regulatory criminal ordinance is illegal and unenforceable 
so that "citizens will have no incentive to knowingly enter into contracts in direct contravention 
of regulatory criminal ordinances."). 
3. Wheaton v. Ramsey Does Not Reject the Argument that Only An Intended 
Beneficiary Can Assert Illegality. 
Connie Taylor and James Beck argue that Idaho courts have declined to accept arguments 
pertaining to the intended beneficiary of a statute.74 But Connie Taylor and James Beck's 
73 See Connie Taylor and James Beck's Supplemental Memorandum, p. 29. 
74 See Connie Taylor and James Beck's Supplemental Memorandum, p. 30. 
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reliance on Wheaton v. Ramsey, 92 Idaho 33, 436 P.2d 248 (1968), is misplaced and not 
analogous to the present case. In Wheaton, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the violation ofa 
Montana real estate broker statute that states "[i]t is unlawful for any licensed broker to employ 
or compensate directly or indirectly any person ... who is not licensed ... " and that the contract was 
consequently illegal. Id. at 35 (emphasis added). 
However, as with the other Idaho cases cited by the Defendants, the facts and applicable 
code are not on point. Idaho, like most states, has strong public policy in requiring contractors, 
real estate brokers and other professionals to be licensed in order to be compensated. Wheaton is 
simply holding to this public policy tradition. I. C. § 30-1-6 does is state that it is "unlawful" or 
"illegal" for a corporation to redeem shares. I.C. § 30-1-6 does not state that certain acts are 
"prohibited" or "void" if they violate the code section. I.C. § 30-1-6 does not state that it is 
"unlawful" for a corporation to redeem shares and grant the selling shareholder a security interest 
in collateral owned by the corporation to secure payment. Rather, I.C. § 30-1-6 is a flexible code 
section that is intended to protect creditors and shareholders. Wheaton is not on point, not 
analogous, and inapplicable to the facts in this case. 
4. Farrell v. Whiteman Also Involves the Violation of a Criminal Ordinance, 
Is Inapplicable and Not On Point. 
Like other cases cited by the Defendants, the Defendants disingenuously argue that 
Farrell v. Whiteman, WL 198516 (Idaho 2009), is applicable, even though it involves a contract 
that violates a criminal ordinance. Id. Moreover, in Farrell, the applicable code section 
specifically states that it is "unlawful" to be an unlicensed architect in Idaho. Comparing the 
facts and Idaho Code in Farrell to the facts and Idaho Code in this case are not analogous. 
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Entering into a stock redemption agreement is not an illegal contract. 
S. The Defendants Have Not Pled a Violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 As An Affirmative 
Defense or As Authority for a Counterclaim. 
1. The Defendants Have Not Pled A Violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 As an 
Affirmative Defense and Are Barred From Asserting It Now. 
A party must plead affirmative defenses. I.R.C.P. 8(c). The failure to plead an 
affirmative defense is a waiver of the defense. Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 191 P.3d 1107, 
1111 (Ct. App. 2008). 
In Nguyen v. Bui, the Idaho Court of Appeals discussed the purpose of requiring a party 
to plead affirmative defenses: 
The purpose of this rule requiring that affirmative defenses be pleaded is to alert the 
parties about the issues of fact that will be tried and to afford them an opportunity to 
present evidence to meet those defenses. 
ld. The application of the requirement to plead an affirmative defense in context of a statute was 
specifically addressed by the Arizona Supreme Court: 
[I]f the defendants wish to base their defense on a particular statute, then that statute must 
be cited specifically in their answer in accordance with the rule that affirmative defenses 
must be pleaded specifically. 
Mohave County v. Mohave-Kingman Estates, Inc., 120 Ariz. 417, 586 P.2d 978, 984 (Ariz. 19n) 
(emphasis added). 
Here, all of the Defendants have failed to plead a violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 as an 
affirmative defense or as the basis for a counterclaim.75 In fact, Connie Taylor and James Beck 
admitted in their Memorandum filed on February 12, 2009, that their prior reliance on I.C. § 30-
75 See Answer of Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck dated April 16, 2008, pp. 10-13; Answ<;r 
of R. John Taylor dated February 25, 2008, pp. 15-17; AlA Services and AlA Insurance's First Amended Answer 
dated March 7, 2008, pp. 14-18; Answer of Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos filed on April 15,2008, pp. 15-18 
(Duclos and Freeman also incorrectly rely upon I.C. § 30-1-46 and fail to cite I.e. § 30-1-6). 
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1-46 was incorrect (they asserted a violation of I.C. § 30-1-46 as an affirmative defense and 
counterclaim). 76 The Defendants cannot raise a violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 because they have 
failed to plead the statute as a defense. 
The Defendants are barred from asserting a violation of I.e. § 30-1-6 as an affirmative 
defense in their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Joinders. 
2. Connie Taylor and James Beck Have Failed to Plead a Violation of I.C. § 
30-1-6 In Their Counterclaim Against Reed Taylor. 
"A cause of action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary 
judgment." O'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9,15,72 P.3d 849 (2003) (citations omitted). 
Here, Connie Taylor and James Beck have failed to alleged a violation ofI.C. § 30-1-6 as 
the basis of their counterclaim against Reed Taylor. Significantly, Connie Taylor and James 
Beck even freely admit that they relied upon the wrong code section in their counterclaim. They 
are barred from asserting a violation of I.e. § 30-1-6 in their Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. Their motion must be denied on this ground alone. Likewise, none of the other 
Defendants have a counterclaim based upon I.C. § 30-1-6. For the same reasons, they are also 
not entitled to counterclaim relief, i.e., affirmative relief. 
T. The Court Should Strike and Exclude The Entire Expert Affidavits Submitted 
By Kenneth Hooper and Drew Voth. 
A party has the right to object to evidence prior to such evidence being admitted by the 
trial court: 
III 
76 Connie Taylor and James Beck acknowledge that their reliance upon I.C. § 30-1-46 is misplaced, however, they 
failed to move to amend their Answer and Counterclaim as required by I.R.C.P. 15. Reed Taylor expressly objects 
to the Defendants asserting a violation ofI.C. § 30-1-6 as an affirmative defense. 
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The time for the trial court to rule on the admissibility of evidence is after the party 
against whom it is offered has had an opportunity to object ... [a] party must be given an 
opportunity specifically to object to the introduction of evidence and is entitled to a ruling 
thereon by the trial judge. 
Theesen v. Continental Life & Acc. Co., 90 Idaho 58,62,408 P.2d 177 (1965) (emphasis added). 
A trial court may exclude evidence offered by a party on its own authority without a motion to 
strike or an objection made by opposing counsel. Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co;, 
122 Idaho 778, 782-83, 839 P.2d 1192 (1992). 
1. Reed Taylor Moves To Strike and Exclude The Expert Witness Affidavit 
of Kenneth Hooper. 
The trial court has broad discretion to exclude certain evidence as sanctions or under 
other legal authority. See e.g., Clark v. Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 48 P.3d 672 (2002)(holding that the 
exclusion of physicians testimony for discovery violations was proper); Priest v. Landon, 135 
Idaho 898, 26 P.3d 1235 (2001)(holding that the exclusion of an expert witness was warranted 
for failure to comply with discovery deadlines). "[A]ny redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 
scandalous matter" may be stricken by the court. I.R.C.P. 12(f). A party seeking to exclude 
evidence must object "stating specific ground." I.R.E. 103(a)(1). 
Specifically, a trial court has the authority to exclude an expert witness that a party fails 
to timely disclose in accordance with a pretrial order, together with any report submitted by such 
expert. Priest v. Landon, 135 Idaho 898, 900-01, 26 P.3d 1235 (2001). In Priest v. Landon, the 
trial court excluded a party's expert witness when that party disclosed the name of the expert 
witness more than two months after the court-ordered deadline. Id. at 901. Moreover, the party 
failed to timely disclose the expert in responses to interrogatories. Id. 
III 
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Here, Reed Taylor objects to the expert witness Affidavit of Kenneth Hooper. Mr. 
Hooper's Affidavit and testimony should be excluded in full. Mr. Hooper's Affidavit is 
"scandalous." Connie Taylor and James Beck did not disclose Mr. Hooper as required by the 
Court's scheduling order. Moreover, Connie Taylor and James Beck have not responded to any 
requests for production or interrogatories submitted to them by Reed Taylor pertaining to expert 
witnesses, which such requests were served well over one year ago.77 78 
But the unfairness does not end with the above facts. James Beck specifically testified 
about his expert witnesses on February 4, 2009 (seven days before Mr. Hoover signed his 
Affidavit): 
Q. (By Mr. Bond): And have you retained any expert witnesses for this case? 
A. (By Mr. Beck): No.79 
Connie Taylor, a licensed attorney, also specifically testified about expert witnesses on February 
5, 2009 (six days before Mr. Hoover signed his Affidavit): 
Q. (By Mr. Bond): Can you tell me the names of your expert witnesses that you're 
relying upon in Reed Taylor v. AlA Services, et al.? 
A. (By Ms. Taylor): No, I cannot. 
Q. (By Mr. Bond): And have you hired an expert to reconstruct the value of AlA's 
assets an debts as of certain dates in 1995 or 1996? 
A. (By Ms. Taylor): Any expert? 
Q. (By Mr. Bond): Yes. 
77 See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 26,2009, p. 2, ~ 3. 
78 Reed Taylor would waive his objection to Mr. Hooper being named as an expert if he is permitted the opportunity 
and time to conduct full and fair discovery regarding Mr. Hooper, the documents provided to Mr. Hooper, the 
information provided to Mr. Hooper, communications with Mr. Hooper and, most importantly, provided the 
opportunity to depose Mr. Hooper. 
79 See Affidavit of Michael Bissell dated February 26,2009, Ex. 33, p. 534, II. 23-25 (emphasis added). 
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A. (By Ms. Taylor): Not to my knowledge. 
Q. (By Mr. Bond): And do you have any knowledge of whether [an expert] has been 
retained for that purpose, an expert? 
A. (By Ms. Taylor): I do not.so 
Accordingly, the Affidavit of Kenneth Hooper should be stricken and/or excluded as evidence 
and Reed Taylor should be awarded attorney fees and expert witness fees incurred in responding 
to the Affidavit pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(g). 
2. Reed Taylor Moves to Strike and Exclude the Expert Witness Affidavit of 
DrewVoth. 
"[A]ny ... scandalous matter" may be stricken by the court. LR.C.P. 12(f). A party seeking 
to exclude evidence must object "stating specific ground." LR.E. 103(a)(1). Idaho discovery 
rules require an expert witness and his opinions to be the subject of discovery. See I.R.C.P. 
Reed Taylor objects to the Court considering any portion of the Affidavit of Drew Voth. 
The Plan was permitted to intervene in this action on February 12, 2009. The Court's present 
discovery order has prevented Reed Taylor from propounding discovery or taking any 
depositions pertaining to the Plan's evidence and witnesses, including Mr. Voth. Moreover, the 
Plan has not provided any of the information or documents provide to Mr. Voth. 
3. Assuming the Affidavits of Hooper and Voth Were Properly Before the 
Court, Reed Taylor Objects to Portions of the Affidavits, and, 
Consequently, Moves to Strike the Objectionable Portions. 
In the context of summary judgment, affidavits must comply with LR.C.P. 56. See 
LR.C.P. 56(e). "[A]ny redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter" may be 
80 See Affidavit of Michael Bissell dated February 26,2009, Ex. 34, pp. 71, 74-76) (emphasis added); see also id., 
at. pp. 90,105-106. 
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stricken by the court. LR.C.P. 12(f). A party seeking to exclude evidence must object "stating 
specific ground." LR.E. 103(a)(1). Portions of affidavits which are argumentative, speculative, 
conclusory, inaccurate, unfounded, and/or unsupported should be stricken. Sprinkler Irrigation 
Company, Inc. v. John Deere Insurance Company, Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 697, 85 P.3d 667 (2004). 
Evidence must be relevant. LR.E. 402. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its ... outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues ... or by considerations 
of delay, waste of time, or needless ... cumulative evidence." LR.E. 403. Hearsay is not 
admissible evidence. LR.E. 802. Legal opinions and conclusions of law contained in an affidavit 
may not be considered and should be stricken. Tortes v. King County, 119 Wn. App. 1,12-14,84 
P.3d 252 (2003). Matters of law are the improper subject of an expert witness. Aguilar v. 
Longshoreman's Union Local No. 10,966 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1992). 
a. Reed Taylor Objects to Portions ofKennetlt Hooper's Affidavit. 
Assuming the Affidavit of Kenneth Hooper was properly before the Court, Reed Taylor 
objects to, and requests that the Court strike, the following portions of the Affidavit of Kenneth 
Hooper (incorporating the legal authority cited above into every objection): 
Paragraph Objections 
Entire Aff. 0 Scandalous and improper to permit an affidavit based upon evidence and/or 
documents not provided to the other party 
Entire Aff. 0 Mr. Hooper's testimony is not based upon the review and consideration of the 
supporting documents which are relied upon to draft the financial statements 
upon which his testimony relies 
Entire Aff. 0 Mr. Hooper bases his opinions on inappropriate assumptions 
Entire Aff. 0 Not based upon personal knowledge 
Entire Aff. 0 Expresses opinions beyond the scope of the documents reviewed 
Entire Aff. 0 Financial Statements relied upon are not properly authenticated by the auditor 
Entire Aff. 0 Affidavit does not comply with LR.C.P. 56(e) 
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b. Reed Taylor Objects to Portions of Drew Voth 's Affidavit. 
Assuming the Mr. Voth's Affidvit was properly before the Court, Reed Taylor objects to, 
and requests that the Court strike, the following portions of the Affidavit of Drew Voth 
(incorporating the legal authority cited above into every objection): 
Paragraph 
Entire Aff. • 
Entire Aff. • 
Entire Aff. • 
Page 7, ~ 6 .. 
Page 8, ~ 9 • 
Page 10, • 
~ 16 
Entire Aff. • 
Entire Aff. • 
Entire Aff. • 
Objections 
Scandalous and improper to submit an affidavit for another party and/or to 
allow an affidavit based upon documents and/or evidence not provided to 
another party 
Not based upon personal knowledge 
Mr. Voth's testimony is not based upon the review and consideration of the 
supporting documents which are relied upon to draft the financial statements 
upon which his testimony relies 
Opinion as to the "meaning" of terms used in the 1995 statute, including the 
term "Earned Surplus," is a legal opinion and as such is improper. 
Opinion that "Earned Surplus" is equivalent to "Retained Deficit" is based 
upon the expert's improper opinion as to the meaning of "Earned Surplus." 
Makes a legal opinion. 
Ultimate Opinion is predicated upon the expert's improper opinion as to the 
meaning of "Earned Surplus." Makes a legal opinion. 
Expresses opinions beyond the scope of the documents reviewed 
Financial Statements relied upon are not properly authenticated by the auditor 
Affidavit does not comply with LR.C.P. 56(e) 
4. Hooper and Voth's Affidavits Must Be Excluded Because They Did Not 
Attach All Documents Relied Upon to Their Affidavits as Required By 
I.R.C.P. 56(e) and No Discovery Has Been Permitted. 
"Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be 
attached thereto or served therewith." See LR.C.P. 56(e). 
Here, the documents relied upon in the Affidavits of Kenneth Hooper and Drew Voth 
were not attached to their respective Affidavits nor were such documents served with their 
respective Affidavits. Thus, the Affidavits of Drew Voth and Kenneth Hooper must be excluded 
pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(e) and the authority cited above since Reed Taylor has not been 
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permitted to conduct any discovery pertaining to these expert witnesses and the Affidavits are 
scandalous. 
5. The Affidavits of JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman Are Objectionable 
Because They Assert, Without Any Foundation or Evidence, that they 
Held Options in AlA Services Shares and Fail To Assert the Required 
Personal Knowledge. 
The Affidavits of J oLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman contain no foundation for their 
assertions that they owned stock options in AlA Services at one time. Furthermore, their 
Affidavits are not based upon personal knowledge as required by I.R.C.P. 56(e). As such, Reed 
Taylor objects to these Affidavits and requests that they be stricken and/or excluded as evidence 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
U. Even If The Court Grants Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, the Motion Has Been Brought Only As an Affirmative 
Defense. 
"An affirmative defense will defeat the plaintiffs claim if it is accepted by the district 
court or the jury." See 5 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.3d § 1270 (2008). 
The distinction between an affirmative defense and a counterclaim is significant: 
A counterclaim is a counter-demand or a cause of action that exists in favor of the 
defendant against the plaintiff and on which the defendant might have brought a separate 
action and recovered judgment. A counterclaim represents the defendant's right to have 
the claims of the parties counterbalanced, in whole or in part, and to have judgment 
entered for any excess. 
If established, a counterclaim will defeat or in some way qualify the judgment or relief to 
which the plaintiff is otherwise entitled .. .Indeed, a counterclaim presupposes affirmative 
relief and may be entitled to adjudication, even after the plaintiff has voluntarily dismiss 
his or her complaint. 
See 20 Am. JUL 2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, Etc. § 1 (2008) (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
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There is a difference between a claim and a defense, a "claim" seeks affirmative relief, 
where a "defense" seeks to diminish or defeat relief sought by a claim. Idaho Dept. of Labor v. 
Sunset Marts, Inc., 140 Idaho 207, 208, 91 P.3d 1111 (2004). 
Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is based upon an 
affirmative defenses.81 
Reed Taylor's causes of against Connie Taylor and James Beck pertain to claim 
derivative of the redemption agreements, i.e., fraud, conversion, breach of fiduciaries dutie:;, 
etc.82 Thus, even if Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion was granted, they would only 
avoid liability for Reed Taylor's direct causes of action which can be derived from the 
redemption agreements.83 Connie Taylor and James Beck would not be entitled to any further 
relief under their affirmative defenses.84 Moreover, Connie Taylor and James Beck would not be 
entitled to an order invalidating the redemption agreements as to all parties and would not be 
entitled to seek the return of any payments or other relief associated with a counterclaim. These 




81 See Connie Taylor and James Beck's Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
82 See Fifth Amended Complaint. 
83 In an abundance of caution, Reed Taylor has also filed a Motion to Amend and Supplement his Complaint to 
assert new claims and facts for fraud, unjust enrichment and securities fraud against the Defendants. 
84 Connie Taylor and James Beck's alleged Counterclaim pertaining to the '~illegality" of Reed Taylor's shares is not 
a compulsory counterclaim and therefore is time barred by the statute of limitations, as discussed in detail above. 
The same holds true for all of the individual Defendants and the Plan in this action. 
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V. The Defendants Have Not Contested and Have Not Disputed the Validitv of 
Eberle Berlin's Opinion Letter Or AlA Services and John Taylor's Written 
Representations to Reed Tavlor. 
Eberle Berlin's opinion letter represented to Reed Taylor that the transaction was legal, 
that the redemption agreements were enforceable by their terms.85 AlA Services and John 
Taylor made the same representations to Reed Taylor.86 Now, over 13 years have elapsed since 
Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed in 1995 and the Defendants are for the first time 
representing to the Court that they made false representations to Reed Taylor in 1995. These 
issues alone create genuine issues of material fact that preclude granting partial summary 
judgment to Connie Taylor and James Beck and place the burden squarely upon the Defendants 
to explain these misrepresentations. See LR.C.P. 56. 
W. The Court Should Enter Partial Summary Judgment In Favor of Reed Taylor. 
The court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the party has not 
filed its own motion with the court. Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d 612 
(2001). It is permissible for the trial court to strike affirmative defenses on a motion for 
summary judgment. Idaho Department of Labor v. Sunset Marts, Inc., 140 Idaho 207, 91 P.3d 
1111 (2004). 
Here, for all of the reasons set forth above, Reed Taylor requests that the Court enter 
partial summary judgment finding that all of the Defendants and the Plan are barred from 
attacking the redemption of his shares. 
III 
85 See Statement of Facts, ~ P. 
86 Id. at ~~ Q and V. 
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X. The Individual Defendants and the Plan Should Be Ordered To Pay Reed 
Taylor's Attorneys Fees and Costs Incurred in Defending Against Their 
Counterclaim and Defenses Pertaining to "Illegality" and This Motion. 
A court may award attorney fees to the party defending the derivative action, which 
includes derivative actions brought for improper purposes. See I.C. § 30-1-746(3). Similarly, 
the Defendants should be ordered to pay Reed Taylor's attorney fees and costs pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 37 for their intentional failure to comply with discovery requests despite numerous and 
repeated requests and discovery conferences. Moreover, fees and costs are warranted under 
I.R.C.P. 56(g) as the Affidavits of Drew Voth and Kenneth Hooper were submitted in bad faith 
and scandalously. 
As such, Reed Taylor requests that the Court award him all attorneys' fees and costs in 
defending against the alleged "illegality" arguments along with those fees and costs attributable 
to this Motion and the Joinders, including the hearing on this Motion. Finally, the Court should 
order each individual Defendant and the Plan jointly and severally liable for the attorneys' fees 
and costs incurred by Reed Taylor and bar them from having AlA Services or AlA Insurance pay 
the fees and costs. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons articulated above, the Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and dismiss Connie Taylor, Corrine Beck and James Beck's 
counterclaim. Moreover, the Court should deny Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and enter an order striking and/or dismissing their affirmative 
defenses based upon violations of I.C. § 30-1-6 and I.C. § 30-1-46 and any claims or defenses 
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?l/73 
based upon the alleged "illegality" of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares.s7 
For the same reason stated above, the Court should also enter identical orders denying the 
Defendants' Joinders to Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and granting partial summary judgment in favor of Reed Taylor. 
Reed Taylor should be awarded his attorneys' fees and costs incurred in dismissing the 
individual Defendants counterclaims and defenses (and the Plan's) pursuant to I.C. § 30-1-
746(3). 
DA TED: This 9th day of April, 2009. 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
By: __ ~~,----::. 
Roderick C. Bond 
Michael S. Bissell 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor 
87 For anyone or more of the reasons articulated above, partial summary judgment would be appropriately granted 
in favor of Reed Taylor against any party that is not presently involved in this action because there are no 
shareholders and no creditors who may attack the redemption of his shares, even if statutory requirements were not 
met. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick Bond; declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of (1) Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Connie Taylor and James 
Beck's Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, ALA 
Services, ALA Insurance, R. John Taylor and ALA Services 401(k) Plan's Joinders and in 
Support of Granting Partial Summary Judgment if Favor of Reed Taylor; (2) Amended an~ 
Restated Affidavit of Paul Pederson; (3) Affidavit of Reed Taylor; and (4) Affidavit of Roderick 
C. Bond on the following parties via the methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants JoLee Duclos and 
Bryan Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Attorney for R. John Taylor 
David R. Risley 
Randall, Blake & Cox 
1106 Idaho St. 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Attorney for Connie Taylor, James Beck and 
Corrine Beck 
Gary D. Babbitt 
D. John Ashby 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Attorneys for ALA Services, ALA Insurance, and 
Crop USA Insurance Agency 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) 
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James J. Gatziolis 
Charles E. Harper 
Quarles & Brady LLP 
Citigroup Center, 500 West Madison Street 
Suite 3700 
Chicago, IL 60661-2511 
Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance Agency 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Attorneys for AlA Services 401(k) Plan 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered - Via Messenger 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) 
Signed this 9th day of April, 2009, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
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Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208-746-9947 
208-746-5886 (fax) 
ISB # 2129 
CharlesABrown@cableone.net 
Attorney for Intervenor, 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan 
for the AlA Services Corporation. 
FI LED 
2003 ~R 1 S PM 3 3li 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 









AlA SERVICES CORP., an Idaho ) 
corporation; AIA INSURANCE INC., an Idaho) 
corporation, R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE ) 
TAYLOR, individually and the community ) 
property comprised thereof; BRYAN ) 
FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS,) 
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE ) 
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and ) 
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK, ) 
individually and the community property ) 





AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; and AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Counter-Claimants, 
INTERVENOR'S REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO CONNIE TAYLOR 
AND JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR PSJ AND REED TAYLOR'S 






Case No. CV 2007-00208 
INTERVENOR'S REPLY BRIEF TO 
PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 
OPPOSITION TO CONNIE TAYLOR 
AND JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR 
PSJ AND REED TAYLOR'S REQUEST 
FOR PSJ IN HIS FAVOR DATED 
APRIL 9, 2009 
6477 
Charles A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 1225/324 Main St 



















401(K) PROFIT SHARING PLAN FOR ) 




COMES NOW the Intervenor by and through its attorney of record, 
Charles A. Brown, and provides this reply brief to Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law in 
Opposition to Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against 
Bryan Freeman, JoLee Duclos, R. John Taylor, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and AIA Services 
40l(k) Plan's Joinders and in Support of Granting Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of 
Reed Taylor dated April 9, 2009, and all other supporting documents filed therewith. 
INTRODUCTION 
The complexities of this case have been distilled down to three issues: 
1. The standing of the 40 1 (k) Plan; 
2. Retained deficit as defined by I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995); OR 
3. Insolvency as defined by I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995). 
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THE STANDING OF THE 401(K) PLAN 
The Plaintiff spends a great deal of time attempting to argue his way around the fact 
that the contract(s) in question are unenforceable due to their illegality. But the case law in Idaho 
is consistent in this regard. 
However, neither of these doctrines applies in the case of a contract 
that violates the law. If a contract is illegal and void, the court will 
leave the parties as it finds them and refuse to enforce the contract. 
The contract cannot be treated as valid by invoking waiver or 
estoppel. Whitney v. Cant 'I Life & Accident Co., 89 Idaho 96, 105, 
403 P.2d 573, 579 (1965). Therefore, because the Agreement was 
illegal and violative of the Act, ISIF cannot rely on the doctrines of 
waiver and estoppel to enforce the Agreement against Wemecke. 
Absent limited circumstances not present here, this Court will not 
enforce an illegal contract, regardless of the fact that the parties 
knowingly entered into that contract. 
See Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 2009 WL 982690, *8 (Idaho) (emphasis 
added). 
The standing of the 401(k) Plan is unassailable. The uncontroverted affidavits, as 
they stand before this Court, have established that in March of 1996 AlA Services Corporation stock 
was transferred to the 40 1 (k) Plan in the amount of$565,000.00. Of that amount, $400,000.00 went 
directly to pay an indebtedness with First Interstate Bank of Idaho, the primary obligors of which 
were Mr. Reed Taylor, AlA Services Corporation, and Mr. John Taylor. (See Exhibit 6 to the 
Affidavit of Aimee Gordon dated February 11,2009.) There is no doubt that said transfer was never 
brought to a shareholder vote, nor even to the Board of Directors for a directors' vote. 
Again, the October 1996 minutes reflect the financial straits in which AIA Services 
Corporation found itself and also that the obligations to Mr. Reed Taylor and Mrs. Donna Taylor had 
to be dealt with. (See Affidavit of Charles A. Brown dated February 27,2009.) Within a 45-day 
time period, another $250,000.00 was transferred from the 401 (k) Plan to AlA Services Corporation 
to financially keep it afloat and to help sustain payments to Mr. Reed Taylor and Mrs. Donna Taylor. 
Again, this exchange of monies and stock went without shareholder notice or approval and even 
went without directors' notice or approval. 
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The 401(k) Plan stands before tlus Court for the fIrst time and is simply stating its 
position - that the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure 
Agreement as entered into by Mr. Reed Taylor and AIA Services Corporation are illegal, and, thus, 
unenforceable because they violate the applicable 1995 statutes (I.C. §§ 30-1-6 and 30-1-46). 
As to an illegal contract in Idaho, standing is granted to anyone, even the Court, who 
can or should raise the issue of illegality. The 401(k) Plan certainly has standing. 
EARNED DEFICIT AS DEFINED BY I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995) 
The Plaintiff, Mr. Reed Taylor, has had two opportunities to have his experts work 
what magic they may. The Amended and Restated Expert Witness AffIdavit of Paul E. Pederson 






See p. 7 of the Amended and Restated Expert Witness AffIdavit of Paul E. Pederson. 
Mr. Pederson does not state that the audited fInancials for 1994, 1995, and 1996 were 
in violation of the applicable GAAP standards, although he has had two opportunities to do so. 
Mr. Pederson does not say that the audited fInancials for 1994, 1995, and 1996 were 
unethical, incompetent, false, or misrepresentative ofthe fInancial status ofthe company as it existed 
at that time. The closest Mr. Pederson comes to taking issue with the audited fInancials is on page 
8 of his affIdavit where he states: 
With the hindsight afforded by obtaining fInancials statements and 
documents for the years following 1995 in order to look back at 1995, 
it is my opinion that AIA's write-offs taken in 1994 and 1995 to 
account for discontinued operations were overstated or overly 
conservative, thus the year-end equity defIcits in 1994 and 1995 were 
also overstated. 
See pp. 7-8 of the Amended and Restated Expert Witness AffIdavit of Paul E. Pederson (emphasis 
added). 
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I am sure that Mr. Pederson would readily agree that it is not "20/20 hindsight" by 
which the accountants should have operated when they were preparing the audited financials for 
1994,1995, and 1996. Instead ofapplying "20/20 hindsight" they had to apply the applicable GAAP 
rules and regulations that applied to accountants in such a situation and by which accountants and 
business professionals must operate. 
Bizarrely, Mr. Pederson finds that ifhe is to apply his "20/20 hindsight" to the earned 
deficit figure for 1995, he still comes up with an earned deficit of <$10,718,574.00> instead ofa 
deficit of <$18,760,127.00>. See p. 8 of the Amended and Restated Expert Witness Affidavit of 
Paul E. Pederson. 
Additionally, the facts as established before this Court include Mr. Reed Taylor as 
founder of AIA Services Corporation over 30 years ago and at which time he was chairman, CEO, 
and the majority shareholder. There is no doubt and no question that by being the CEO and the 
majority shareholder of AIA Services Corporation, Mr. Reed Taylor was in control of his 
corporation, and, as such, he is imbued with intimate knowledge of the same. When 
Mr. Reed Taylor was in charge, two accounting firms were involved in doing the audited financials 
for 1995 and those audited financials come within dollars of each other in regard to the earned deficit 
for the year. 
This brings the analysis to an end. As such, the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement 
and the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement as entered into by Mr. Reed Taylor are 
illegal and in violation ofI.C. § 30-1-6 (1995) and, thus, unenforceable today. 
The only possible "out" that Mr. Reed Taylor can fashion is one that is set forth in 
Mr. Pederson's affidavit on page 22 where he states: 
This information is required to reconstruct and determine the amount 
of adjusted earned surplus for AlA in 1995 or 1996. 
See p. 22 of the Amended and Restated Expert Witness Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson (emphasis 
added). 
Thus, the only escape route for Mr. Reed Taylor is an argument to the Court whereby 
he pleads that he should not be bound by the audited financials arrived at by his own accounting 
firms in 1994, 1995 (twice), and 1996; his new accountant should be allowed to "cook the books" 
and go back and "reconstruct" the remnants of whatever financial information might still exist in 
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order to arrive at an earned deficit which allows him to avoid the applicability of I..c. § 30-1-6 
(1995). In other words, Mr. Reed Taylor is arguing that he should not be bound by the audited 
financials of the two separate and highly respected accounting firms he used back in 1995, but should 
now be able to "reconstruct the books" to his own liking. 
The 401(k) Plan was not given such an option. The monies from the 401(k) Plan 
were taken in exchange for worthless AIA Services Corporation stock; the same corporation which 
was saddled and hamstrung (excuse the mixing of metaphors) with the obligation to Mr. Reed Taylor 
as a result of his stock redemption agreements. 
INSOLVENCY AS DEFINED BY I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995) 
Normally the issue of insolvency would be laden with factual issues, but this case is 
very peculiar. Mr. Reed Taylor has admitted, and it has been established by affidavit, that the 
$1.5 million Down Payment Note was supposed to be paid at the time of closing, then within ninety 
(90) days of closing, and then some other time period, none of which were ever met. Additionally, 
Mr. Reed Taylor has alleged that the $6 million Promissory Note payment schedule was in default 
from the beginning, and, of course, as the basis for the lawsuit it still remains in default. Thus, the 
affidavits before this Court clearly establish that the amount obligated to Mr. Reed Taylor as a result 
of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement 
simply could not be paid without obtaining involuntary capital contributions (that is a nice way of 
phrasing it) from the 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan for AlA Services Corporation in March of 1996, 
November of 1996, and again in 1997. All of this is uncontradicted. 
Even the Plaintiff s expert agrees, but with a twist: 
With the exception of Reed Taylor, no creditors have been impaired 
by AIA through non-payment or failure to fulfill financial obligations. 
See p. 21 of Amended and Restated Expert Witness Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson. 
This is like saying that I was able to pay the utilities on the house, but not the 
mortgage. As the bank forecloses on the house, at least one can tum off the lights on the way out 
the door. 
When faced with the inconsistent positions the Plaintiff has taken, his counsel 
Mr. Bissell, in open Court, took the path of expediency - i.e., the corporation was solvent to the 
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extent necessary to advance Plaintiff s case (1995 and 1996), but it was insolvent after that date in 
order to advance Plaintiff s case against the other Defendants. This smacks more of convenient 
rather than principled argument. 
In fact, ever since July of 1995, AIA Services Corporation has been unable to pay 
ALL of its creditors as the debts became due which fits the statutory definition of insolvency found 
in the corporate code. 
Please note that the definition of insolvency in La Voy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 
120, 369 P.2d 45 (1962) predated the applicable statute that applies herein. The enactment of the 
corporate statute explicitly defmed insolvency for purposes ofthe application to the corporate code. 
Mr. Reed Taylor tries to use the La Voy definition as if a case decided before the statute was enacted 
can be used to interpret the same statute. The law should be just the opposite; the legislature 
explicitly defined insolvency in a manner different than LaVoy, and, thus, supplanted the LaVoy 
definition with the more precise statutory definition. 
Additionally, insolvency has been pled by Mr. Reed Taylor throughout four amended 
complaints and also throughout two separate lawsuits which he filed against the lawyers representing 
the defendants in this matter. 
Mr. Reed Taylor had to plead insolvency of AIA Services Corporation in order to give 
himself a scintilla of footing to allege a breach of fiduciary duties owed to him individually by said 
attorneys. 
Again, when the parties were in open Court on March 12,2009, this conflict was 
brought to the above-entitled Court's attention. Mr. Bissell, on behalf ofMr. Reed Taylor, declared 
in open Court that Mr. Pederson's affidavit was in error and that AIA Services Corporation was, 
indeed, insolvent from 1997 onward. 
Well, we thought we had that issue tidied up until we received Mr. Pederson's 
amended and restated affidavit in which he states again that AIA Services Corporation was not 
rendered insolvent by the redemption ofMr. Reed Taylor's shares. 
In open court, Mr. Reed Taylor's counsel said Mr. Pederson was in error and that AlA 
Services Corporation was insolvent from 1997 onward. 
Mr. Pederson said in his previous affidavit that AIA Services Corporation was 
solvent, and again reiterates that position. 
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So, which affidavit is in error? 
Which complaint alleging insolvency is in error? 
.. The Second Amended Complaint; 
.. The Third Amended Complaint; 
.. The Fourth Amended Complaint; 
.. The Fifth Amended Complaint; 
.. The first complaint against Clements, Brown and McNichols, 
.. The First Amended Complaint against Clements, Brown and McNichols; 
.. The first complaint against Hawley, Troxell, Ennis and Hawley; 
.. The First Amended Complaint against Hawley, Troxell, Ennis and Hawley; 
.. The Notice of Appeal filed with the Idaho Supreme Court on the appeal 
against the Clements, Brown and McNichols firm; or 
The Notice of Appeal filed with the Idaho Supreme Court on the appeal 
against the Hawley, Troxell, Ennis and Hawley firm? 
Judicial Admission Discussion. 
"A judicial admission is a formal act or statement made by a party or attorney, in the 
course of judicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing with the need for 
proof by the opposing party of some fact." Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616, 618, 930 P.2d 
1361 (Ct. App. 1997), citing McLean v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 783,430 P.2d 670, 674 
(1967); 29A AM JUR 2D EVIDENCE, § 770 (1994); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 48 (6th ed. 1990). 
Judicial admissions generally remove the admitted facts from the field of controversy. Perry v. 
Schaumann, 110 Idaho 596, 598, 716 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Ct. App. 1986). A party who makes a 
judicial admission is bound by the statement and may not dispute the statement on trial or appeal. 
Strouse, 129 Idaho at 619, citing 29 Charles A. Wright and Michael H. Graham, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 6726 (Interim Edition 1992). 
"Statements in a party's pleadings are generally seen as bindingjudicia1 admissions." 
Strouse, 129 Idaho at 619. While in some states a pleading must be admitted into evidence to serve 
as a judicial admission, in Idaho the pleadings may be considered for the purpose of judicial 
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admissions, within the case in which they were filed, without admission into evidence. Id. citing 
Koser v. Hornback, 75 Idaho 24, 33, 265 P.2d 988 (1954). 
In the Strouse case, the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he had received a certain 
sum as compensation for his services from the defendant, a construction company for which the 
plaintiffhad worked as a real estate agent. At the trial of the matter, however, the district court made 
a finding that the plaintiff had actually been paid a different amount. This resulted in the court 
making a damage award to the plaintiff that did not take into consideration the amount that the 
plaintiff alleged he had already received. The defendant filed a motion to amend the damage award, 
arguing that the question of the amount of compensation received by the plaintiff was admitted in 
the plaintiffs pleading and the court had erred in making a finding contrary to that amount. The 
district court denied the motion, and the defendant appealed the award of damages. 
On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that the plaintiffhad made an allegation 
in his complaint ofthe amount the defendant had paid to him. Strouse, 129 Idaho at 619. The court 
also noted that the allegation was stated clearly and was within the plaintiffs personal knowledge. 
Id. Furthermore, the complaint did not state a belief that the amount was uncertain or unknowrld. 
Therefore, the court concluded the statement qualified as a formal judicial admission and, as such, 
removed that particular issue from the consideration of the trial court. Id. The court also held that, 
"regardless of the nature of his in-court statements [the plaintiff] was bound by the judicial 
admission made in his complaint and the district court could not make factual findings in 
contravention ofthe facts stated in [the plaintiffs] complaint." The court then went on to find that 
the damage award was in error, and reversed and remanded the case to the district court for entry of 
judgment denying the plaintiff relief. Id. at 620. 
The case of Anderson v. Hoops, 52 Idaho 757, 19 P.2d 908 (1933) considered the 
effect of a later amendment to a pleading upon an admission made in the initial pleading. In that 
case, the defendants, in their answer, admitted certain paragraphs of the complaint. During the 
course of the trial, the defendants asked for and received leave to amend portions of their answer, 
changing an admission to a denial. The plaintiffs did not offer the previous admission contained in 
the answer as evidence, nor did they attempt to prove the admission by any other method. One of 
the jury instructions instructed the jury that admissions made by the defendants in their verified 
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answer were to be considered as evidence in the case. A judgment was entered in favor of the 
plaintiffs and the defendants appealed. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court considered the effect of the defendants' 
amendment oftheir answer. The court commented that, before the amendment was granted, the prior 
answer had been a judicial admission of the material allegations contained in the complaint, which 
would have limited the issues and put certain facts beyond dispute. Anderson, 19 P.2d at 909-910. 
However, once the answer was amended, the prior admission became "a mere ordinary admission, 
subject to proof and to explanation as fully and as though it had been made in a letter." Id. The 
court also noted that "[t]his court has held that when a pleading is amended or withdrawn, the 
superseded portion disappears from the record as a judicial admission ... nevertheless, it exists as 
an utterance once seriously made by the party, and for certain purposes may be admitted in 
evidence." !d. at 910, citing Shurtliffv. Extension Ditch Co., 14 Idaho 416,627,94 P. 574 (1908). 
On that basis, the court concluded that giving the disputed jury instruction was reversible error. Id. 
at 910. 
CAPITAL SURPLUS AS DEFINED BY I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995) 
Desperate times really do call for desperate measures. 
Mr. Reed Taylor is now trying to argue that the "capital surplus" language of 
I.e. § 30-1-6 (1995) saves the day. 
Not so. 
The applicable provision within I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995) upon which Mr. Reed Taylor 
focuses reads as follows: 
... if the articles of incorporation so permit or with the affirmative 
vote ofthe holders of a majority of all shares entitled to vote thereon, 
to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available 
therefor. 
AIA Services Corporation's Articles of Incorporation do not allow for such event to 
occur. Mr. Reed Taylor does not even try to argue the same. 
What Mr. Reed Taylor is trying to argue is that when there was a shareholder vote 
back in March of 1995, it somehow authorized the sale to Mr. Reed Taylor co ••• to the extent of 
unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available therefor." Id. 
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The details of the March 1995 shareholder vote are buried in footnotes #37 and #38 
on the bottom of page 8 of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Statement of Facts. He references Exhibits B-F 
attached to the Affidavit of JoLee Duclos notarized on February 11, 2009, in order to support the 
fo llowing statement: 
... the payment of $1.5 Million down at closing, the issuance of a $6 
Million Note, the balance payable in ten years, and the granting of 
security interests were all overwhelmingly approved by the 
shareholders of AIA Services.37 
See p. 8 of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Statement of Facts. 
Not so fast. 
Exhibits B-F of said affidavit are the various minutes of the shareholder meeting 
which occurred in March of 1995. What Mr. Reed Taylor does not point out is that the meeting also 
contemplated: 
3. Issuance of the newly authorized Series B and Series C 
Preferred Stock and related Series B and Series C Warrants 
pursuant to a private placement conducted by J. G. Kinnard 
and Company, Incorporated. 
4. Redemption of500,000 of Reed J. Taylor'S 613,494 shares of 
Company's Common Stock for $7.5 million; application of 
the proceeds of sale of the Series C Preferred Stock and 
Warrants to the $1.5 million down payment ofthe redemption 
price for Reed J. Taylor's Common Stock; issuance of the 
Company's $6 million promissory note for the balance of the 
redemption price for Mr. Taylor's Common Stock; and 
approval of related transactions with Mr. Taylor. 
5. Application of a portion of the proceeds of sale of the Series 
B Preferred Stock and Warrants to the partial or complete 
redemption of the outstanding Series A Stated Value 
Preferred Stock. 
6. Contribution of at least $4.2 million ofthe proceeds of sale of 
the Series B Preferred Stock and Warrants to the Company's 
subsidiary, The Universe Life Insurance Company ("ULIC"); 
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and distribution of ULIC's subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc., to the 
Company. 
See pp. 1-2 of Exhibit B to the Affidavit of JoLee Duclos notarized on February 11, 2009, 
(AIA0025254-AIA0025255). 
In other words, the March 1995 transaction contemplated a redemption of only 
500,000 ofMr. Reed Taylor's shares of stock, but more importantly it contemplated an infusion of 
millions of dollars as a result of 735,000 shares of Series B Preferred Stock (at $10.00 a share it 
equals approximately $7,350,000.00) which never occurred. If I was a shareholder at that meeting, 
I would have voted for it too with the understanding that the tremendous infusion of cash was going 
to happen as a result ofthe Series B Preferred Stock. The "sale" of Series B Preferred Stock went 
so poorly that the Series B was withdrawn. 
Additionally, the notice of special meeting of shareholders did not even include 
discussion of capital surplus as required by the statute. See pp. 1-2 of Exhibit B to the Affidavit of 
JoLee Duclos notarized on February 11, 2009. 
Desperate times do call for desperate measures. Mr. Reed Taylor is so desperate to 
try to avoid the illegality of the applicable statute he is arguing the infusion of millions of dollars as 
a result of the Series B Preferred Stock, which did not occur, and he now acts as if it had occurred 
for purposes of his argument before this Court. 
It should be noted that Mr. Reed Taylor filed a fifty-six page "Statement of Facts" 
signed by Mr. Rod Bond, and, thus, it is not in the form of an affidavit. 
It should be noted that when Mr. Reed Taylor's affidavit is reviewed he does not 
declare in any manner that the shareholders voted on his stock redemption agreements as reflected 
in the July 22, 1995, Stock Redemption Agreement. Nor does he attempt to argue that the 
shareholders voted on the August 1, 1996, Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Reed Taylor cannot avoid the application ofLC. § 30-1-6 (1995), and, thus, is 
asking this Court for leave to "reconstruct" (alkla cook the books) from date of incorporation to 1996 
instead of relying upon audited financials prepared by two separate, nationally recognized accounting 
firms for the year 1995. Hmmmmmmmmmm. 
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The acts of Mr. Reed Taylor are an exemplification of why the public policy as 
captured by I. e. § 30-1-6 and I.e. §30-1-46 were statutorily in place. 
Additionally, one can tell by the tone, tenor, and attitude of the appellate courts on 
illegal contracts issued just this year that the courts are not going to be involved in the enforcement 
of such contracts. The courts are not going to waste their time trying to carve out exceptions for rich 
people who have already walked away with over $9 million. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 16th day of April, 2009. 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney for Intervenor, 401 (k) Profit 
Sharing Plan for the AIA Services Corporation 
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I, Charles A. Brown, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was: 
D mailed by regular fIrst class mail, and deposited 
in the United States Post Office to: 
D sent by facsimile to: 
D sent by facsimile and mailed by regular fIrst 
class mail, deposited in the United States Post 
Office to: 
D sent by Federal Express, overnight delivery 
D hand delivered to: 
;gJ Emailed to: rod@scblegal.com 
D mailed by regular fIrst class mail, and 
deposited in the United States Post Office to: 
D sent by facsimile to: 
D sent by facsimile and mailed by regular first 
class mail, deposited in the United States Post 
Office to: 
D sent by Federal Express, overnight delivery 
D hand delivered to: 
~ Entailed to: mbissell@cbklawyers.com 
D mailed by regular fIrst class mail, and deposited 
in the United States Post Office to: 
D sent by facsimile to: 
D sent by facsimile and mailed by regular fIrst 
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VVITNESS AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL E. 
PEDERSON IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS AND AlA SERVICES 401(k) 
PLAN'S MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JOINDERS, 
IN SUPPORT OF REED TAYLOR'S 
MOTIONS FOR I.R.C.P. 56(f) MOTIONS 
FOR CONTINUANCE, AND IN SUPPORT 
OF REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO 
DISSOLVE AND MOTION RELINQUISH 
COLLATERAL 
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I, Paul E. Pederson, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, and 
make !his Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge. 
2. I am the President of Pederson Associates, Inc., a consulting firm that 
primarily provides financial advisory services to clients involved in civil litigation 
matters. I have been retained by the law firm of Smith Cannon & Bond on behalf of the 
named plaintiff, Mr. Reed Taylor ("Reed Taylor"), to review, evaluate, consult and 
possibly testify regarding claims for financial impacts suffered from the actions, and or 
inactions of the named defendants and others in the instant matter, and to ascertain the 
financial status of AlA Services Corporation in 1995 and 1996. 
3. Prior to founding Pederson Associates, Inc., I was employed from January 
1, 1993 through October 15, 1995 as a Director in the Financial Advisory Services Group 
of Coopers & Lybrand, an international public accounting firm. From December 1, 1987 
through December 31, 1992, I was employed as an Executive Consultant with Peterson 
Consulting Limited Partnership, a national consulting firm. I was also employed in the 
audit division of Arthur Andersen & Co., an international public accounting firm, from 
approximately June 1981 until September 1987. 
4. I possess a Bachelor of Arts III Business Administration from the 
University of Puget Sound, with an emphasis in accounting, and I passed the Certified 
Public Accountant ("CPA") examination in 1981. I was licensed to practice public 
accounting in the State of Washington shortly thereafter and continued to do so until I 
fonned my consulting firm in 1995. I am a member of the Washington Society of 
Certified Public Accountants and a past member of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants. 
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5. Throughout the course of my career as a CPA and a consultant, I have 
personally reviewed financial agreements, contractual stipulation or consideration 
sectio~s and the financial records of hundreds of companies involved in a variety of 
industries, including construction, real estate development, wholesaling, distribution, 
agency, retailing, restaurants, agriculture, fishing, forest products, and others. In 
conjunction with these efforts, I have often been asked to evaluate and testify to the 
meaning and interpretation of financial statements, financial agreements, stipulations or 
consideration in contracts, and the direct and consequential financiaLimpacts caused by a 
breach of contract or some other action. On occasion, I have been asked to determine the 
value of a particular contractual relationship and the value of businesses based upon 
anticipated future income. My experience also includes review, analysis and the 
determination of unpaid claims from events presumably covered by insurance policies. 
Attached, as Exhibit A to this Affidavit, is a copy of my curriculum vitae, and Exhibit B, 
which is a client listing for Pederson Associates, Inc. (covering the period from its 
inception in October 1995 to current). Virtually all of our projects require us to 
investigate and review financial records and supporting documentation of financial 
transactional activity. 
6. This Affidavit supersedes and replaces my Affidavit signed on February 
26, 2009. I am amending and superseding my Affidavit dated February 26, 2009, to 
correct typographical errors, clarify certain opinions and facts, clarify differences 
between the financial condition of AlA Services Corporation and its Subsidiary AlA 
Insurance, to expand on certain opinions and facts, and to provide a description of 
documents that have not been produced which are required for me to provide a full and 
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complete opinion on the earned surplus of AlA Services on the date Reed Taylor's shares 
were redeemed, specifically, July 22, 1995. 
7. As part of our efforts, we reviewed and, to the extent applicable, offer 
opinions based upon the following documents (and exhibits thereto), all of which were 
forwarded by email transmittals which indicated such documents were provided to all 
other Counsel in this action: 
II Connie Taylor's and Jim Beck's Supplemental Memorandum III 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; 
II Affidavit of Aimee Gordon; 
II Affidavit of JoLee Duclos; 
II Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; 
II Affidavit of Kenneth E. Hooper; 
II Affidavit of Connie W. Taylor; 
II Intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; 
II Intervenor's Motion for Reconsideration of Opinion and Order on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; 
II Brief in Support of Intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and the Motion for Reconsideration of Opinion and Order on 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; 
II Affidavit of Drew E. Voth, CPA, CFE, CV A, CIRA in Support of 
Intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for 
Reconsideration of Opinion and Order on Plaintiff s Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
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• Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Response in Opposition to Connie Taylor and 
James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Bryan 
Freeman, Jolee Duclos, R. John Taylor, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, 
and AlA Services 401(k) Plan's Joinders; 
• Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor in Opposition to AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance's Motion to Amend Answer and Motion for Rule 67 Deposit 
and in Opposition to Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; 
• Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order; 
• Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Reed Taylor's Motion to 
Disqualify the Attorneys and Law Firms of Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley LLP, Clements Brown & McNichols, P.A., and Quarles & 
Brady LLP; Motion to Relinquish Collateral; Moti<:n to Compel; 
Motion to Protect Collateral; and Motion for Continuance; 
• Second Supplemental Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of 
Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify the Attorneys and Law Firms of 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, Clements Brown & McNichols, 
P.A., and Quarles & Brady LLP.; Motion to Relinquish Collateral; 
Motion to Compel; Motion for Continuance and Opposition to AlA 
Services' 401(k) Plan's Motion to Intervene; 
• Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Reed Taylor's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment Against the Defendants Re: Illegality and 
in Support of Motion to Shorten Time; 
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.. Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Opposition of AlA Services 401 (k) 
Plan's Motion to Intervene; 
.. Supplemental Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Opposition of AIA 
Services 401(k) Plan's Motion to Intervene; 
.. All exhibits admitted at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing on March 
1,2007; and 
.. Attached as Exhibit C is an additional listing of documents further 
relied upon in developing the opinions outlined in_this Affidavit. 
8. In addition to the documents listed above, we also relied upon the 
financial and accounting documents that have been produced to date in this matter 
[AIAOOlOOOl through AIA0024875]. These documents were produced to us on data 
disks and consist generally of certain financial records and accounting workpapers from 
1995 through 2006 for AlA Services Corporation and Subsidiaries, including AlA 
Insurance, Inc. 
9. Unless I specifically refer to a subsidiary of AlA Services Corporation by 
name, I will collectively refer to AlA Services Corporation and its Subsidiaries as "AlA" 
in this Affidavit. My opinions in this Affidavit are based upon the assumption that the 
financial records produced to us are true and accurate copies of the original documents as 
produced by in-house accountants, attorneys and/or outside consultants. At this time, we 
still have not been granted access to the full range of documents necessary to adequately 
investigate this matter. 
10. The Defendant's motions and affidavits listed above generally allege or 
assert that the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement (" 1995 Agreement") and the 1996 
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Restructure Agreement (" 1996 Agreement") are void and unenforceable based upon 
interpretations ofIdaho Code 30-1-2 and 30-1-6. 
11. In Connie Taylor's and Jim Beck's Supplemental Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Risley maintains that the 1995 and 1996 
Agreements are void and unenforceable based upon AlA's lack of an earned surplus. As 
noted in the motion, AlA recorded substantial earned deficits in 1995 and 1996 primarily 
due to the writing off assets and liabilities associated with its insurance underwriting 
operations mainly attributable to The Universe Life Insuran~e Company ("The 
Universe"). Amounts written off which are attributable to discontinued operations total 
$13,662,629, with $4,657,509 being written off in 1994 and $9,005,120 being written off 
in 1995. In addition, AlA wrote off an additional $2,331,166 in 1995 of deferred 
acquisition costs associated with the discontinued underwriting operations. As you can 
see in the table below, these write-offs had a significant impact on AlA's Earned Deficit, 
Total Stockholder's Deficit, Operating Income after Interest Expense, and.Net Income. 
Operating 
Total Income after 
Stockholder's Interest 
Earned Deficit Deficit Expense Net Income 
1994 ($ 919,700) ($ 852,374) ($ 260,640) ($4,867,962) 
1995 (18,760,127) (17,018,838) ( 84,479) (10,650,150) 
1996 (17,037,673) (14,792,476) 868,033 1,722,454 
1997 ( 7,247,168) ( 5,223,433) 1,162,900 9,790,505 
1998 ( 7,881,005) ( 6,053,439) 820,960 ( 726,381) 
The Defendants and AlA Services 401(k) Plan ("Plan") fail to note that AlA's earned 
deficits recovered significantly in 1996 and 1997 as AlA recognized income associated 
with the "write up" of assets attributable to discontinued operations of $900,505 in 1996 
and $8,820,000 in 1997. The earned deficit in 1996 and 1997 actually improves over the 
previous year's totals, by $1,722,454 in 1996 and $9,790,505 in 1997. With the hindsight 
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afforded by obtaining financial statements and documents for the years following 1995 in 
order to look back at 1995, it is my opinion that AlA's write-offs taken in 1994 and 1995 
to acc~)Unt for discontinued operations were overstated or overly conservative, thus the 
year-end equity deficits in 1994 and 1995 were also overstated. In addition, AlA's 
earned surplus was affected by dividends paid to the Series C Preferred Shareholders of 
AlA Services Corporation who invested in AlA Services Corporation concurrent with the 
redemption of Reed Taylor'S shares. It should be noted that there was no obligation to 
invest unless Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed. In addition, Reed Taylor originally 
was to be paid $1,500,000 from the sale of Preferred C Shares, however the funds 
generated from this sale were not paid to Reed Taylor. Instead, Reed Taylor was 
provided an interest bearing promissory note in the same amount. The interest payments 
on this promissory note also negatively impacted AlA's earned surplus in future periods. 
Considering only the impact of other questionable transactions that occurred in 1995 and 
"write ups" in the value of assets in the years after 1995, an adjusted e~ned surplus for 
AlA as of December 31, 1995 is shown in the following table: 
Adjusted Earned Surplus (Deficit) Summary as of 12/31/95 
Earned Surplus (Deficit) 
Adjustments: 
Payment of dividends 
Payment to Beck & Cashman for attorney fees 
Payment to Eberle Berlin for consulting fees 
1996 write-up for discontinued operations 
1997 write-up for discontin ued operations 
1998 write-off for discontinued operations 
Total Adjustments 
Adjusted Earned Surplus (Deficit) 
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This table does not include financial impacts from management decisions that may have 
negatively impacted AlA's earned surplus after Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed. 
12. Despite the substantial earned deficit amount in 1995 (which is presented 
only on a book value basis and does not include the value of assets not listed on AlA's 
financial statements such as the present value of commissions), AlA's counsel, Richard 
A. Riley, maintains in his July 1, 1996 letter to Reed Taylor's counsel that "the 
preliminary appraisal value of the Company as of December 31, 1995, net of all liabilities 
including the Company's obligations to Mr. Taylor, exceeds $2.5 million." This 
valuation is certainly at odds with the book value estimate as presented in AlA's financial 
statements and the calculated amount presented in the Affidavit of Kenneth Hooper. 
Since I submitted my Affidavit dated February 26, 2009, more appraisals have been 
produced, including an appraisal valuing AlA at $19,391,414 or $19.03 per share 
(AIA0029303-05). This valuation is also at odds with the book value valuation indicated 
on AlA's financial statements 
13. The Defendants and Plan also argue that the 1995 and 1996 Agreements 
violated the solvency requirements and maintains that "AlA was either unable to pay its 
obligations as they became due prior to the redemption transaction or was rendered 
unable to pay its obligations as they became due as a result of the redemption 
transaction." According to Idaho Code 30-1-2, insolvent is defined as the "inability of a 
corporation to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business." 
Although I cannot express a legal opinion as to the meaning of this code, it is certainly 
open to interpretation. To my knowledge, and based upon our review of AlA's 
accounting documents from 1995 through 2006, AlA's business operations were never 
impaired because of a failure to pay operating expenses and maintain positive financial 
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relationships with third-party vendors. In fact, for the II-year period between 1996 
through 2006, AlA has generated Operating Income after Interest Expense of$3,867,584 
and N~t Income of$10,194,714 [see attached Exhibit C]. Based upon these facts, it is my 
opinion the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares did not render AlA insolvent. 
14. With the exception of Reed Taylor, there is no evidence of any general 
creditors that have not been paid who were creditors in 1995. Further, there is no 
evidence of creditor or shareholder lawsuits filed against AlA related to the redemption 
of Reed Taylor's shares based upon the documents provided to -us by AlA. By all 
accounts, AlA was able to continue operations and generate positive cash flow from 1996 
through 2006, and is still in business today. 
15. In the three year period year period following the signing of the 1995 
Agreement (1996 through 1998), AlA produced total Operating Income after Interest 
Expense of $2,851 ,893. This amount excludes any recognition of 1996 and 1997 income 
or losses related to the discontinuation of operations and represents, actual income 
produced through operations (after interest expense). AlA's financial performance 
through 1998 is critical because beginning in 1999, AlA management begins to conduct a 
series of questionable transactions that divert funds away from AlA to the benefit of other 
entities, putting into question its ability to meet the outstanding obligation of Reed 
Taylor. This issue will be further explained in sections below. 
16. In the Affidavit of Kenneth E. Hooper, Mr. Hooper addresses the issue of 
solvency and concludes AlA's earned surplus is negative on July 22, 1995 based upon 
1994' s year-end retained earnings balance and a pro-rata allocation of 1995 losses. It is 
my opinion that Mr. Hooper has not adequately assessed or audited the financial status of 
AlA as of July 22, 1995 (the date the 1995 Agreement and the $1.5 Million promissory 
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note were signed) or any other date within the 1995 and 1996 calendar years. This 
exercise would require an exhaustive review of the books of original entry and ledgers 
along .with perfonning a detailed valuation of the assets and liabilities to be disposed of in 
AlA's discontinuation of its insurance underwriting operations. The valuation provided 
by Mr. Hooper is cursory in nature based upon an estimated mathematical allocation and 
not supported by actual documents. Mr. Hooper also does not address the significant 
"write ups" in asset values that I discussed above that accounted for over $9,000,000 in 
profits in 1996 and 1997. At this time, I have not detennined the _financial status as of 
July 22, 1995 or any other date within the 1995 and 1996 calendar years as we have never 
been provided full and complete access to the necessary documents. Such a review is not 
possible based upon the documents produced to date and would require an exhaustive 
review of the AlA's books of original entry and ledgers, all of which have not been done 
by Mr. Hooper. 
17. As discussed above, the magnitude of the 1995 write-off, ~losely followed 
by substantial write-ups in 1996 and 1997 totaling $9,720,505, demonstrate the arbitrary 
nature of estimating the net impact of discontinued operations and invalidates the net 
deficit amount calculated on a pro rata basis by Mr. Hooper as of July 22, 1995. Based 
upon our retrospective look at the impact of discontinued operations on AlA's financial 
statements, it is apparent that they significantly overestimated the impact of discontinued 
operations in 1995, thereby resulting in an inflated deficit amount as of December 1995. 
18. Practically, it is very difficult to detennine the net impact of discontinued 
operations and its effect on the net deficit amount in 1995. This is further complicated by 
the fact that after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, new management was 
responsible for making operational and financial decisions. The net impact of these 
AMENDED AND RESTATED EXPERT WITNESS Qr'",z. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL E. PEDERSON - 11 (J vc.J 
decisions may have further negatively impacted the resultant end-of-year net deficit 
amounts. 
19. Even if a business entity's overall book value is negative, this may not be 
indicative of the entity's ability to maintain normal operations into the future or indicate 
that the entity has no significant net value. Additional factors include its ability to obtain 
credit and/or produce future positive operating results and cash flow. Likewise, an entity 
can have asset book values that are sizably less than fair market values, which, upon 
liquidation, can reduce or eliminate equity deficits. 
20. Mr. Hooper also notes that the 1995 Auditor's Report raised doubt as to 
AlA's ability to continue as a Going Concern. The Going Concern issue was removed 
prior to issuance of the Auditor's Report for AlA's 1997 audited financials. This fact 
further undermines any insolvency argument attributable to the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares. 
21. In the Affidavit of Drew E. V oth, CPA, CFE, CV A, CIM in Support of 
Intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for Reconsideration of 
Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Voth comes to 
many of the same conclusions as Mr. Hooper. Namely, that AlA was insolvent as of July 
22, 1995, and had insufficient earned surplus. For the same reasons that apply to Mr. 
Hooper's opinions, Mr. Voth's opinions are not supported by the review and 
investigation of all the required documents necessary to form his opinion. 
22. It appears that neither Mr. Voth nor Mr. Hooper address capital surplus in 
their opinions as to the financial ability of AlA to redeem Reed Taylor'S shares in 1995 
or 1996. Neither Mr. Voth nor Mr. Hooper addressed any consideration and due 
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diligence considered by the Board of Directors of AlA when determining the financial 
condition of AlA in 1995 or the fair market value of its assets. 
23. With the passage of 13Yz years since the date of the 1995 Agreement, one 
is now afforded the opportunity to take a more practical and realistic approach as to the 
question of solvency. As noted above, for the II-year period from 1996 through 2006, 
AlA generated Operating Income after Interest Expense of$3,867,584 and Net Income of 
$10,194,714. These financial results, including the ability to continue to operate for no 
less than an additional eleven (11) years, should resolve any issue regarding whether or 
not AlA was solvent in 1995 as a result of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. I note 
that AlA started paying Reed Taylor reduced amounts contemporaneously with the 
formation and operation of CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. (f/kJa AlA Crop Insurance, 
Inc.). 
24. Mr. Voth notes as evidence of AlA's inability to pay its debts the failure 
of the AlA to pay the $1.5 million down payment at closing or within 90 days. In fact, it 
was not paid until 2001. Mr. Voth fails to note that as part of the restructuring plan in the 
1995 Private Placement Memorandum, AlA was to sell 150,000 shares of Series C 
Preferred Stock and receive $1,500,000 from a group of investors. This $1.5 million was 
to be used as the down payment on Reed Taylor's $7.5 million stock repurchase deal. 
AlA received this money, but never paid the agreed upon down payment amount of 
$1,500,000 to Reed Taylor. 
25. Mr. Voth has not attempted to perform a valuation or determined the 
financial status, either on an asset valuation model or calculating earned surplus of AlA 
as of July 22, 1995 or any other date within the 1995 and 1996 calendar years. He simply 
states "there was not sufficient Earned Surplus in order to fund such an obligation based 
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upon how that term is used in Idaho Code 30-1-6 and 30-1-46." As stated above, such a 
valuation and opinion would require an exhaustive review of AlA's books of original 
entry ~d ledgers, which Mr. Voth and Mr. Hooper have not done. In addition, to 
properly opine on the amount of AlA's earned surplus in 1995 or 1996, one would need 
to review all financial statements, journal entries, general ledgers, supporting documents, 
auditor and accountant workpapers, and the other documents listed below. 
26. Mr. Voth also notes AlA's failure to payoff the $6.0 million note as 
evidence of AlA's inability to "pay its debts as they became due in the usual course of its 
business." As noted in my previous Affidavit, dated September 8, 2008, our review of 
AlA accounting and financial records disclosed a number of questionable and/or 
inappropriate related party transactions. These transactions began started with the arrival 
of new leadership at AlA in 1995 and have continued through December 2006, the end 
date of records that we have thus far reviewed. Generally, these transactions have had 
the effect of increasing AlA's general and administrative costs and decre~ing net income 
and available cash to pay Reed Taylor. A summary of transactions follow: 
a AlA and CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA") engaged in a 
number of transactions to the detriment of AlA creditors and 
shareholders: 
• AlA Crop Insurance Inc. is incorporated on November 18, 1999. It 
appears that this is a subsidiary of AlA. Articles of Amendment filed 
November 13, 2000 changed the name to Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc. CropUSA apparently became an independent company 
at some point in time, although I have been unable to conclusively 
make an opinion as to when that event transpired. Mr. John Taylor's 
involvement in CropUSA is questionable especially given the non-
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compete provisions in the Executive Officer's Agreement with AlA 
signed August 1, 1995. 
II AlA subsidized expenses related to CropUSA from 1999 and on by 
providing general and administrative support and either undercharging 
CropUSA for this support, or not charging them at all. For example, 
for years 1999 through 2004, none of John Taylor's total 
compensation, which ranged from $196,536 to $250,000, was 
allocated to CropUSA. Due to the types of accounting records that 
were maintained in 1999 and 2000 when CropUSA was an AlA 
subsidiary, and based upon the records that have been produced to 
date, it is impossible to determine the amount of dollars that should 
have rightfully been allocated to CropUSA without an exhaustive 
review of the financial records of both entities. Based upon what has 
been provided though, costs appear to have been allo<;:ated on a very 
subjective basis with no documentation to support the allocation logic. 
It appears other costs or expenses paid by AlA for CropUSA may 
never be known. With respect to the labor allocations, no substantive 
documentation was provided to support the arbitrary allocation of time 
between AlA and CropUSA. According to 2001 and 2002 financial 
records as represented in the known accounting entries, the unallocated 
cost total was approximately $500,000. This amount was never 
allocated to CropUSA. 
.. In 2004, AlA Insurance, a subsidiary of AlA, purchased CropUSA's 
ownership shares of AlA Services for approximately $1.5 million in 
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cash. According to CropUSA's financial records, these shares had a 
book value of $21,850. This appears to be a thinly veiled attempt to 
capitalize CropUSA while depleting the financial resources of AlA. I 
also note that AlA Insurance was responsible for the income taxes on 
the $1.5 million transferred to CropUSA. 
• AlA Insurance became the guarantor on a loan with AGM, LLC for 
$15,000,000. AIA received no consideration for this loan guarantee 
and it further demonstrates that the Defendants \\I.ere utilizing AlA for 
the benefit of CropUSA without any compensation or return benefit to 
AlA. 
• According to a letter to shareholders dated August 18, 2008, certain 
CropUSA assets were to be sold to Hudson Insurance Company 
("Hudson"). The representation disclosed in the letter indicates "the 
sale of the current block will result in a gain in excess ~f $10 million." 
There is a legal question as to whether Reed Taylor should have been 
entitled to a security interest in the assets that were sold to Hudson 
based upon our identification of significant amounts of money that 
were transferred to CropUSA by AlA and the fact that this entity was 
initially operated as a subsidiary of AlA. 
b AlA engaged in a number of transactions where stock was redeemed and 
payments were made to ESOP for put contracts: 
• Based upon my understanding, AlA is specifically prohibited from 
engagmg m paying any dividend to the Series C Preferred 
Shareholders or redeeming any other shares m AlA Services 
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Corporation until it has satisfied the outstanding obligations of Reed 
Taylor and redeemed all of the Preferred A Shares in AlA Services 
Corporation. Based upon the limited records reviewed, below is a 
listing of the transactions: 
II Payments made to employees for stock redemptions: 
II 1997-2002 - $405,658 
II 2003-2006 - $14,963 
II Payments made to the ESOP for put contr,!cts: 
II 1999 - $49,626.90 
II 2000 - $37,531.88 
II 2001 - $42,487.81 
II 2002-$31,914.18 
II 2003 - $58,114.89 
II 2004-$16,671.68 
II 2005 - $8,901.13 
II 2006 - $2,945.98 
c AlA paid dividends to Preferred C Stock shareholders from 1995 through 
1998: 
II AlA's payment of dividends is hardly the action of an insolvent 
corporation. These payments are made despite the fact that the 
obligations of Reed Taylor and the Preferred A Shareholder had not 
been satisfied. Based upon the limited records reviewed, amounts paid 
in dividends by year total: 
II 1995 - $67,123 
AMENDED AND RESTATED EXPERT WITNESS 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL E. PEDERSON - 17 
• 1996 - $249,888 
• 1997 - $289,702 
• 1998 - $74,375 
d AlA engaged in a number of transactions with Pacific Empire Radio 
Corporation ("PERC"). PERC was at one time a related party with AlA: 
• From December 1997 through December 2001 AlA engaged in a 
series of transactions where 219,044 shares of PERC common stock 
were purchased. The total book value of stock held was $411,844. In 
December 2001 and the third quarter of 2004, AlA transferred all of its 
ownership shares of PERC to ~ohn Taylor at a transfer price that may 
or may not have been at fair market value. 
• A receivable in the amount of $95,000 owed by PERC to AIA was 
transferred to CropUSA on December 31, 2006. 
• Transactional activity reflects an ongoing back and forth transfer of 
cash between AlA and PERC, even though AlA was no longer an 
owner of PERC stock after the third quarter of2004. 
• Emails and other documents produced by AlA also show that AlA 
personnel were providing services for Pacific Empire Radio 
Corporation and related entities. 
e John Taylor received total compensation ranging between $196,536 and 
$250,000 per year from 1995 through 2006: 
One can question the validity of the reasonableness of both the amount of John 
Taylor's total compensation and as to why AlA was required to absorb these costs, as his 
salary was not allocated to CropUSA until 2006 (his total compensation appears to have 
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been allocated after John Taylor testified on March 1, 2007, that his salary was not 
allocated to CropUSA and that he spent half of his time working for CorpUSA). 
f John Taylor is charging AlA an excessive amount for the rental of a 
parking lot: 
• Prior to John Taylor's purchase of a parking lot in 2001, AlA was 
being charged $5,000 per year in rent for the lot. Amounts paid in 
2004,2005 and 2006 were $15,750, 15,000 and $30,000 respectively. 
The $30,000 amount paid in 2006 includes $15,000 of "prepaid 
parking ~ot rent for 2007." 
g AlA purchased vehicles on behalf of John Taylor: 
• In January 2004, AlA purchased John Taylor's BMW for $41,450. 
• In September 2004, AlA purchased John Taylor's Ford Excursion for 
$18,770. 
27. Currently our investigation is incomplete because documents requested 
during the discovery process have not yet been produced. The above examples of 
questionable transaction are not exhaustive and our investigation in this regard remains 
ongoing and incomplete. Upon production of the necessary documents and answers to 
questions from various past and present accounting personnel in and outside of AlA, we 
will need additional time to review the records of AlA and related parties to scrutinize 
investments, transfers and other transactions from 1995 through the present time to 
confirm that AlA actually produced sufficient cash flow to pay Reed Taylor. Without 
gaining full and unencumbered access to additional financial records and accounting 
information, it is impossible to measure the full extent of funds that have been drawn out 
of AlA for the benefit of others. With the added complexities of locating historical 
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financial records and other documents from over 13 12 years ago, we may never be able 
to measure the full amount of the financial impact or to fully rebuild the financial status 
of AlA on certain dates in 1995 or 1996. 
28. The previously noted financial transactions identified to date represent 
deliberate instances of self-dealing and questionable business transactions involving the 
use of AlA as a financial platform to fund other unrelated or competing opportunities. 
Without doubt, these transactions were detrimental to AlA and are subsumed in the 
balance sheet and operating result~ for the respective periods in which they occurred; 
although as previously mentioned, for the period from 1996 through 2006, AlA generated 
positive Operating Income after Interest Expense of $3.8 million. The cumulative effect 
of these transactions impacted AlA's ability to meet its existing debt obligations to Reed 
Taylor, including amounts owed as a result of the 1995 and 1996 Agreements. Based 
upon my understanding of the priority of the various shareholders and creditors of AlA, 
the $1.5 million transferred/paid to CropUSA for the Series C Preferreq Shares in AlA 
Services should have been paid to Reed Taylor or the Preferred A Shareholder before 
being transferred/paid to CropUSA. 
29. Based upon our review of the documents that have been produced to date 
in this matter, my findings are summarized as follows: 
a Neither of the financial consultants in this matter (Mr. Hooper and Mr. Voth) 
has provided a thorough and accurate financial status of AlA as of July 22, 
1995 or August 1, 1995. 
b AlA was not rendered insolvent in 1995 or 1996 as a result of the redemption 
of Reed Taylor's shares as evidenced by the following: 
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II Positive cumulative operating results from 1996 through 2006, and no 
evidence that any creditors besides Reed Taylor had not been paid. 
II With the exception of Reed Taylor, no creditors have been impaired by 
AlA through non-payment or failure to fulfill financial obligations. 
c From 1995 through present, the management of AlA has engaged in a series 
of questionable and prohibited transactions with the net effect of diminishing 
the value of AlA and Reed Taylor's asserted security interest therein. 
d Given the magnitude ,of AlA's pattern of questionable and prohibited 
transactions and transfers of capital that have occurred over a 13 Y2 year 
period, it is conceivable that the remaining obligation owed to Reed Taylor for 
surrendering his AlA stock presumably could have been satisfied in 
accordance with its terms. 
30. As indicated above substantial amounts of financial documents have not 
been produced or made available in this action. In order to determine ap.d render a full 
and complete opinion on the amount of earned surplus available at AlA in 1995, the 
following documents for AlA need to be produced 
(a) All journal entries, general ledgers, supporting documents, income 
statements, check registers, tax returns, financial statements, 
accounting notebooks (monthly, quarterly and year-end), 
workpapers, and account analysis for AlA and all Subsidiaries 
from the date of incorporation through the end of 1996; 
(b) All workpapers and notes from all internal and outside 
accountants/auditors for AlA and all Subsidiaries from the date of 
incorporation through the end of 1996; 
(c) All record for all dividends, distributions, redemptions and other 
corporate transactions for AlA and all Subsidiaries from the date of 
incorporation through the end of 1996; and 
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(d) All due diligence information relied upon by the Board of 
Directors of AlA and all Subsidiaries for all material transactions 
(including the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares) from the date 
of incorporation through the end of 1996. 
This information is required to reconstruct and determine the amount of 
adjusted earned surplus for AlA in 1995 or 1996. This effort will require sufficient 
time once the documentation has been provided, along with an allowance of time for 
follow up with any other information and/or supporting documents which may have 
been omitted and/or may be required to fully' reconstruct an adjusted earned surplus 
for AlA in 1995 and 1996. 
DATED this 9th day of April 200 . 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to on this 9th day of April 2009, before me, a 
Notary Public for the State of Montana, by Paul E. Pederson, known to me to be the 
person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged that he 
executed the same. 
Pri n ted N am e : --''-'----'-'~-=:.L..f1'F---F-'::'tt~>.LJ..J.,'tf-_\_ 
Notary Public in and for 
Montana, residing at __ --""'--'L""-"'~'-""\--"'--L..-"'-:-"-'-"~~I\ 
My Commissi on Expires :--L-="A'~-":=~~-;;z,~ 
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, ViA 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-7100 
Fax: (509) 455-7111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE 
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and 
CORRINE BECK, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
Defendants. 
ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
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Case No.: CV-07-00208 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND (1) 
IN SUPPORT OF REED TAYLOR'S 
MOTIONS FOR RULE 56(f) 
CONTINUANCE, (2) REQUEST FOR 
SANCTIONS, (3) IN SUPPORT OF REED 
TAYLOR'S PENDING MOTIONS TO 
COMPEL DEPOSITIONS AND 
DISCOVERY, (4) AND IN OPPOSITION TO 
CONNIE TAYLOR AND JAMES BECK'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND JOINDERS BY THE 
40 1 (k) PLAN AND OTHER DEFENDANTS 
I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, one of 
the attorneys for the plaintiff Reed Taylor ("Reed") in this action, and make this Affidavit 
based upon my personal knowledge. 
2. As an initial matter, I believe that the Defendants in this action will never 
comply with discovery requests, produce all documents, attend depositions or otherwise 
comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure unless they are ordered to do so by the Court or 
a discovery master. Reed Taylor will never get a fair trial or fair discovery until the 
Court or a discovery master enters an order(s) to compel. For over two years, the 
Defendants have failed to produce documents and answer interrogatories as required by 
the Rules of Civil Procedure. As the Court is aware, no orders to compel have been 
entered by the Court in this action despite Reed Taylor's warranted and repeated requests 
to do so. Knowing that they do not have to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
Defendants then persuaded the Court to limit discovery over the objections of Reed 
Taylor. The Defendants have and continue to unilaterally narrowly construe the Court's 
order. The Defendants' actions have resulted in Reed Taylor incurring tens of thousands 
of dollars in attorneys' fees, expert witness fees and costs responding to arguments and 
requesting orders to compel and responding to the newly filed expert witness affidavits of 
Kenneth Hooper and Drew Voth. Counsel for the Defendants are wrongfully thwarting 
discovery in violation of the Rules of Civil Procedure with no ramifications and thereby 
prejudicing Reed Taylor'S ability to prosecute this action and respond to Defendants' 
assertions and defenses. 
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3. Through the date of this Affidavit, James Beck and Corrine Beck have still 
never responded to any of Reed Taylor's requests for production or interrogatories, which 
have no date restrictions whatsoever. We have received no documents from James and 
Corrine Beck and we have received no responses or documents pertaining to discovery 
requests for information pertaining to their expert witnesses. James and Corrine Beck 
have still not filed a belated disclosure of expert witnesses as previously ordered by the 
Court. 
4. Through the date of this Affidavit, we have received no further 
supplemental responses or answers from Connie Taylor. We have received no 
information regarding her expert witness other than the documents filed with the Court. 
Connie Taylor has still not filed a belated disclosure of expert witnesses as previously 
ordered by the Court. 
5. After the Court set for hearing the motions scheduled to be heard on April 
23, 2009 (we were awaiting the order on Reed Taylor's Motions to Compel and Request 
for a Discovery Master), I exchanged emails with Gary Babbitt and John Ashby 
regarding reviewing documents at AlA Services' offices in light of the Court's order and 
apparent decision to not issue an order on Reed Taylor's Motions to Compel. Attached 
as Exhibit 1 are true and correct copies of the emails exchanged between me and Gary 
Babbitt and John Ashby. Mr. Ashby stated that only documents pertaining to 1995 and 
1996 would be produced. As the Court is aware, I brought this issue to the Court's 
attention at the hearing held on April 16, 2009, at which time the Court encouraged the 
parties to construe its order limiting discovery as broadly as possible. Despite the Court's 
order in open court, all responsive documents were not made available to us and have not 
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been made available to us. The Court's recent instructions regarding broadly construing 
discovery have been ignored by defense counsel. 
6. Through the date of this Affidavit, we have never been provided all the 
documents and correspondence pertaining to the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, 
including, without limitation, the documents contained in the legal files of Eberle Berlin 
and Hawley Troxell (whether privileged or not) (as further indicated by the exhibits 
identified in paragraph 15(a)-(h) below, which have not been produced to my 
knowledge). We have not received a full and complete privilege log either. The legal 
files are important because they would or could contain information on due diligence, 
valuations, correspondence between James Beck and Michael Cashman's attorneys (the 
same attorneys AlA Services paid/reimbursed over $40,000 in fees to in 1995)--all of 
which could provide documents and/or information to enable Reed Taylor to address 
valuations of AlA Services and other issues relating to earned surplus, capital surplus and 
related issues. 
7. AlA Services Corporation was incorporated on December 20, 1983 (f/kla 
AlA Insurance Corporation), as evidenced by the attached Certificate of Formation and 
related documents that I obtained from the Idaho Secretary of State's website at 
www.accessidaho.org/public/sos/corp/search, true and correct copies of which are 
attached as Exhibit 2. When I was last at AlA Services Corporation's offices last week, 
only certain documents from 1986 through 1994 were provided to us for inspection. We 
were not provided all documents and were advised that documents had been destroyed. 
Obviously, in order to determine the amount of earned surplus, we need to review all 
documents, accounting information, accountant/auditor workpapers, accounting and 
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depreciation treatment documents and information, financial statements, and everything 
relating to the calculation of "earned surplus" and "capital surplus" dating back to the 
date of incorporation. We have not been provided access to all of the forgoing 
documents and information, and have been advised that documents have been destroyed. 
8. Since the Court stayed general discovery and limited discovery, we have 
only been permitted to take the depositions of Connie Taylor and James Beck. We have 
not been permitted by Defense counsel to take any other depositions, despite serving 
notices of depositions to John Taylor and JoLee Duclos and requesting other parties to be 
made available, e.g., Richard Riley. Reed Taylor previously requested an order from the 
Court compelling the depositions of various individuals, but no order has been entered by 
the Court. The Defendants' attorneys have refused to make their clients available for 
depositions. In addition, I have been unable to locate the legal file for the redemption of 
Reed Taylor's shares that was originally at Eberle Berlin, et aI., and need to conduct 
records depositions at Eberle Berlin and Hawley Troxell regarding the same and issues 
pertaining to the formation and operation of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and other 
entities and the wrongful transfer of millions of dollars to such entities, i.e., fraud is a 
defense to an illegal contract as recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court in Trees v. 
Kersey, 138 Idaho 3,56 P.3d 765 (2002). 
9. During the week that we deposed Connie Taylor and James Beck (Feb. 2-
6, 2009), we also scheduled depositions for JoLee Duclos and John Taylor. Initially, 
Charles Brown and Mike McNichols agreed to make JoLee Duclos and John Taylor 
available for depositions; however, on the morning of February 9, 2009, they refused to 
do so. Mike Bissell, Charles Brown, Michael McNichols, other counsel and I had a 
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telephone conference call with Judge Brudie's clerk, Arne' Cochnauer, at which time she 
indicated that Judge Brudie was only authorizing the depositions of Connie Taylor and 
James Beck. As a result, the Defendants have refused to attend depositions (by and 
through their counsel) and we have not been permitted to depose John Taylor or JoLee 
Duclos regarding the "illegality" defense. As indicated in some of the exhibits attached 
to this Affidavit and other documents already filed with the Court, JoLee Duclos and 
John Taylor were both involved in the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and the 
negotiations and closing of the transaction, yet Reed Taylor has not been permitted the 
right to question them at a deposition. They would likely have information relevant to 
the legal issues raised in Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Connie 
Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. As indicated in my 
previous affidavits in support of Reed Taylor's other pending Motions for Rule 56(1) 
Continuances and Motions to Compel, there are other individuals who need to be deposed 
as well. I believe it is possible that there was miscommunication or a misunderstanding 
with the Court as to the depositions that still needed to be taken in this action. Since my 
previous affidavits and today, there are other depositions that we need to take as indicated 
in my previous Affidavits and as set forth in this Affidavit. Besides having knowledge 
of facts or discoverable evidence pertaining to the "illegality" defense and asserted 
violations of I.C. § 30-1-6, some of the individuals who need to be deposed (including, 
without limitation, those identified in this Affidavit and my prior Affidavits) will likely 
know other facts relating to other claims and/or defenses to the "illegality" arguments, 
i.e., fraud, negligent and/or intentional misrepresentations, etc. 
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10. After the Court clarified that discovery should be broad on April 16,2009, 
I again requested that John Taylor be deposed (this is after the last time his deposition 
was scheduled, but vacated as a result of the guidance we received from Judge Brudie's 
law clerk. Attached as Exhibit 3 is a letter from Mike McNichols denying my request to 
depose John Taylor and stating that his schedule would not permit the deposition of John 
Taylor "even if [I was] authorized ... " We have never been permitted the opportunity to 
depose John Taylor on the "illegality" defense and all corporate governance issues 
pertaining to the defense. Contrary to Mr. Nichols' letter, we had already filed two 
motions to compel depositions and discovery, both of which have not been ruled on by 
the Court. We have repeatedly requested discovery and depositions. 
11. The first time I visited AlA Services/AlA Insurance's office was over one 
year ago. At that time, we were permitted to obtain access to AlA Services/AlA 
Insurance's document storage room. Although there were binders of documents that I 
picked up and was not permitted to review, there were other binders referred to as 
"accounting notebooks" that we were permitted to copy. These binders contained a 
wealth of information not previously provided to us regarding totals for year-end, 
financial statements and transactions, despite specific discovery requests. Reed Taylor'S 
shares were redeemed in the 3rd Quarter of 1995. We have never been provided the 
accounting "quarter end" notebook for the 3rd Quarter of 1995. I believe that this binder 
would have significant documents and information pertaining to the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares, but, again, it has not been produced. We have also not received an 
explanation as to possible the location of the binder. 
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12. Reed Taylor's First Requests for Production of Documents include 
specific requests asking for all the "books and records" of AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance, among countless other specific requests (See Affidavit of John Ashby 
notarized on April 16, 2009, Ex. 1). First, all books and records for AlA Services have 
not been produced from 1995 through the present. In fact, Reed Taylor has not been 
provided financial statements for 2009 and other accounting information. On April 10, 
2009, counsel for AlA Services and AlA Insurance, for the first time (see Affidavit of 
John Ashby notarized on April 16, 2009, Ex. 4), indicated that Reed Taylor's Requests 
for Production and Interrogatories propounded to AlA Services and AlA Insurance were 
limited to the time period of 1995 through the present (although even if true, AlA 
Services and AlA Insurance have not complied with these discovery requests). I pulled 
up an electronic version of Reed Taylor's First Requests for Production and the requests 
indicted that they "included" the period of 1995 through the present time. I forwarded 
these Requests for Production to John Ashby and never heard back until I saw his 
Affidavit notarized on April 16, 2009. I promptly reviewed the pending discovery 
requests and served an amended and restated time period for all discovery requests upon 
all defendants, which was filed with the Court. Attached as Exhibit 4 is a letter that I 
sent with the amended and restated time period. I have received no response from any 
defense counsel whether they will provide responsive documents so that I can advise the 
Court. I would also note that the purpose for these limitations was that no transactions or 
documents were at issue prior to 1995 and the alleged "illegality" defense had not been 
asserted. I would also note that Mr. Ashby's argument that we had not requested 
documents prior to 1995 has no bearing whatsoever on the depositions we have requested 
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and his requirement to produce documents relating to his clients' affirmative defenses 
and counterclaims, e.g., the Defendants' "illegality" arguments and asserted violations of 
I.C. § 30-1-6. Counsel for AlA Services and AlA Insurance refuse to provide lists of 
creditors in 1995 through the present time so that we can further support our intended 
beneficiary arguments. 
13. Prior to February 12, 2009, no defendants had relied upon I.C. § 30-1-6 
for any arguments or defenses. When the Defendants (including Connie Taylor and 
James Beck) restated their motion for partial summary judgment and filed it on February 
12, 2009, they asserted, for the first time, that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares 
violated I.C. § 30-1-6. Shortly thereafter, we filed motions to compel depositions and 
discovery. The Defendants have not alleged a violation of 1. C. § 30-1-6 in any of their 
Answers, Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses, and, despite our recent objections, 
have still never moved to amend their Answers and Counterclaims. 
14. As a result of the ongoing discovery problems, I drafted and served 
additional detailed discovery requests to all the Defendants in this action. We have 
received no responses from the Defendants on the production of the requested 
documents, despite my request so as to be able to advise the Court. We have served these 
requests to be more specific and also place the burden on the individual directors and 
officers to comply with discovery. I would note that Reed Taylor had previously moved 
the Court almost one year ago for an order compelling directors and officers to produce 
corporate documents and no order has been issued on that issue (it was my understanding 
from the hearing held in 2008 that the Court was going to enter an order that had a 
mechanism for directors or officers to be required to produce corporate documents in the 
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event the corporations failed to produced them). There is substantial discovery that has 
intentionally not been complied with by the Defendants and their counsel. 
15. Also after the Court clarified that discovery should be broad, I agam 
requested that Richard Riley be deposed. Mr. Riley is a key figure and, as indicated in 
many of the attached exhibits, was intricately involved in the negotiation of the 
redemption agreements, drafting of the redemption agreements and the issuance of an 
opinion letter to Reed Taylor. James LaRue, counsel for Richard Riley, stated that he 
would not make Mr. Riley available for a deposition without a Court order. Attached as 
Exhibit 5 are true and correct copies of emails exchanged between me and Mr. LaRue. 
Attached as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of Eberle Berlin's opinion letter to Reed 
Taylor (page 2 indicates that the opinion letter based upon the knowledge of Richard 
Riley, which is separate and distinct reason to depose him). As we have previously 
indicated, Mr. Riley's firm provided Reed Taylor an opinion letter stating that transaction 
was legal and did not violate any laws, Mr. Riley attended many board meetings, drafted 
the redemption agreements, drafted resolutions, acted as counsel for AlA Services in the 
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and even drafted board resolutions for AlA Services. 
The following documents are true and correct copies of documents recently provided to 
me by Reed Taylor'S counsel, Scott Bell which demonstrate the need to depose Richard 
Riley, 10hn Taylor, 10Lee Duclos, Bruce Sweeny and others to ascertain the issues raised 
in paragraph 16 below (which would assist Reed Taylor in fully responding and possibly 
defeating any and all assertions relating to the illegality defense): 
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a. Attached as Exhibit 7 is a letter from Richard Riley to AlA Services dated 
March 7, 1995. This letter was addresses to AlA Services Corporation and 
JoLee Duclos and referenced board resolutions drafted by Mr. Riley. 
b. Attached as Exhibit 8 is a memorandum from Richard Riley to Scott Bell 
dated May 30, 1995, pertaining to issues relating to the terms and 
conditions of Reed Taylor's redemption agreements. 
c. Attached as Exhibit 9 is fax cover sheet and revised redemption 
agreements from Richard Riley to Reed Taylor dated May 26, 1995, re: 
Stock Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement and Security 
Agreement. It appears that Mr. Riley significantly marked up and revised 
the proposed agreements. This illustrates his involvement in the 
transaction and knowledge of the representations and warranties contained 
in the agreements. 
d. Attached as Exhibit 10 is a letter from JoLee Duclos to Scott Bell dated 
August 14, 1995, re the closing of AlA ServiceslReed Taylor transaction. 
This document illustrates JoLee Duclos' involvement and the fact that 
AlA Services and others were making substantial representations to Reed 
Taylor to induce him to close the transaction (Reed had a right to 
terminate the agreements if all conditions were not met, e.g., opinion letter 
provided, representations and warranties not accurate, etc.). 
e. Attached as Exhibit 11 is a fax from Scott Bell to Richard Riley dated 
April 11, 1995, re the proposed redemption of 500,000 shares of common 
stock. The fax cover sheet indicates that a copy of the proposed letter of 
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intent needed to be forwarded to Bruce Sweeney, the director of AlA 
Services chairing the independent committee established to negotiate with 
Reed Taylor. Mr. Sweeney has never been deposed. For all of the reasons 
stated in this affidavit, Reed Taylor needs to depose him. 
f. Attached as Exhibit 12 is a memorandum to Richard Riley from Scott 
Bell dated April 18, 1995, re the redemption of Reed Taylor stock. This 
memorandum again referenced Bruce Sweeney. 
g. Attached as Exhibit 13 is fax from Richard Riley to Scott Bell dated June 
1, 1995. This document also contains a letter of intent signed by Reed 
Taylor and John Taylor. 
h. Attached as Exhibit 14 is a fax from John Taylor to Scott Bell, Richard 
Riley, and Rich Campanaro dated April 21, 1995. This fax also contains 
memorandum from John Taylor to Reed Taylor dated April 21, 1995. 
16. In sum, Reed Taylor needs further time for discovery to respond to the 
issues raised by the Defendants in Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and the Defendants and Plan's Joinders for the following relating to 
an alleged violation of I.e. § 30-1-6, stock buyback schemes, acquiescence, the parties 
who had a larger role in the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, intended beneficiaries 
and other issues and arguments raised in Reed Taylor's Response and Motions 
(including, without limitation): (a) ascertain the amount of earned surplus from the date 
of incorporation through 1995 and the accounting and related issues used to determine 
the earned surplus (all of the documents requested in discovery should provide the 
answers, if they have not been destroyed), (b) ascertain what the board of directors of 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND - 12 
AlA Services and independent committee established to negotiate the purchase of Reed 
Taylor's shares considered and how they valued AlA Services at the time of the 
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares (i.e., earned surplus and capital surplus, etc.), (c) 
ascertain what Mr. Riley knew and considered as counsel for AlA Services and the party 
responsible for the opinion letter to Reed Taylor stating that the transaction was legal, (d) 
ascertain the value of all of AlA Services' assets in the 1995-1996 time frame, (e) 
ascertain all documents and information as to what extent shareholders approved the 
transaction as this relates directly to using capital surplus under I.C. § 30-1-6 (and if not, 
why? (Mr. Riley and John Taylor (also a licensed attorney at the time) would certainly 
know the answers to these questions», (f) ascertain the total amount of money and 
unallocated expenses fraudulently transferred out of AlA over the years that could have 
been paid to Reed Taylor as a defense to an illegal contract (assuming the redemption 
violated I.C. § 30-1-6 and assuming the Court finds that the agreements were illegal), (g) 
ascertain all knowledge and documents by Richard Riley, Eberle Berlin and others (no 
attorney-client privilege exists if the information cannot be found elsewhere or for 
opinion letters) to all issues pertaining to an alleged violation ofI.C. § 30-1-6 and related 
factual issues, (h) ascertain the value of AIA Services capital surplus in 1995 and 1996, 
(i) ascertain why AlA Services, John Taylor, Richard Riley and other applicable parties 
would represent to Reed Taylor that the redemption was legal and that the corporation 
had the power and right to redeem the shares when they are now arguing otherwise, i.e., 
misrepresentations if sufficient earned and capital surplus was not present, and (j) 
ascertain whether any creditors who were owed money in 1995 exist today, and if so, the 
amount of money they are owed. In addition, I believe that the above discovery would 
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enable Reed Taylor to argue and/or prove that AlA Services, its assets and its contractual 
relationships were valued at sufficiently high valuations by the board or committee to 
justify the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. I also believe that based upon aggressive 
accounting taken in 1994-1995, the earned surplus of AlA Services could be further 
adjusted to properly reflect the amount of earned surplus (i.e., AlA Services wrote off 
millions of dollars of assets in excess of that being necessary as it recognized an over $9 
million profit from the write up of assets in 1997). I also believe that the more discovery 
Reed Taylor is permitted to conduct will only produce more facts and further discovery to 
support all of the arguments asserted in Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law In 
Opposition to Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and the Defendants and 401(k) Plan's Joinders. 
DATED: This 220d day of April, 2009. 
Roderick' C.~Bond 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 220d day of April, 2009. 
-.-
Notary Public for I aho . 
Residing at: --t~---/rli;~.LL.!~""""'--"""'----;r-:--:-;:o 
My commission expires: 
_..o...L-T---'-LT-~'-'----''-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond (wi exhibits) on the 
following parties via the methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants JoLee Duclos and 
Bryan Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorney for R. John Taylor 
David R. Risley 
Randall, Blake & Cox 
1106 Idaho St. 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorney for Connie Taylor, James Beck and 
Corrine Beck 
Gary D. Babbitt 
D. John Ashby 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Attorneys for AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and 
Crop USA Insurance Agency 
James J. Gatziolis 
Charles E. Harper 
Quarles & Brady LLP 
300 North LaSalle Street 
Suite 4000 
Chicago, IL 60654 
Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance Agency 
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( ) Overnight Mail 
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Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
Lewiston, lD 83501 
Attorneys for AlA Services 401(k) Plan 
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Roderick C. Bond 
From: John Ashby Uashby@hawleytroxell.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, April 08, 2009 8:52 AM 
To: Roderick C. Bond 
Cc: Gary Babbitt; Mike Bissell; mmcnichols@clbrmc.com; david@gittinslaw.com; David Risley 
Subject: RE: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. [DMSMSG1.FID319790] 
Rod, 
I explained very clearly in my earlier email the documents that will be available for your review today -- the 1995 
and 1996 ledgers, journals, accounting notebooks and source documents, all of which have been made available 
to you previously. You are free to request that the AlA staff assist you in locating source documents. However, 
you are instructed not to attempt to discuss substantive issues with the AlA staff. Any discussions related to the 
scope of your document review should be had only with counsel. 
I am pretty sure we have produced the most recent US Bank statement, but I understand that AlA will have a 
copy waiting for you. 
-- John 
From: Roderick C. Bond [mailto:rod@scblegal.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2009 5:25 PM 
To: John Ashby; James D. LaRue 
Cc: Gary Babbitt; rjt@lewistondsl.com; Mike Bissell; Sarah L. Riedle 
Subject: RE: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. [DMSMSGl.FID319790] 
John: 
I called Janet and requested a call with the Judge on this issue. We maintain that it is wholly inappropriate what 
you are dOing. Nevertheless, we will be at AlA in the morning and work with what we have. We will want to see 
all documents that relate in any way to the judge's order, including all payments to Reed, etc. (which would 
include all statements for the US Bank account purportedly established for payments to Reed. We will seek 
sanctions for our expert's time. Thank you. 
Rod 
From: John Ashby [mailto:jashby@hawleytroxell.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 20093:53 PM 
To: Roderick C. Bond 
Cc: Gary Babbitt 
Subject: RE: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. [DMSMSG1.FID319790] 
Rod, 
I will let AlA know that you will be at the AlA office tomorrow at 10 am. They will pull the 1995 and 1996 
ledgers, journals and year-end accounting notebooks for your review. The documents will be set in a separate 
room for your review. If you want to look at additional source documents from the 1995-1996 period, just let 
them know and they will do their best to locate the source documents for you. 
If you disagree with the procedure or want to discuss issues separate from the 1995-1996 ledgers, journals and 
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year-end accounting notebooks, those concerns should be addressed directly with Gary or me, not with the AlA 
Staff. 
Finally, please let me know what procedure you intend to use for copying. The procedure last time was to mark 
documents to be copied and have the Litigation Document Group scan and bates number the documents. I 
assume you will use the same procedure. Note, however, that any copy expenses incurred will by paid by Reed 
Taylor. AlA will not be paying any copy cost other than the cost of producing a copy of any disks for AlA's 
records. 
-- John 
From: Roderick C. Bond [mailto:rod@scblegal.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2009 2:44 PM 
To: John Ashby 
Cc: Gary Babbitt; Mike Bissell; rjt@lewistondsl.com; Sarah L. Riedle 
Subject: RE: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. [DMSMSG1.FID319790] 
John: 
We will be at AlA at 10 am tomorrow. 
Rod 
From: John Ashby [mailto:jashby@hawleytroxell.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 07,2009 1:16 PM 
To: Roderick C. Bond 
Cc: Gary Babbitt 
Subject: RE: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. [DMSMSG1.FID319790] 
Rod, 
The Court has limited discovery to the issues related to illegality, specifically referencing "the financial status of 
AlA Services and AlA Insurance in 1995 and 1996." Frankly, we don't see the reason to re-review the documents 
at this time at all. The summary judgment motions have been fully briefed by both sides. Reed Taylor moved for 
56(f) relief to obtain additional discovery, but the Court has now set the summary judgment motions for hearing 
without ordering any additional discovery. 
Please let us know if and when you intend to review the 1995 and 1996 documents. Please also keep in mind 
that the accounting staff are very busy now in tax season. 
-- John 
From: Roderick C. Bond [mailto:rod@scblegal.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 20091:53 PM 
To: John Ashby 
Subject: RE: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. [DM5M5G1.FID319790] 
Thanks John. We would like to look at all journal entries, ledgers and supporting documents pre-1995 as well. A 
well as all current ones through 2009. Thanks. 
Rod 
____________________________ ~I 
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From: John Ashby [mailto:jashby@hawleytroxell.com] 
Sent: Tue 4/7/2009 12:15 PM 
To: Roderick C. Bond; mbissell@cbklawyers.com 
Cc: Gary Babbitt 
Subject: RE: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. [DMSMSG1.FID319790] 
Rod, 
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If you would like to review the ledgers, journal entries, year-end closing notebooks, etc. for the 1995 to 1996 
time period, AlA can have them available tomorrow at 10:00 am. Let me know if you want to review documents 
tomorrow or if you prefer a later date. Just let me know what you decide to do so I can pass it on to AlA. 
As far as electronic spreadsheets, you should also know that the Z drive does not contain spreadsheets prior to 
1999. 
-- John 
From: Roderick C. Bond [mailto:rod@scblegal.com] 
Sent: Saturday, April 04,20091:46 PM 
To: Gary Babbitt; John Ashby; mmcnichols@clbrmc.com; James D. LaRue; jjj@hljlawyers.com 
Cc: rjt@lewistondsl.com; mbissell@cbklawyers.com; Sarah L. Riedle 
Subject: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. 
Hi Gary: 
I presume that you have seen the Court's order setting the hearings. We would like to be at AlA's offices this 
Tuesday and Wednesday. Please confirm the times we can be there. Also, please confirm whether you are 
going to produce any of the paper spreadsheets beforehand. Thanks. 
Rod 
By: Roderick C. Bond 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 Eighth st. 
Lewiston, 10 83501 
Tel: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
rod@scblegal.com 
This email and any attachments may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information, which only the 
authorized recipient may receive and/or view. If you are not an intended reCipient, please promptly delete this 
message and contact the sender at the above address. Thank you. 
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AlA INSURANCE CORPORATION 
I. PETE T. CARR SA. Secretary of Stale of Ihe State of Idaho. hereby certify that 
duplicate originals of niclc or Incorporation for the incorporation of ~lAA--'llbHll!iODw.... __ 
CORPORATION 
duly signed pursu nl 10 thc pro i ion. of the Idah Busi nc~ Corporation Act, ha e been received 
in this office a nd arc found to conform to law. 
A OR I 'C I. Y and by vir ue of the authority e ted in me by law. I issue thi ertificate of 
Incorporation and attach herclo a dup licate original of the rt ic1c. of Incorporation. 
Dated: o.c""r 20. 1983 
s RETARY OF ST TE 
by: _______________ _ 
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ARTICLES OF INCORPOI:tA'fnON 
Utt. i. 3 l.i ' pu fQ " 
OF - I) uJ 
AlA INSURANCE CORPORATION ~,,:. i 1:: 
THE UNDERSIGNED, acting as incorporator of a corporation 
under the Idaho Business Corporation Act, adopts the following Articles of 
Incorporation for such corporation: 
FIRST 
The name of the corporation is AlA INSURANCE CORPORATION. 
SECOND 
The period of its duration is perpetual. 
THIRD 
The purpose for which the corporation is organized is for the 
transaction of any or all lawful business for which the corporation may be 
incorporated under the Idaho Business Corporation Act. 
FOURTH 
The aggregate number of shares which the corporation shall have 
authority to issue is 5,000,000 with a par value of $1.00 per share. 
FIFTH 
Shareholders shall not have a preemptive right to acquire 
unissued or treasury shares or securities convertible into such shares or 
carrying a right to subscribe to or acquire shares, except as provided in the 
Idaho Business Corporation Act. 
SIXTH 
The location of the initial registered office of the corporation is 
One Lewis Clark Plaza, Lewiston, Idaho 83501 and the name of its initial 
registered agent at such address is R. John Taylor. 
SEVENTH 
The number of directors constituting the initial Board of 
Directors is four, and the names and addresses of the persons who are to 
serve until the first annual meeting of the shareholders and until their 
successors are elected and qualified are: 
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION- P. 1 
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NAME 
Reed J. Taylor 
R. John Taylor 
ADDRESS 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Raymond R. Heilman P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Mary K. Frost 
EIGHTH 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
The name and address of the incorporator is as follows: 
Reed J. Taylor 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
NINTH 
The Board of Directors is expressly authorized to alter, amend or 
repeal the By-Laws of the corporation and to adopt new By-Laws, subject to 
repeal or change by a majority vote of the shareholders. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal 
this ~ day of December, 1983. 
£. [6,,/ )~. ~. ') 1 ~
Reed J. 'I"aylo 
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION - P. 2 
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CONSENT TO USE CORPORTION NAME 
A.I.A., Inc., hereby consents to the use of corporate name, "AlA Insurance 
Corporation ll , by the incorporated thereof, and by the corporation to be formed 
using that name as its corporate name. 
12/19/83 
Date 
State of Idaho 
County of Nez Perce 
On this 19..th day of Dec. • in the year 1983, before me Bobette Ruddell 
personally appeared Reed J. Taylor known to me as President of A.I.A., Inc., 
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that 
he executed the same. 
My commission expires 3/15/84 
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ATE OF AMENDME 
OF 
AlA INSURANCB CORPORATION 
I PETE . CE RR U A. ecretary of Slate of the State of Idaho hereby. certif. thai 
duplicate origin 1 of rticles of Amendment to the rlides of I ncorporalJon of 
duly signed and verified pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho Bu ine orporalion ACL, have 
been recei ved in Ihi. office and are found 10 conform 10 law. 
A OROI G Yandbyvirtucoftheaut h rilyvestl!dinmeb.law. l i s~tlelhis· n i lt:atcuf 
Amendment to the Articles f Incorporation and attaeh hereto a duplicate original of the rticlc: 
of Amendment. 
Dated ----------4:~~_Itf!~~6_---. J 9 iHlt---
• F. RF. RY OF ST 
CAM 779 
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ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT 
TO THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION 
OF 
AlA INSURANCE CORPORATION 
* = * * * * * * * * * 
(./' W r'1 _ 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 30-1-61 of the Idaho 1f@si.liir.,Qss 
rn .z:-
• .-4 
Corporation Act, the undersigned corporation adopts the following Ar~cl,!,)of 
-< 
Amendment to its Articles of Incorporation. o 0 ..,.. ~ 





SECOND: The following amendments to the Articles of Incorporation 
were adopted by the shareholders of the corporation on the 29th day of 
August, 1986 J in the manner prescribed by the Idaho Business Corporation 
Act: 
"FIRST 
The name of the corporation is AlA SERVICES CORPORATION." 
THIRD~ The number of shares of the corporation outstanding at the 
time of such adoption was _1-<.....,0,-,0:....0 __ ; and the number of shares entitled to 
vote thereon was 1,000 
FOURTH: The designation and number of outstanding shares of each 
class entitled to vote thereon as a class were as follows: 
Number of Shares: 
Common 1,000 
FIFTH: The number of shares voted for such amendment was 
1 t 000 ; and the number of shares voted against such amendment was 
o 
ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT - P. 1 
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DATED this 13th day ofOc~ober, 1986. 
AIA INSURANCE CORPORATION 
By 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
Ada. :S8. 
County of Nez-t'eTce ) 
I, Ma Amri t Savi to , a Notary Public, do hereby certify that 
on this 13th day of October, 1986, personally appeared before me REED J. 
TAYLOR, who, being by me first duly sworn, declared that he is the 
President of AlA INSURANCE CORPORATION, that he signed the foregoing 
document as President of the corporation, and that the statements contained 
therein are true. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: Boise> Idaho 
ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT - P. 2 
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CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone (208) 743-6538 
Fax (208) 746-0753 
Roderick C. Bond 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
LAWYERS 
April 15, 2009 
Re: Taylor v. AlA, et. al. 
Dear Rod: 
RECF!VED 
Sw\l '; i _ ... "~d!~)l\'· 
1j;:{~FBrb\Vn 
Justin J. Coleman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch'" 
Eric K. Peterson'" 
Bentley G. Stromberg 






Philip E. Peterson 
(1922-2003) 
I received your e-mail stating that the judge had declared discovery to be "as broad as possible" 
and your desire to depose John Taylor "again immediately". 
Though Judge Brudie did clarify a part of paragraph (2) of his order of January 30, 2009, there 
was no discussion about paragraph (1) of the order dealing with depositions. 
As you recall, in the context of whether JoLee Duclos' deposition could be taken under the 
order of January 30, 2009, all counsel spoke to Judge Brudie's law clerk, Arne' Cochnauer on 
the telephone. Ms. Cochnauer told us that it was the Court's intent that no depositions other 
than those of Connie Taylor and James Beck were to be taken. 
During that telephone conversation, Ms. Cochnauer invited you to fIle a motion and request an 
order shortening time for hearing to request the authority to take additional depositions. You 
did not fIle a motion requesting permission to take additional depositions. 
I have tried to reach both John Taylor and JoLee Duclos today by telephone without success. 
I'm going to be out of the offIce in Seattle tomorrow and Friday. I have 4 depositions scheduled 
on Monday, April 20, and 4 depositions scheduled on Tuesday, April 21, and 1 deposition 
scheduled on Wednesday, April 22 in another case. Accordingly, even if you were authorized 
to take John Taylor's deposition, we would not be able to accommodate you before the 
Summary Judgment hearing on Thursday, April 23. 
Very truly yours, 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
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ccAFFfuA«v¥r1(jp!jfODERICK C. BOND 
JERRY V.SMITH t 
NED A.CANNON 
RODERICK C. BOND' 
t Rerired (12-31-05) 
" Licensed in Idaho and WasMnqron 
April 17, 2009 
Michael McNichols 
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Re: Reed Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et al. 
Case No. CV 07-00208 
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Attached are Reed Taylor's Amended and Restated Time Period Applicable to All Requests for 
Production and Interrogatories Propounded Upon All Defendants in this Action and Notice of Services 
for the same. As a result of the Defendants untimely and un-pled arguments and refusal to produce 
documents for earlier time period based upon such new arguments, Reed Taylor has been forced to take 
this unnecessary action. 
As I want to be clear in my next Affidavit to the Court in Support of Reed Taylor's Rule 56(f) 
Continuance, please advise me in writing when you all will be able to provide full and complete answers 
and responsive documents. I understand that you have 30 days under the Civil Rules to comply. Thus, 
if you need the full 30 days, please let me know so that I can advise the Court in my Affidavit. If you 
are going to produce the documents and interrogatories immediately, please immediately let me know in 
writing. 
In an email to Mr. Ashby, I cited to language that I believed was the proper time period in Reed Taylor's 
First Requests for Production. I was incorrect. I apologize to Mr. Ashby as I opened an electronic copy 
of Reed Taylor's First Requests for Production, which I have ascertained was an earlier version than the 
version actually served, i.e., the language was revised to "cover" from "include." 





All Defense Counsel 
April 17, 2009 
Page- 2 
I have also been highly frustrated by all of your failures to comply with discovery, even after Judge 
Brudie ordered that discovery 'regarding the "illegality" argument be construed as broadly as possible 
(after you all stated that the order's language of "including" means "only"). I remain perplexed why the 
Defendants do not comply with discovery. We can only construe your failure to comply with discovery 
as evidence that you are not producing documents and information that is damaging to your arguments. 
In addition, I would note, however, that a violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 was first raised on February 12, 
2009, by the defendants in this action. Despite Reed Taylor's objections to Connie Taylor and James 
Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the Joinders based upon discovery violations, expert 
witness deadline and discovery violations, and pleading problems, not a single defendant has moved to 
amend hislher/its answer and affirmative defenses and not a single defendant has provided any specific 
responses to' interrogatories propounded by Reed Taylor. 
Despite our objections, requests and demands, I note that James Beck has still not provided any answers, 
responses or documents to Reed Taylor's First Discovery Requests to James and Corrine Beck, which 
do not have time period limitations and were served on March 26, 2008. I also note that Connie Taylor 
has not provided any responses to Reed Taylor's interrogatories pertaining to defenses and 
counterclaims and has not produced a single document, despite being served the requests for production 
and interrogatories on October 21, 2007. 
I note that all of you have taken the position that Reed Taylor is not entitled to take any depositions 
based upon the Court's order limiting discovery, even Judge Brudie again advised us in open Court that 
discovery pertaining to "illegality" defense be broadly construed. For example (just a few of many), it is 
amazing how you all can sit back and argue that shareholder approval was not obtained and that there 
was insufficient surplus (among other arguments) when you know that Reed Taylor has never been able 
to question John Taylor, Richard Riley (AlA Services' counsel and the attorney who provided an 
opinion letter to Reed Taylor regarding the transaction), JoLee Duclos or other members of the board of 
ALA Services and the independent committee established to negotiate and complete the redemption of 
Reed Taylor's shares. You all also know how busy the Court is in other actions and you have prayed 
upon that fact by disregarding all Idaho Civil Rules of Civil Procedure on discovery. 
Finally, based upon the belated expert witness affidavit submitted by Connie Taylor and James Beck 
after the deadline to disclose expert witnesses, we will seek sanctions for the attorneys' fees, costs and 
thousands of dollars in expert witness fees attributable to responding to Mr. Hooper's untimely and 
inappropriate Affidavit as provided in I.R.C.P. 56(g). 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND 
All Defense Counsel 
April 17, 2009 
Page-3 
If any of you need additional time to respond or complete discovery and/or you desire to permit Reed 
Taylor to conduct full and fair discovery regarding the "illegality" defense and his defenses to this 
defense (including depositions), please let me know immediately so that I can fully address these issues 
to the Court in my Affidavit or we can stipUlate to such to save the Court and the parties time and 
money. Otherwise, I will proceed accordingly on Monday or Tuesday of next week based upon the 
information in my possession at that time. 
I look forward to hearing from you. Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
SMITH, CANNwN & B,' PLLC 
--'--10' ;' ./ 
//-
By: R~d~ick C. S6nd 
RCB:rb 
Enclosures 
cc: Reed Taylor via email (wI enclosures) 
Michael Bissell via email ( wf enclosures) 
Charles Brown via email (wI enclosures) 
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From: James D. LaRue [JDL@elamburke.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2009 2:45 PM 
To: Gary Babbitt; John Ashby; Roderick C. Bond 
Cc: mbissell@cbklawyers.com; rjt@lewistondsl.com; Sarah L. Riedle 
Subject: RE: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. 
Mr. Bond: 
The issue of whether Richard Riley, or others, can be deposed prior to the summary judgment hearing was 
raised in a telephone conference with Judge Brudie's law clerk, attended telephonically by Loren Ipsen of my 
firm. During that conference, I understand Judge Brudie's law clerk stated that the Judge had intended only 
that Jim Beck and Connie Taylor be deposed. Your client's 2/11/09 Motion to Compel Discovery, etc., argued 
that the Court should grant Rule 56(f) relief and your Affidavit of that date identified Richard Riley as an 
individual from whom you sought a deposition prior to the hearing on the summary judgment. Your client's 
2/19/09 Motion to Compel Discovery, etc., made the same argument. I understand those motions were fully 
briefed and argued, though no decision has been rendered by Judge Brudie on either motion. I further 
understand that the Court has set the motion for summary judgment for hearing without ordering any additional 
depositions. The latest Rule 56(f) Motion, filed 4/9/09 by your client, again argued that Richard Riley should be 
deposed. Thus, it appears that the issue of whether Mr. Riley, or others, should be deposed has been placed 
squarely before the Court and the Court has not agreed with your position that Mr. Riley's (or Hawley Troxell's) 
deposition can be taken. I further understand that at the hearing last Thursday, the Court's limited discovery 
order was discussed, but only in the context of a dispute over whether pre-1995 accounting documents should 
be produced. I am advised that the Court did not address, nor did counsel for any party inquire about, 
additional depositions. 
For the above reasons, I will not make Richard Riley available for a deposition or accept service of a subpoena 
on his behalf, nor will I make Hawley Troxell available for a record production deposition or accept service of a 
subpoena on its behalf, until I receive a copy of an Order from Judge Brudie authorizing such depositions. If 
you have such an Order, kindly produce it at your earliest convenience. otherwise, I sincerely hope you don't 
cause my clients or my firm to incur unnecessary costs and expenses in filing a motion to quash such 
subpoenas, should they be served. 
Jim LaRue 
James D. LaRue 
Elam & Burke, P .A. 
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
BOise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-5454 
(208) 384-5844 (fax) 
jdl@elamburke.com 
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt from 
disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately by 
replying to this message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute it. Thank you. 
»> On 4/14/2009 at 3:45 PM, in message 05l..f 
<9D123FFF6EA0644A8F4509AAA2836D5F1FOF28@ALGHOST.alghost.local>, "Roderick C. BJIi." __ ~~O~\_!t. 
<rod@scblegal.com> wrote: EXHIBIT 
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Thanks Jim (is it okay to call you Jim?). FYI, because we are on a short time frame, I am looking at early 
next week-Monday or Tuesday. I would also like to see the documents at that time as well. I am basing the 
depo on the opinion letter provided to Reed Taylor, the fact that Dick Riley was involved in the entire 
transaction and the fact that we cannot find answers to many questions elsewhere (although I believe the 
opinion letter alone will give us the information we need, which of course is not privileged in any way). 
Thanks. 
Rod 
From: James D. LaRue [mailto:JDL@elamburke.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 2:38 PM 
To: Gary Babbitt; John Ashby; Roderick C. Bond 
Cc: mbissell@cbklawyers.com; rjt@lewistondsl.com; Sarah L. Riedle 
Subject: Re: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. 
Mr. Bond. 
I am in receipt of your two emails and will be in contact with my clients re: same. 
Jim 
James D. LaRue 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-5454 
(208) 384-5844 (fax) 
.iQl@~lamburke.com 
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt 
from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us 
immediately by replying to this message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute 
it. Thank you. 
»> On 4/14/2009 at 2:40 PM, in message 
<9D123FFF6EA0644A8F4509AAA2836D5F1FOF25@ALGHOST.alghost.1ocal>, "Roderick C. Bond" 
<rod@scblegal.com> wrote: 
Hi Mr. LaRue: 
Will you accept service of a subpoena duces tecum/records deposition to be served upon Hawley 
Troxell? We need to get this done asap as well. Thanks. 
Rod 
By: Roderick C. Bond 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 Eighth St. 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Tel: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
rod@scblegal.com 
This email and any attachments may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information, which ~ St(S 
only the authorized recipient may receive and/or view. If you are not an intended recipient, please 
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Roderick C. Bond 
From: Roderick C. Bond 
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 1 :38 PM 
To: 'James O. LaRue'; 'Gary Babbitt'; John Ashby 
Cc: 'rjt@lewistondsl.com'; 'mbissell@cbklawyers.com'; Sarah L. Riedle 
Subject: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. 
Hi Mr. LaRue: 
In open court last Thursday, the judge stated that everything to do with the redemption was fair game. Please 
provide dates for Mr. Riley's deposition. Thank you. 
Rod 
By: Roderick C. Bond 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 Eighth St. 
Lewiston, 10 83501 
Tel: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
[od@Scblegal.com 
This email and any attachments may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information, which only the 
authorized recipient may receive and/or view. If you are not an intended recipient, please promptly delete this 
message and contact the sender at the above address. Thank you. 
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Eae:RLE., Ee:RLIN, KADING, TURNaOW &: McKLVe:EN, 
CHARTf?:~EO 
Reed J. Taylor 
P.O. Box 538 
4wiston ID 83501 
ATTORNEYS ANI!) COUNS":l.OFtS AT LAw 
C"'I>'TO!. PARK f'~A 
300 NORTH SIXTM S'tREET 
PosT OFF1CE Box 135e 
BOISE, IOAHO 'e3701 
August 15, 1995 
Re: Common Stock Redemption 
, 
Dear Mr. Taylor; 
TELIl:"Iofc)~!!: 
(20a) jo ...... -SS3S 
F"AJ:::SIMI LE 
120S) 344-S54l! 
.lAMe:s .... el1"UN 
Of' CoUNSEL 
This opinion is being delivered to you pl.ttsuant to Section 2.50) of the Stock Redemption 
Agreement dated July 22, 1995 ( "Agreement") by and between AIA Services Corporation, an 
Idaho COIporation ("Company") and Reed J. Taylor. All capitalized terms not defined herein 
shall have the respective meanings ascribed to them in the Agreement. The phrase "Transaction 
Documents" refers collectively to the Agreement, together with the Note, the Pledge Agreement, 
the Security Agreement, the Consulting Agreement and the Noncompetition Agreement, as such 
documents are defined :in the Agreement. 
We have acted as general counsel for the Company in connection with the transactions 
contemplated by the Agreement. As such general counsell we have assisted in the negotiation, 
and have examined executed counterparts (or photostatic copies of executed counterparts) of the 
Agreement and other Transaction Documents. 
In addition, we have examined originals, executed counterparts or copies of such 
agreements, corporate records, instruments and certificates., certificates of public authorities and' 
such matters of law as we have deemed necessary for the purpose of rendering the opinions set 
forth herein. To the extent we deemed necessary for the pUIposes of this opinion. we have 
relied upon. (i) the statements and representations of the Company as to factual matters, (li) the 
corporate records provided to us by the Company, and (iii) certificates and other documents 
obtained from public officials. We have further relied as to factual matters on the representations 
and warranties contained in the Agreement and the other Transaction Docllments (including, 
without limitation, Mr. Taylor's representations in Article N of the Agreement) and on the 
Company's representations in Schedule m (attached) to the Agreement; and we have assumed 
the completeness and accuracy of all such representations and warranties as to factual matters. 
We have assumed the genuineness of all signatures (other than those of the Company), the legal 
capacity of Mr. Taylor to execute the Agreement and all other documents we have reviewed, 
the authenticity of aIJ documents submitted to us as originals. and the conformity to original 
documents of all documents submitted to us as certified, photostatic, reproduced or conformed 
copies. We have further assumed that the Agreement and the other Transaction Documents have 
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been duly authorized, executed and delivered by Mr. Taylor and are enforceable against him in 
accordance with their respective terms, and that the execution, delivery and performance of the 
Agreement and the other Transaction Documents by Mr. Taylor does not and will not result in 
. a breach of, or constitute a default under. any agreement, instrument or other document to which 
Mr. Taylor is a party, or any order, judgment, writ or decree applicable to such party to which 
Mr. Taylor's property is subject. 
Whenever our opinion with respect to the existence or absence of facts is indicated to be 
based on ,our knowledge, we are referring to the actual knowledge of R. M. Turnbow and 
Richard A. Riley, who are the sole atto~eys in Eberle, Berlin, Kading. Turnbow & McKlveen, 
Chartered who have represented the Company during the course of our reptesenmtion in this 
transaction. Except as expressly set forth ~erein, we have not undertaken any independent legal 
or factual investigation to detemline the existence or absence of such facts, and no inference as 
to our knowledge of the existence or absence of such facts should be drawn from such 
representation. 
Based upon and SUbject to our examination and assumptiOml as aforesaid and subject to 
the qualifications hereinafter set forth, we are of the opinion that, except as set forth in the 
attached Schedule ill andlor the Schedules attached to the Agreement: 
1. The Company is a corporation du1y organized and validly existing under 
the laws of the State of Idaho. Based solely on the attached Certificates of Corporate Status 
issued by the Idaho Secretary of State, the Company, The Universe Life Insurance Company 
("Universe"), AlA Insurance, Inc. ("AIAI") and Fanners Health Alliance Administrators, Inc. 
("Farmers") are corporations incorporated under the corporation laws of the State of Idaho and 
in good standing on the records of the Idaho Secretary of State. 
2. The Com.pany and its Subsidiaries have full corporate power and authority 
to enter into, execute and deliver the Transactions Documents and to perform their respective 
obligations thereunder; all corporate action on the part of Company and its SubSidiaries, and 
their respective directors and shareholders, necessary for the authorization, execution, delivery 
and performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents and the 
consummation of the transactions' contemplated thereby has been taken; and the Transaction 
Documents have been duly executed and delivered by Company and its Subsidiaries. The 
Transaction Documents constitute the valid and binding obligation of Company and its 
Subsidiaries enforceable against them in accordance with their respective terms) except that 
enforceability may be limited by (a) appUcable bankruptcy,. insolvency, moratorium, 
reorganization j fraudulent transfer. receivership~ cOllservatorship or similar laws affecting 
creditor's rights generally, (b) the exercise of judicial discretion in accordance with general 
principles of equity (whether applied by a court of law or equity) and (c) considerations of public 
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3. Neither the execution and delivery of the Transaction Documents by 
Company and its Subsidiaries, nor the consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby, 
will (a) conflict with. or violate any provision of their respective Articles of Incorporation or 
Bylaws, as amended; or (b) constitute a violation or default under any indebtedness, indenture, 
mortgage, deed of trust, note, bond, license, lease agreement. or other material agreement or 
instrument to which Company or any of its Subsidiaries is a party or to which any of its assets 
or the as~s of its Subsidiaries may be subject; or (c) to the best of our knowledge, violate any 
law, rule, license, regulation, judgment, order, ruling, or decree, including any il18lltance laws 
or regulations of any jurisdiction to which Company or any of its Subsidiaries are subject, 
governing or affecting the operation of Company or its Subsidiaries in any material respect. 
Neither the execution and delivery of the Transaction Documents by Company and its 
Subsidiaries, nor the consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby. will constitute an 
event permitting termination of any material agreement or the acceleration of any indebtedness 
of the Company or other liability, with or without notice or lapse of time, or result in the 
creation or imposition of any lien upon the Collateral. 
4. No consent, authorization, approval or exemption by, or filing with, any 
Person or any Governmental Authority is required in connection with the execution, deliyery and 
performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents, or the taldng of 
any action contemplated thereby, except such as have been obtained prior to Closing. 
5. All of the currently outstanding Pledged Shares are owned beneficially and 
of record by Company and, to the best of our knowledge, there are no warrants, options, or 
other rights to purchase such Pledged Shares. 
6. Except for the lien of First Interstate Lien upon the First Interstate Shares, 
and any interest in the Commission collateral created or granted in fayor of The Centennial Life 
Insurance Company pursuant to that certain Reimbursement Agreement dated Angust 11, 1995 
among The Centennial Life Insurance Company, AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insumnce, 
Inc., The Universe Life Insurance Company and AlA MidAmerica, lnc., the Collateral is free 
and clear of all pledges, liens, encumbrances, security interests, equities, claims, or options. 
Upon delivery of certificates representing the Pledged Shares of AIAI and Fanners to 
Shareho1der at Closing, Shareholder shall have at Closing a perfected first priority security 
interest in such Pledged Shares. 
7. To our knowledge, there are no claims, actions, suits, proceedings or 
investigations pending or threatened against or relating to Company or any of its Subsidiaries. 
at law or in equity before Ot by any Governmental Authority, nor has any such action, suit, 
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proceeding or investigation been pending during the three-year period preceding the date hereof. 
Neither Company nor any of its Subsidiaries is in default with respect to any adjudicatory order, 
writ, injunction or decree of any Governmental authority, and neither Company nor any of its 
Subsidiaries is a party tD any cease and desist order. supervisory agreement or arrangement, 
consensual or otherwise, with any Governmental Authority. 
The foregoing opinions are limited to the laws and .regulations of the State of Idaho 
(excluding the principles of conflicts of laws); and we have not considered and expressed no 
opinion o~ the laws or regulations of any other jurisdiction. This opinion is rendered only with 
respect to the laws and the rules, regulations and orders (excluding the principles of conflicts 
of laws) of the State of Idaho that are in effect as of the date hereof. We assume no 
responsibility for updating this opinion to take into account any event, action, interpretation or 
change of law occurring sUbsequent to the date hereof that may affect the validity of any of the 
opinions expressed herein. 
The enforceability opinion expressed in opinion '2 of this letter is subject to the 
following additional qualifications: 
(i) The terms of any commission agreement, lockbox agreement or other 
account agreement which may affect the Commission Collateral, the rights of the parties 
(other than Company or any of its Subsidiaries) to any such agreement, and any claim 
or defense of such parties against the Company or any of its Subsidiaries rising under or 
outside any such agreement. 
(ii) The qualification that certain rights, remedies and waivers contained in the 
Transaction Documents may be rendered ineffective, or be limited t by applicable Idaho 
laws or judicial decisions governing such rights, remedies and waivers; but the inclusion 
of such rights, remedies and waivers does not affect the validity or enforceability of other 
provisions of the Transaction Documents and, in the event the Company or any of its 
Subsidiaries does not comply with the material terms of the Transaction Documents, Mr. 
Taylor may exercise remedies that woUld nonnally be available under Idaho law to a 
secured party provided Idaho law applies and Mr. Taylor proceeds in accordance with 
such law. 
(iii) We express no opinion with respect to the perfection or the relative 
priority of the security interests granted to Mr. Taylor in tbe Commission Collateral. 
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This opinion is furnished by u.s solely for your benefit for use in connection with the 
Transaction Documents and the transactions contemplated therebYt and it may not be furnished 
or quoted: to~ or relied upon, by any other person. 
Very truly yours, 
sf 
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RICHARO A. RILEY 
ESERLE, BE~LlN, KADING, TURNSOW & McKLVEEN, 
CHARTERED 
ATTORNEYS ANO COUNSELORS AT LAW 
CAPITOL PARK PLAZA 
300 NORTH SIXTH STREET 
POST O"ICE Box 1368 
BOISE, IOAHO 63701 





......... ES L. BERLIN 
0 .. COUNSEL 
T. H. EBERLE (1922-1977) 
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 
JoLee Duclos 
Legal Assistant 
AIA Services Corporation 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Re: AlA Corporation Board Meeting - March 7, 1995 
Dear JoLee: 
Enclosed please find two complete sets of Resolutions adopted at the meeting of AlA 
Services Corporation's Board of Directors on March 7, 1995, together with attached exhibits. 
The unmarked copy is for the corporation's original records. The second set is a marked copy 
showing the changes I made from the drafts contained in the Board notebook. The markup 
reflects my understanding of the changes from the drafts which were discussed and agreed upon 
by the Board. You and Dan might compare your own notes to verify the accuracy and 
completeness of those changes. 
Also enclosed please find duplicate original Articles of Amendment to the Articles of 
Incorporation of AlA Services Corporation. I would appreciate your verifying the outstanding 
shares shown on page 16 of the Articles of Amendment and the number of shares voted for and 
against the amendment as set forth on page 17 of the Articles of Amendment. Please have John 
and Dan sign and date the Articles of Amendment, have a notary public complete the verification 
on page 17 and return both duplicate originals to me for filing. 
Please give me a call if the resolutions or exhibits need any further work or jf you have 
any other questions. 
RARls 
Enclosure 
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Richard A. Riley 
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EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW 
& MeKLVEEN, CHARTERED 
300 North Sixth Street 
Post Office Box 1368 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1368 
Telephone No.: (208) 344-8535 
Facshnile No.: (208) 344--8542 
FAX COVER SHEET 
DATE: May 30, 1995 
PAGES INCLUDING THIS SHEET: 4 
TO: Scott .Bell 
NUMBER CALLED: (206) 587-.2308 
FROM: Richard Riley 
MA ITER: 80550-4 
MEMO: 
If transmission is not properly received please call Savito at (208) 344-8535. 
* '" II< :I< * :I< 
The information containfld in this transmission is attorney-client privileged, cOnfidential atld intended only for the use 
Qf tIle individual or entity named above. H the reader of this message is not tIle intended recipient, you are herbby 
notified that any dig.'lemirultion, distribution or copying of this COIDIl1Umcation is strictly prohibited. It" you have received 
this communication in error, pJease notify us immediately QY coUect telephone and relUm the orlginul message to us at 
the above address via U.S. Mail. We will rejmhurse you for postage. Thank you. 
EXHIBIT 






SCOTT BELL, R • .JOHN TAYLOR 
RICHARD A. RlLEY 
REED TA YWR.'S STOCK REDEMPTION 
May 30, 1995 
PRINCIPAL BUSINESS ISSUES 
1. Pledge of stock and commissions is not intended to secure Consulting Agreement 
$147,OOO/year. 
2. Definition of proscribed business for noncompete purposes: farm association 
insurance business, not farm association ~ insurance business. Must be consistent with 
Agent of Record which covers life and disability insurance-only property and casualty insurance 
is excluded. 
3. Fix Debit Balance at 4/2t/95 (date of letter of intent). Offset subsequent draws 
and advances against Consulting Agreement. 
4. Limit Company's representations and warranties to matters directly related to 
authorization of transaction, title to security, etc. Company should not make representations and 
warranties about Company's financial condition and other matters which Reed knows as well as 
anyone. 
5. Definition of quaJi.fying Bonds (Stock Pledge §1O): 
(i) Stock pledge terminates upon funding of Bonds with $6 million maturity 
value at tenth anniversary; security interest in commissions continues to secure payment of 
interest. 
(ii) Stock pledge and security interest in cQmmissio!l~ terminate upon funding 
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AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND 
8655 
with Bonds with current value of $6 million and bearing interest at projected rate comparable 
to rate on Note. See Stock Pledge §11.5; Security Agreement §§4,9.4. 
6. Do not incorporate Series' A and First Interstate Bank covenants (Stock 
Redemption Agreement §5.1 (m». Replace with cr05s-default provision. 
7. Financial covenants 1n Redemption Agreement (§5.1) cease upon full funding of 
Bonds. 
8. Need for escrow agent/trustee to hold pledged stock. 
9. Lockbox agreement not ,irrevocable; but will require institution to notify Reed of 
any cancellation~ termination, amendment, etc. No $42,000 minimum in lockbox (Security 
Agreement §4). 
10. Acceleration of principal (and discounted PV of interest) only if default is 
material: Need to work on materiality standard. See Stock Pledge Agreement §8; Security 
Agreement §5. Conform Stock Redemption Agreement §8.2. 
I-:\uSERS\l!J\VITO\W~"''''IA\AIA\8f.nVlcp.Mtll·MtM,1 
o~rJoIU~ 1D:31 .. "," 
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SCOTT BELL; R. JOHN TAYLOR 
RICHARD A. RILEY 
RE: REED TAYLOR'S STOCK REDEMPTION 
DATE: May 30,1995 
PRINCIPAL LEGAL ISSUES 
1. Indemnification provision (Redemption Agreement §6.2) doesn't fit indemnity for 
breach of representations and warranties. 
2. Add conditions to Company's obligation to close. 
3. Fonu A approval requirement should be condition precedent to foreclosure on 
ULle (GFL) stock. 
4. Idaho law should govern aU agreements. 
5. Stock Pledge (§11.5) should terminate upon full funding of bonds. 
iNll~""'V?'tplnrl,1,\T,III~trlJtncll:'tlR1-.MtU.,J­
MfJfJ,1M rd.~ 
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Post Office Box 1368 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1368 
Telephone: (208) 344-8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542 
FAX COVER SHEET 
DATE: i':2f., If;-
t 
PAGES INCLUDING THIS SHEET: 2i-
. C3t?&J 5~~ - J3D~ 
UC-IZ (), k~i 
[] Original will follow 
[ J by U.S, Mail ClLl [ jby __________ __ 
~ Original wi/! not follow· 
f] Please review and call me 
[] For your approval/signature 
; 
( -' 
[J Response needed by ____ --_________ ~--
IF TRANSMISSION IS NOT PROPERLY RECEIVED, PLEASE CALL BETH AT (208) 344u 8535. 
THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS TRANSMISSION IS ATIORNEY-CLJENT PRIVILEGED, 
CONFIDENTIAL, AND INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE, OF THE INOIVIDUAL OR ENTITY NAMED 
ABOVE IF THE REA.DER OF THIS MESSAGE IS NOT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY 
NOTIFIED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS 
STRICn Y PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS COMMUNICATION IN ERROR, PLEASE 
NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY BY COLLECT TELEPHONE AND RETURN THE 0 US 
AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS VIA U.S. MAIL. WE WILL REIMBURSE YOU U8Ss8 
'in 
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Stock Redemption Agreement 
This Stook Redemption Agreement (this "Agreement") is made and entered into as of 
, 1995~ by and among AIA Services Corporation, an Idaho cD:rporation 
-:::-:::-!'l:l.'P-Illl::::::::;Y;;:::,,)=, an::::::.......~· d J. Taylot' ("Shareholder"), 11 .J.... ~ 
IL (J f-bnYlc; -{ {i4'2 utu-rt. CU ~fI- j;n~uJ't:Yrll.e.r 
wrrtl~ Recitals Z:n t- • 
~ A. COIPpany is parent holding company and owner of all of the capital stock of 
Tht.- Universe Life ance Co any. an Idaho domestic insurance company (<<Universe), AlA 
lrururanco, Inc., IdMo c rporation ("AlAl")1 and Fanne:rs HoolthAlliance Administrators,. 
Inc .• an Idaho corpor~tiQ "Fanners"). Great :Fidelity Life Insurance Company, a stock life . 
insurance company d~midled· in Indiana ("Great Fidelity"), is ~ wholly-owned subsidiary of I 
Universe, . 
B. Shnreholder owns 6]3,494 shares of COmnlon siock (}f Company (the "Shares':'). 
C. Company desires to redeem the Shares and Shareholder desires that the Shares be 
redeemed, on the tenns and subject to the conditions hereinafter set fortb. 
Agreement 
Fol' good and valua.ble consideration: ,the receipt and sufficiency of which ate hereby 
. acknowledged. the parties agree as follows: 
Article I -Definitions 
In addition to the temJ.S defUled elsewhere in thi$ Agreement, including the preamble and 
recitals above, thl! following termg !Shall take the following ascribed meanings: 
"Agreement, " "this Agreement H "hereto," "hereof," "herein; " "h~nnmdfJr~ tl uherehy'~ 
and similar expressions refer to this Agreeroent, including the schedules and exm'bits attached 
hen~to, and not any specific article. section, subsection 9t other ,subdIvision hereof or thereof . 
.. oOJ\(~,>" hct~ ~ fllea.nl~ ~<J.thhf~ q.", l'r Iry ~~ to t>f 1+/lJ,J Sioc..k 
"CAP Pragrtdn" has the meaning ascribed to it on. Schedule 1 attached hereto. r lc:Jve... 
" . ~~~ 
"CAP Program Tcingihle Property" has the meanmg asCIibcd to it on Schedule 1 eDt T.3) 
attached hereto. 
"CAP Sel'Vicfs Center Balanc~ JI has the meaning asctibed to it on Schedule 1 attached 
hereto. 
"Collateral" refers collectively to the collateml to be given to secure all of the obligations 
of Company to Shafcholdtil' under this Agreement, including but not limited to (l) all of the 
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outstanding oap stock ofUni'V01'si AlAl and FannersJ and any capital stock acquired by 
Company after the, Closing, includirig any stock acquired as a result of a dividend made to 
'7_ om~ by Universe (including a dividend of the stoQk of Great Fidelity)"JiIU,Ii1:&f8 811 ht\f;-
an dividends 0 proceeds with respect to any such stock (collectively, the ~'Pledged .. 
Shares"); (2) alilllsurallce ~~ommissions paid 01' payable to' or fO'r tilt:: benefit of Company or its 
direct or ifi~ Subsidiariewd any interest accrued in oonnection therewith (the • 
"Connnissions"); and (3) the~nds drr:,d_itn\.t1iI"S;l~ and any interest aocrued in . I 
connection therevvith{tHe "Beads'?+. bl!- 'Ii ~' 
_---.-- ' pi 'I- A. "I ~ ~11 'J-( 
~ the meaning ascribed '" it On Schedule 1 attached hereto. ~~ 
"First Interstate" means First Intcmtate Bank ofIdaho, N.A. cl..~~. I~ ~~1t1 
. /J.~ ttv 
CIGMP" means generally l1c~ted accounting principles, as defmed by "the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
"Governmental Authartly" means any nation or government, foreign or domestic. any 
state O'A~ other political subdivIsion thereof. and any agency or other entity exercisillg executive, 
legislative, judicial, regulatory Or fldmin.istrative fun.cnons of government., including, vvithout 
limitation, all state in!>lmIDce regulatory authorities and all taxing a.uthorities. 
"Person" meana an individual. corporation, partnership, unincorporated Msociation, 
trust,joint venture or othm- organization or entity, 1ncluding a Governmental Authority, . 
"SubsidiaryH of a Person means (i) any corporation 50% or mote of the outstanding ., 
voting securities having ordinary voting power of which shall at the time be owned or contr~llhd, 
directly or indirectly, by such Person or by one or more ofits Subsidiaries or by $1;lchPersonand 
one or more of its SubsidiariesJ or (H) any partnership, association, joint venture or similar: 
business organization 50% or more of tile ownership interests having ordinary voting power iff 
which shalil1t the time be so owned or controlled. 
Article II ~ Redemption of Shares; Closing.of )l,edemption Tral1sacti011. 
2.1 ~II;lption QfShares 
2.1.1 Redemption. On and subject to the terms and conditions set forth in this :. 
Agreement~ at Closing. CO:oJ:pany shall redeem the Shares. 
2.1.2 Redemption Price. The aggregate consideration to be paid by compai&~ffi· 
full consideration for the redemption of the Shares shall consist <?fthe following: (a) One','!:" 
Million Five Hundred ThOU$alld Dollars ($1,500.000) payable by casbler's cheek at Closing (the 
"Down Payment"); (b) Six Million Dollars ($6,000,000) payable pursuant to the te:r:ms of a 
promissory note to be del~.vere by Company at Closing in substantially the form attached heieto 
as Exhibit A (ful!l"'Note',); (c those certain Cessna 441. Ce:!lsna 206 and Piper Cub airplanes " 
. more particularly descdbcd n Schedule 2.1.2 attached hereto (the'; "AJrplane1'7 , (d) eliminat10n 
. , 1/1/ ~ ~h~~~j) 
t\e./tv -2 -)f/It.tIJIii C.,,~bJe-v'~ ~o:\t.l 5(00 
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of any Debit :Balance outstanding at Closing and the releaso of any obligation of Shareholder to 
the Company with respect thereto; (e) elimination of any CAP Services Center Balance 
outstanding at Closing and the relQase of any obligation of Shareholder to Company with :respect 
thereto and with respect to any expenses. of the CAP Program; and (f) the CAP Program Tang.ible 
Property. ..
2.1 . .3 Alllication of Redem on Priel!. The redemption prica !1Ihall he allocated 
for tax purposes as set forth on SchedUle L3 attached hereto. . 
.. Vh r n n (.~.J. 0.:> .d...w.. (fr< -t&t.. 
~~~~2~2~~S~C~g~Jl~ri~ty~.~T~o~s~e~cure~fo~am~oun~t~p~a~§~o~S~har~eh~Ol~d~er under the Not vtJ'l.i. ) "SM:h_ Company sha] execute d 
deliver at Closing a Stock Pledge Agreero.en su stanu y m e form attached hereto as siq-. 
Exhibit a (the '<Pledge Agreement';), and shall execute and deliver, and cause its Subsidiaries to 
execute and deliver, a Security Agreement substantially in the form attaohed hereto as Exhihit.C 
(the "Security Agreement"), In the event that Company is able to obtain, for the benefit of 
Shareholder, Bonds meeting the tonditions specified in tho Plc;dge Agreement, and 11 Company 
otherwise me.t;rt$ the terms and conditions for the substitution of such collateral contained in the . 
Pledge Agreement, Shareholder will release the Pledged Shares in exchange for a pledge of the 
Bonds. 
2.3 CQrumlting Agreement;. fol' and in consideration of the mutual covenants oftbis 
Agreement~ Shareholder and Company shall also, at Closing, enter into a Consulting AgreemMt 
SUbstantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit D (the "Consulting Agreement"). In 
connection with the Consulting Agreement, Shareholder shall, at Closing, enter into a 
Noncompetition Agreement substantially in the fonD. attached hereto as E:dribit E (the 
''Noncompetition Agreement"). . 
2.4 Closing. The closing uf lll1; transactions contemplated hereby (the "Closing, 
shall take place at the. offives of in at __ .m. local t:i.me on 
____ ~, 1995 or such other time or place as the prutie.':l shull mutually agree (the "Closing 
Date"). 
2.5 Ileliyeries by._Company at Closing. At Closing,.. Company shall duly execute and 




?'1 q I .q '1) ~htl.:f"~'!. 0(.2 
AM /tAl p-D;;;. /WTnf}\fY\-
(0) Stock ce' aws repreSenting e Pl~:;~~:fotherthan those 
certificates representing . stock ofU 'Yl;llie urrently in. the possession of First 
Interstato and held as security for Company's oblitations to First Interstate (the "First 
1nterntat~ Sharer" .togetherr with duly executed assignments sepnrute from certificate -with 
respect to all sto certificate!! .representing the Pledged Shares; . 
ayJt {)JII, ~aL{ "11eM0rt 1fJr" moL~M ~4 
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(d) Instructions. in fonn and substance satisfactory to Shareholder~ signed by 
Company and by First Interstate, requiring that the certificates representing the First Interstate 
Shares be delivered promptly and directly to Shareholder upon the satisfaction of those 
obligations which are outstanding as of Closing and wInch arc secured by the Fit'st Interstate 
141005 
, I 
Shates~ rurd prohibiting any notion ~ubsequcnt to Closing which would increase the' of !)1--tr 
'i-he.- Company1hat 'lr.e ~cwOO by ~erstate Shares; . .. ~ _I ~ '. r 
pan ~'~;7 JIje;~ rrl'i~lF""" 
(e) The Security Agreement; A~ AI /fJ,*/1/ 
(l) Tran.sfer dQcumentatio~ in form and substance satisfactory tolf/1/I7
fNVYV 
v 1 
Shareholder, transferring nIl of Company's right, titk and interest in and to the Airplanes, subject 
only to those liens Which were outstanding as of December 31, 1994 and which are described on 
Schedule 2.1.2; 
(g) A Bill of Sale in substantially the funn attached hereto as Exhibit F. 
transferring title to the CAP Progtftbl TtIDgible Property to Shareholder; 
(11) The Consulti1lg Agreement; 
(i) The Noncompetition Agreement; 
G) An opinion of Company' sIegal oounsel substantially in the fann of 
Ex.hibit G hereto; 
(k) A certificate signed by an officer of Company. satisfactory in form and 
mbstance to Shareholder, certifYing the accuracy on the Closing D~te of Company's 
representations and warranties contained in Article ill below; 
(1) A certificato signed by an officer of Company, sawnactoryinform and 
substance to Shareholder, certifying thui Shar.eholder has no obligation to Company, and .. 
releasing Shareholder from any obligation to COmpmy, with respect to the Debit Balance, the 
CAP Services Ce1if.er Balance. any CAP Program expEmSes, and any an.d all other matteJ.'S (except 
for those obligations of Shareholder that arise out of this Agreoment); and 
(m) Such other documents and instruIn.ents as Shareholder or his counsel may 
reasonably r~quire to effectuate or evidence the transactions contemplated hereby. ..], 
2.6 Deliveries hi' Bbat'((bclrkr at Closing. At Closing, Sh.a!eholder s1uill duly execute 
and deliver to Company the following documents: 
(a) A certificate or certificates representing the Share5~ endorsed for transfer 
or accompanied by an assignment separate from certificate; 
(b) The Pledge Agreement; 
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(c) 
(d) 
(e) Tho Noncompetition Agreement; 
(f) An assumption agreement? sati9fuctory in form and substance to Company, 
relating to the obligatIon5 secured by the liens on the Airplanes described in Schedule 2.1.2; 
(g) A certificate signed by Shareholder, satisfactory in form and substtltlce to 
Company, certitying the accuracy on the Closing Date of Shareholder's representations and 
warranties contained in Artiele V below; and 
(h) Such other doc;umcrits and instruments as Company or its counsel may' 
reasonably require to effectuate or evidence the trat).':IactioDS contemplated hereby. . 
Ar(4~lc III - Representations tllld Warranties Regardillt: Company 
To induce Shareholder to enter int() and perfonn tbjs Agreement, CO~PflJl~~e~. ..... -.L- '.i . 
and warrants to Shareholder as follows: ~ /J1,t}'{/ JI'V .JI«IU af/~ E, 
, 3.1 O~jzmjQD and Good Standing, Each of C pany, AlAI and F.a:rmors is a ~/;l~~ i 
corporation duly o:r:gaI~l~ed~ validly existing ~d in good ding under.the laws ~ftbe state' 0~.1 -7,)~~1 
Idaho and has all reqmslte power and authonty to own eaS6 or operate Its propertIes and to Can)" ; ?~f! 
on its busines~ as it ~ n~w beln? conducted. Ynivers s a domestic insurance company du1y ::.{.·!., ,.'.;.'~.'l 
orga:u::ed, valIdly exIsting .and ill good standing un r the laws ~f the state ofId2lh~ md has all ,.', '; Y~~ 
requlSrte power and autbonty to own, lease or op to its ptoperties and to cany on It, business as it ' .:~pi 
:is now being con-dueted. Great Fidelity is a stoc life insurdllce company duly organi:ze~ validly .. :'.hW 
existing and in good standing under thelaws 0 the state OflndiHIlB. and h.EL~ all requisite power and " i i ;~Y' W?f 
Ltu.tl.lodty to own, lease or operate its prQperti and to cany on its business as it is now being . .. , 
conducted. CompIUlY rmd each of its SUb3i arles me duly qualified to do business and are in good 
standing as foreign corporations in alljuris 'ctions where the failtUe to be so qualified would 
materially adversely affect Company or it Subsidiaries. Company owns all of the outstanding . 
capital stock ofTJpiverse( AlAl and Fanners, and Universe owns all of the outstanding capital st.OCk 
ofGreatFideli~ l ~ r ~r d.II'LL~r;,11uP--.)d)li~ s'ha.~2 .' 
. (\01- 3.2 ~un.d Authorit)'. Company has full corporate power a~~ 
~4- execute, deliver and perform. this A e and to consummate the transactions contemplated 
~ ~ D/I hereby. This Agreement has be ul authorize executed and delivered by Compapy and is a. 
'tV' Q- legal, valid and binding obligation 0 ompany, eniorceable against it in accordance 'With its, • . 
...r.~ 0 tenn.s, except as enforceability may be limited by bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization or other 
~ ~ \~. AitX'- similar laws affecting the enforcement of creditors' ngbt..'l generally or the availability of 
~~, {t equita.blc ~m¢di(l$ subject to the discretion of1he court. 
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3.3 Consents; NoncontraventjOD. The execution and delivery ofthls Agreement and 
the perfonnance of the trenBaotions contemplated hereby "ill not result in ~. violation of any of 
the terms or provisions of the articles of incorporation or bylaws of Company or any of its 
SUbsldiaries or any amendments thereto, or constitute Ii violation or default under any 
mdebtednes3. indenture. mortgage. deed of trust, note; boml, liccllSe, lease agreement or other 
material agreement or irurt.tument to which Company or any of its Sub.!iidi~es is a party or by 
which it or any of its assets may otherwise be bound, or of any lQ.w, rule, license, regulation. 
judgment, order, ruling or decree gOi/erning or affecting the operation of Company or any of its 
S ubsidianes in any material respect; hOT will the same constitute an event permitting tt'lnnmation 
of any material agreement or the acceleration of any .indebtednes~ or other .liability of Company 
or any of its Subsidiaries, with or without notice or lapse of time, or result in the creation or 
imposition of any lien upon the Collateral No consent, authorization; approval or exemption by, 
or filing with, any Person or any Governmental Authority is required in connection with the 
execution. delivery and pe.rfonnance by Company of this Agt'eeillent or the taking of enyaction . 
cont.emplated hereby. except such as have been or shall have been obtained prior to Closing. The 
redemption of the Shares and the other transactions contemplated under this Agreement arc not 
prohibited by and do not. violate any instu'aoce laws or regulations of any jurisdiction to which' 
Company or any of its Subsidiaries are subject. 
3.4 Title to Properties; ;encumbrances. Company owns beneficially and of record, 01' 
will at the time of Closing own beneficially ann of record, all of the Pledged Shares, free and 
clear of all pleds~:a. liens. ~n(lUlnbrances, security interests, equities. claims, options, or 
limitations on Company's ability to vote such shares or to transfer such shares to Shareholder. 
except for the liens in.favor of Shareholder created in connection with the transactions 
contemplated by this Agreement and the lieu in favor of First Interstate 1.Ipon the First Interstate 
Shares. Comp£U).y has full right, title and inter~st In and to the Pledged Shares, and full authoritY 
to pledge the Pledged Shares to Shareholder at Closing as security for the perfonnance of . \ 
Company's obligations to Shareholder arising under the Note and this Agreement. All of the.' j 
Pledged Shares have been du1y authorized ahd validly issued. and are fillly paid and ':,' 
nonas~es~ablo. At Closmj. Shareholder will hltYc eo firBt priority, J1crfected security interest in:,:l::" 
the Pledged Shares, other- 1h.an the First Interstate Shares. There are no options, warrant.'!, calls, ' 
subscriptions, rights, agreements. commitments or undcI'Standings of any nature that call for the'; ' . 
jg~l1ance. s::,.le, pledge or other disposition of any Pledged Shatl!!s or which entille any person t;:l::: ~ ! \ l 
acquire such shares, other than those rights :lrising under this Agreement. The Company has ~~:, ~ .. 
good and marketable ti free and clear of any lien Or encmnbrnnce.,,, other than tho!'le . , 
disclosed on Schedul 1.2. Schedule 3.4 attached hereto. and full power and authority to' , . ; . 
transfer, (1) the Aitplanes. (2) the CAP Program Tangible Pt'opertyjllnd (3)the· Corittnission!:I~~1~\f; 
'1" " 
3.5 Finar.l!~iaJ Condjtion. ~ consolidatld financial statements of CompmlY and its 
Subsidiaries for the years ended December 31. 1994, 1993 and 1991 attached hereto as 
Schedule 3..5 (the "Financial Statements") present fairly the financial condition and results of 
operations and changes in financial pOSition of Company and its SubSidiaries as of such 
' " 
.. respective dates and for th~ r~8pective years then ended in conformity with GAAP applied on a jJ1i!:, consistent basis# ang Iljnce.Dec.emb~,.199·~ 00 materiaJ. ad"'B1'81il eH(t'Hgefl hat/@ QCCll;n:ed ~ l: 
\~ 9:::7~~;~~S~~:£~:~ ~~I · j 
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~ 3.6 Fl=!ng. Company has sufficient funds .VlIilabl. or has received wri~;>'~ {It 
~com.mitments from third parties to provid~ sufficient funds to pay the Down Payment. ') ~ ~1l ... ~ 
\~~~ " 3, 7 Liti~ There are no claims. actio , suitst pI'OCeedings or investigations r-:t 
pending or, to the best of Company's knowled , ate.t'led a~amst or :t:e1ating to Company or 
eny of its Subsidiaries, at law or in equity ore or by any OovennnentID Authority. nor has .any . . 
such actiot1; suj~ proceeding or invest" 'on been, to the best of Company's knowledge, pending 
since tht: commencement of the c-.year period covered by the Fimtncial Statements, except as 
set forth on Schedule 3.7 her . Neither Company nor any ofits Subsidiarios is in defauItv.rith 
respect to any ru:ljudicato order, writ) itUunction or decree of any Governmental Authority .. 
Neither Company nor y ofits Subsidiaries is a party to any cease and desist: order. superVisory 
agreement or arr ement, corueIlsual or otherwise. with any Governmental Authority. except as 
set forth on Sc dule3.7. 
3.8 ~. Company and its Subsi' . es have filed all state, cotlD.ty.local and federal 
tax and otho1' return!" ~nd reports .that they required to file in respect of .all taxes, as~1;;ti~men~ 
levies, llcense and registration fees, ch es or withholdings of any nature whatsoever shown by 
such returns to be. or that are othe . se; due and paya1;lle, including, 'without limitation,. income, 
business and occupation. unem yment, social secUrity. withholding, excise and workers' 
compensation taxes and ass ents ('Taxes'), and to the extent its liabilities for Taxes as of 
Closing have not been dischargftd; fu.ll and complete reserves have been established on the 
December 31,. 1994 b ance sheet included itl the Financial Statements. Neither Company nor' 
.any of its Subsidi es is in default in the payment of any Taxes due or payable or of any 
assessments re Ived in respect thereof. 
3.9 CQmpli5lOCe with Lav,m, Each of Co any and its Subsidiaties is in compliance 
in all material Iespects with all fcd~.ral; state oeal laws, statutes, rules, regu:lations and orders 
of all Governmental Authorities matcrial . business; and all required registrations and other 
f11mss by or on behalf of Company nch of its Subsidiaries with all Governmental 
Authorities are materially true an omplete and are cUttent nnd v!1lidJ)' in force; all permits and 
licenses requlred in connectio "th the operation of the Company's business or the business of· 
~ 
its Subl'iidiarics have been mined and are current and validly in force; and neither the Company 
nor any of its Subsidi s have received any notice that it is in violation of any lavvsJ regulations 
or orders. ' .'. 
3.10 Brokers. Finders.. El&. All negotiations relating to this Agreement and the 
transactions contemplated hereby have been catrled on without the intervention of any person 
acting on behalf of the Company in such manner as to givo rise to any valid claim against the 
Company or Shareholder fur sny brokerage or finder'S fee, commission~ or similar 
componsation. . 
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3.11 Def<lWiS. Neither Company nor any of its Subsidiaries is in violation of any of 
the tenns or provisions of its articles ofincotflotation or bylaws or any amendments tbereto,or in 
vio.lation or default under any indebtedness, indenture, mortgage, deed of trust. note, bond, 
license. lease agreement of other materla.l agreement or .instrument to which Company or any of 
its Subsid.iaries is a party or by which it or any of its assets may o"therwise be bound, or of any 
law. rule. license, reguIation,judgment. order. ruling or decree governing or affecting the 
opemtio-u of Company or any olits Subsidiaries in any material respect; no ci.rcutnstance exists 
which constitutes an e-ventpemrltrlng term.ination of any ma.terial agreement or the acceleratirm 
of any indebtedness or othel' Hahility of Company or ~ny of its Subsidiaries, with or without 
notice 01.' lapse of time, or which could result in the creatiou or imposition of any lie'll lJpOD the 
Collateral. Neither Company nor any of it! Subsidiaries is in violation of any insurance laws or 
regulations of any jurisdiction to which Company or any ofits Subsidiaries are subject. . !. 
Article IV - Representations and Warranties of Sharell(Jlder 
; '~~~.:, \ 
To induce Company to enter into W'id perfonn this Agreement, Shaniliolder represen.~' 
and warrants to Company as follows: Sh2il,'(:holder owns the Shares free and clear of all pledges, 
liens, encumbrances. security interests, equities, claims. options (other than the option orlainally 
granted to Centermial Life Insurance Company, la.ter assigned to Company and ox~cised 
ptInmant to this Agreement), or !imitations on Shareholder's ability to vote the Shares or to 
fraIlsfe.r the Shares to Company. Shareholder has full ~ght, title and interest in and to the Share~..:J~ 
tJf""' (ii)t1J/ ~,~ o(l'13onJ.j m~.e..'k;, rx1['('/I'al1~.; 
Article V- Cuvenauts p/. ~ku-n. '10 (') f/ 'J~c.k P1u:p-f1j~ .:t! 
, 
\ 5.1 . Company hereby covenants to Shareholder that until Ute 
! ~Ier /)~W Note has been paid .in ful it will perform and ohserv~ the following covenants: . , .... ,. 
(a) Company will provide Shareholder with quarterly financial statements •. 
prp.pared.in accordance with GAAP, within 45 days of the end of each . .fiscOO. qUlUier; , ' 
(b) Compttny will provide annual audited financial statements, prepared m: .... 
acl~6jdance with GAAP, within 120 days of the end of each fiscal year; i\::. 
/1~~;r/.; , 
(c) As of the last day of each calendar month, Company shan maintain "i:: 'l , 
shareholders' equity, calculated in accordance \"Vith GAAP consistently applied, eql1a1 to at least . 
$ ,; wd I be.- (:) tJVJ at e-J.(J"'.7/Aj '--t ./It;;/ ~ , 
(d) As of the last day of each calendar month, ~-l:y ~ ma:lntain. 
working capital (current assets less currerit liabilities), calculated in sccordance with GAM !.. 
consistently applie~ equallo at tea!'.;t $ ____ ~ 
(e) As of the last day of each calendar month. Company shall maintain a ratio 
of cmrer1t a"lsets to current liabilities, calc:ul::ded 1n accordance with GAAP consistently applied, 
equal to I\t least _-to-_; 
WdlS:S SG-9Z,-S 
~ 
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(f) All of the lest day of each calendar nlonth. Company shall maintain a ratio ' 
of Consoli dared Long Term Debt-to-ConsQlidated Net Worth (as such terms are defined in 
Section 4.2.1C> of the compaI1Y'.s Articles ofIncorporation~ l'IS a~endedY'{th~~·~. ',clr~"}) equal to 
atleast3.6-to-l; . ,JiJL. M tI ~jt. L1aitt/ 
f
' (g) /\ Company kl not loan funds to any affililrte other than wholly-ovm.ed /l 
, Company" e:JCisting employee stock ownership plan); ? tt~ ~.:it- j 
Subsiruaries (other than any loans tha.t ate ()urrently required to be made to or for the benefit ... Of ' 
, ... ~ fjr- ..,td-uJZ-/J;r 
• . ') {V (h) Company W1~'1l t mortgage edge, subject to lien or other ncumbrance. 
1lf'J,JP" sell. assign or transfer any, Collater or, except' the ordjnary courso ofbusin.es any other ' 0 
~ ~() ( _ ~ material asset of Company or any 0 Its Sub . iarieJ or fail to take all reasonab e steps necessary ,' fv 
(>(.tW'"4' to maintain its customer aud (;licnl buse and all otn:r intangible assets; 
fi\~ / . (i) Company will use it!: best ~ffotts to Cause Shareholder, or a desi~~ 'ot :' 
/. Sh~'I'eholder rea~OnablY a~eptablo.to com~any, to be elected t~ comp~~'S. Board Of~irecto:rs; 
I~Jn~-j G) Company will perrrut. and cause each oflts Submd~WlCS to perrmt" ' 
tr/f/IfJU/ Shareholder, or a designee of Shareholder reaso~bly acceptable to Company, to have full ~ce&: 
~
lhItJf;1 to its premises md to all properties. books, contracts. commitments and records with X'eapect to 
/111-" l{ each such company's business, property and personnel as SharehoIder or its representatives may 
from time to time request; 
~~ 
~ 
. (k) Company shell ensure that no adrlitional shares of capital stock are issued 
by Universe, Farmers, AlAI or Great Fidelity; a.n:;l. J . ...1!.. ' ,", : 
, .~Mor- > ; 
(1) Cumpany shall use its best eff0;E obtain and deliver, as soon after tJ;w 
Closing as possible, but in no event later th/jI1 Lh~ cons mroation of a public offering by the ". . 
Company, :Bonds meeting the requirements set forth in le Pledge Agreement" and, to the extent 
penrtissible under applicable insurance laws and regulationSt \vill use allY net proceeds from the 
sale of Great Fidelity or its assets, and any net proceeds from any public offering of Com.pao:Yi,L~ 
, 1\- ' , 
stock. toward ofBondsJ~ 'fi'~)J ,: 
Y"nJlTU :'; .. 
:? " 
, :; 
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such press release, statement or disclosme and the time of the release thereof has been approved 
in advance by the othet: party hereto. 
5.2.2 Cooperation. Each party will fully cooperate with the other party and 
51.1Cb. other party's advisors in COTInection wlth any steps required to be taken as part of ltg 
obligntiQl1S hereunder, and will use its best ~ffOlts to cause all conditions to Closing to be 
satisfied as promptly as possiblo and to obtain all consents and approvals necessary for such 
parly's due and punctual performance of the Agreement and for the satisfaction of the conditionS 
hereof on its part to be satisfied,. and will execute and deliver. or cause to be executed and , 
delivered, such additional reasonable documents and instruments and do. or cause to be done, all 
xf::(Ulonable things nece5smy, proper or advisable under applicable law to consummate and make 
effective the transactions eoti:t~mplated hereby. 
Artlde VI -lndemniflcutlo1J 
fgjOll 
6.1 lndemnificatiQn of SbarehQlder anclQotnpany. Each party heret.o ("1n.demnifying , ... 
Party'~) hereby agrees to defend. indemnify and hold harmless the other party hereto and eac1:i.'bf 
such other party' $ affiliate!!> successors, assigns. officers, directors, sbm:eholders and mnployd~s ; 
("Indemnified Partie.s~') from and against and in respect of any and all costs, losses; cla.hns t .,,:. 
liabilities, fines, penalties, dam~gt;ls lind expenses (mc1uding, without limitation, court ~osts ani, 
reasonable fees and disbursements of counsel and accountants) invurn:d by an Indemnified Patty 
in ccmnectlol1 with or arising out of any !?reach or alleged breach of any representation,. wamilitY': '. 
_or covenan~.made by the Indemnifying Party in ~ ~~ ~ . ,,' 
r'A~ 6.2 - - . 0 r ~. ron~p{(y after recei$t by ·ii Indemnified Party of 
~ 1t~JY.- A~ notice o~ com.meucement of any actio over~d by ibis Article VI, such lndem.ni:fied P!lrty,' 
\ ~ K \f. shall notify the n emm ill of the comrn.encer.nent "thereof; provided,. however,' 
. i .. ~ that any delay by the Indemnified :rarty in so notifying the Indemnifying Party sb.allnm r~1ieve 
iJ.-00; \P~ 11m Indemnifying party of any liability to the Indemnified Party hereunder. c'Xccpt to the ~ent ... 
~ &.-\ "'1 the IndemnifYing Party is materially and adversely prejudiced by such delay. The Indcmnifyin.g 
(\td\t Party, by ddiv~ ofwritiennouce to the IndemnifledParty l.Vitbin 30 S ofreceipt ofnotiee of' 
(T t/v claim to indemnity from tlte Indemnified Party. may elect to comes such claim, actIOn r 
0< proceeding at the Indemnifying Party>s apcnse and by COl.lD.5c:l of its own choosmg. f the 
Indemnifying Party does not elect to contest such cJaim, action or proceeding. the IndemnUied. 
Party shaH have the right to prosecute, defend, comprom~se, settle or pay any claim at the . 
Indem.n.ifying Party's expense. If the Indemnified Party requests in writing that suchcl.ai:m, •.... 
• . '; . ~ . It,,, 
action or proceedmg not be contested, then it shall not be contested. but shall not be covered ' 
the in.dern.qities provided herein. The Jndennrlfying party may settle an indemnifiable matter'that 
it has duly elected to contest with the consent of the Indemnified Party, after delivering a written 
deScription oftbe proposed settlement W~ ~lIId receiving consent ftom. the Indemnified Party .. hi 
the event tha.t the Indemnified Party declines to consent to a bona. fide settlement acceptable ti>:; . 
the claiIll2Ult, the Indemnified Party shall have no right to indemnification beyond the amount of 
the proposed settlement. 1b.e lndemnified Party shall cooperate with the Indemnifying Party in .. 
connection with any matter or claim for indenmification.. 
,"., ., 
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Article JIll ... Conditions ~Dr ' 
7.1 Conditjons to SharehQlder's ObligatioDs. C obligutions of Shareholder unde ..•.~. 
this Agreement are subject to the fulfilhnent, ~ prior to losing1. of each of the following i'; 
con.d.itioll.-t:. any or ~l of which m.ay be waived in~' Shareholder in his sole diSOretiO~.· . :.. ' 
>k. i;l.M'l\ u> .;r. ., .. 
~ f\/f) ~ 1.1 . estrZlciurir ()fOwnership of and Farmers. All of the outstanding ;;' 
r ' '5" apital stock of shall have boon distributed to Company by Universe as a ' , 
dividendjan all be ovvne~ directly by Company. J l-: .• _. .' 
tLl! 0 u:htAj ~,;,t. Itl ru:~,-cv-rnt:r.5 
7.1.2 Consents. Authorizations or consents of any Per~on or Governmental 
Authority requirod in connection with the consummation of the transactions oontemplated 
hereby, including without limitation consents of the Id11ho Department ofInsll.l'aD.ce and First , 
Interstate, shall have been CJbtttined, and copies of such authorizations or consents shall have ,1 
been delivered 10 Shareholder. 
7.1.3 A ccuracy of Repre.sentatlotlS atld Warranties. All of the representatio;i 
and warranties ofCompHhy ~ontained herein shall be true on and as of the Closing Date with tile 
same force and ffeet as thotlgh made on and as of the ClosinQ Date. 
/' 
7.2 Conditions to Company's QWigations. The obJiga1ions of Company hereunder 
are Bubj ect to the fuJfillment. at or prior to Cloamg. of each of the following conditions, any or all 
of which may be waived in writing by Company, in its sole disGrcti01'l; 
7.2.1 Accuracy ofRepr~~TJtatiolls and Warranties. The representations a:nd 
wan'antiM of Shareholder contained herein shAll be true Qn and as of tbeClosing:Qate with the . ' 
same force and effect as though r:ade on and as of the Closing Date, ": " ,',., 
7.2.2 Clas£; !focuments. Shareholder shall have complie-.Q With the 
requirements ofSection2,~ above. 7 ~,t( S~~, tt.d -s"-ot::l (}(lterf1 ' .. 
raJ 012 
. 7,?. ~ tM~&(\.,*,.' - '1,')ftVYI C;~ ~tJ~~Ar4: 
Arttcle VIII .. Taltillil1tiC11t and Default - «td.l~ e~1M·R--r J (. ) ~1 
8.1 7.;t.S" m~ 7,1'{,.. Q-6.\lnA.4-Wt!- ~~~) ~ ;i 
. ~ . ! . 
. I ~. . . 
(a) by muWal consent of the parties here(o; ',,~~!,: 
. j .. 
(b) at the election of either party to this Agreement upon written notice to~; 
~\~ ~I I 
fl(pcm# ~::~DL~:::"OF ROD:~~~J~ '~J!~ND Wd8S S SG-9G-S , 8~",1'~~ 
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(c) by Shareholder if there ha..s been e materiw violation or br~ach by 
Company of any agreement, representation or warranty contained in tbis Agreement that has 
rendered the satisfaction of any condition to the obligation of Shareholder impossible and sllch 
violation or brea.ch has not been waived by Shareholder; or 
(d) by COll)pany ifthere has been a m.aterial violation or breach by 
Shareholder of any agreement, representation or warranty contained in this Agreement that has 
rendered the satisfaction of any conditioll to the obligations of Company impossible and such 
violation at breach has not been waived by Company. 
8.2 Defaults Hud.,! the Agreem~nt. "Event of be fault; ." wherever used herein, means 
any Orie of the following events: 
(a.) Company shall fail to pay any interest or any other aIllOWlt payable to . 
Shareholder or his succes!<or(s) or assign(s) pursu.ant to the Note, when and U3 the ~.lame becomes 
due and in accordance with its tenns, and such fai)ur~ continues for three (3) days following the 
~- , ' 
(b) Company shaH fail to observe or perfonn any te~ covenant or agreement 
of Company in this Agreement~ and such failure shall not have been cured with.h1 thirty (30) day~ 
following written notice thereof from Shareholder; 
(c) Any representation or warranty made by Company herein or in connection 
with this Agreement shall prove to hav~ been irteorrect when made or deemerl. made, and cure 
shall not have been made within thirty (30) days ofwrittcn notice thereof from Shareholder; , 
" 
(d) Company shall d~fault under the Note, the Pledge Agreement. the Security 
Agreement, the Consulting Agreement, or the Noncompetition Agrcc:mcnt after the expiration uf "" ,',, ' 
any applicable cure period; ' ' ' i " " 
(e) Company or any of its material Subsidiaries shall trulke <1 general 
assignment for the benefit of creditors or shall become insolvent; 
(f) Company or any of its material Subsidiaries shall be the subject of, or th~ 
debtol' i~ any bankruptcy, reorganization, :receivership. compromise, Bll'angement, insolvency. 
readjustment of de~ dissolution or liquidation case or proceeding under any law, whether now 
or bert:laflcJ; io t:ffect, of any jurisdiction; or . 
. ,'. 
(g) First Interstate, the holders of the Company's preferred stock, or any other , 
material obligoe of Company shall have taken any rem¢dial f\Ction against Company following,'a : . 
default in the fulfi11ment of Company's obligationS toward nny su.c::h obligee. , ~~: ';!i 
, ' ' 
" . ! 
- 12-
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8.3 Remedies for Default. Upon the occurrence of any Event of Default or at any , 
time thereafter, if any Event of Default is then continuing, Shareholder roay, v.1thout notice (or 
without fmther notice) if initial notice was required pursuant to ~etiOD 8.2 ahovo)~ in his 
discretion: 
(a) declare the entire unpaid balance of ptincipal and interest under the Note 
hrunediately due and payable by Company, without presentment, demand., prDtI!!9t or any notice 
of any .kind, all of:wmch are hereby expressly waived by Compan~; 
(b) subj (let to the requirements of applicable law then ill effect, proceed 10 
enforce this Agreement Dr any document contemplated hereby by exercising such remedies as are 
availa.ble thereunder or in respect thereof under applicable law, whether for damag~s, S))ecific 
performance of any covenant or other ngreement, or m the excrciBe of any power granted herein 
or in the documents contemplated hereby; 
(c) In addition to ilie exercise of any rights now or hereafit:'T existing under 
applicable law, exerciso all rights of a seemed creditor under the Uniform Commercial Code in 
all relevant jurisdictions; and prOt<eed to protect and enforce.: its rights hereunder or realize ,(many 
or all security ,granted pursuant hereto or under the Pledge Agreement. the Security Agreement ox-
the Note in any manner or order he deems expedient without regard to any equitable principles of 
marshaling or otherwise; and/or 
~ ,: . 
. (d) give written notice to Company of his desire to .becol1le "agent of record" .' . 
for all farm association trusts andIor policies for which Company or any of its Subsidiaries, at'the, "; I .' 
time of giving of such notice, serves as agent of record. Upon receipt of such notice. Company .,. 
shall promptly deliver written notice, in form and submance satisfactory to Sbareholder; to:all ., 
such trusts, policy holder,') and other appropriate prutic5 of the appointment of Sharehold~ .as ' . 
agent of record 
" ,:: 
Article IX - General 
9.1 ~unrjya1 of Representations and Wrur~. The representations, wacranties, 
covenants and agreements of tho parties serforth in this Agreemen:t, including the exhibits .and 
schedules hereto, and in any written fepresentation and any ancillaty document con1e:mplated 
hereby, and the prOvisions of Article VI regarding indemnification and release of claims. shall 
survive Closing until the later of (i) three years followina Closing or (ii) final paym~t by 
Company in full satisfaction. of the Note. 
9.2 Amendments and WaJ.y~. The provisions oftbis A~cemcnt ma:y.be mnlmcIt~(1 
only by the written agreement of the parties hereto. E~t as othexwise pl'ovil.led " -~" .-~J 
waiver, permit, consent or approval of any kind or cbaract~ on the: part of either party of 
provision or condition ofthl!'l Agreement must be made in writing and shall be effeetive 
the extent s,pecifically set forth in BUch writing. No action taken purstIaIrt to this 
including any investigation by or on behalf af ofther party. shan be deemed to constitute 
by the party taking suth action of compliance with any representation, war.nmty. 96verumt 
_ 13 _ {;~h: ' : :: ' , , i.:' r.r,' ;r~" .... 
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agreement contained herein. The waiver by any party hereto of 11 breach of any provision of this 
Agreement shall not operate or be construed as a waiver of any subsequent breath. 
9.3 filrtjctJ in Interest. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto 
and sball be biDding upon the p~rties hereto and their respective heirs, personal representatives • . 
successors and assigns. Except to the extent expressly stated in this Agreement" nothing in this 
Agreement is intended to confer uy rights or remedies on any Person other t.h.an the parties 
hereto. Dor is anything in thi~ Agreement intended to relieve or disch~e the obligation or 
liability of any thitd party, nor shall .my provision give any third party any right of subrogation 
or <'IC1ion against any party to this Agreement. . 
9.4 Not~Y8. All notices. requost5, demands and other commmrications that are: 
required-to-be or may be given under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed Jo 
have been duly given when delivered in person or tra:nsmitted by telex, facsimile, cable or . 
tdegram, or by certified or registered first class mail, postage prepaicL return receipt requested, to 
the respective parties as follows: 
Ifto Company, to: -
AJA Services Corporation 
One tE-..mg Clark Plaza 
Lewiston, Idaho 83.501 
Attention: John Taylor 
With a copy to: 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Tumbow &. McKlveen, Chartered 
300 North Sixth Street 
P.O. Box 1368 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1368 
Attention: Richard Riley 
If to Shareholder, to: 
Reed J. Taylor 
- 1 t1 -
, . , 
) ~,."' j ., ' 
,;1\ 
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With a copy to: 
Caimcross & Hempelmann 
70th Floor; Columbia Center 
701 FLfth.Avenue 
Seattle, WA 98104~7015 
Attention: Scott Bell 
1.,! 
: .•.. :. 
or to such other address as any party may have furnished to the others in writing in ~ordance 
herewith, ~copt that notices of vhaDge of address shall be effective only upon receipt. 
9.5 Remydles CllJl!ulatiye. A.ll Tights and remedies of Shareholder shall be 
cumtdative and may be t:xcroised at such times aud in such order as Sha:reholder de~es. ' The 
failure Qf Shareholder to inBi:st upon or enforce strict porformance of any provision of thls or any 
related agreement, or to exercise the rights or privileges hereunder or thereunder or any of its . 
rights as provided by statute Or law or in equity or otherwise, shall not impair. prejudice or ' 
constitute a waiver of any such right, power. remedy or privilege or be constructed as a waiver of 
any default hereunder or thereunder or as .an acquiescence therein or preclude the exercise or?> 
enforcement thereof at a later time. Nor shall any single or partial exercis~ of any such righ~ : 
power. remedy or privileges preclude any other or further exercise of any other right. powei; · ~ ' 
remedy or privilege. 
9.6 Severabili~. The invalidity of all or any part of any section of this Aireem~t ., 
shaU not render jnvalid the remainder of this Agreement or the remainder of such section. If any 
provision of this Agreement is so broad as to be W1enforceable~ such provision ~ball be 
interpret~d to be only so broad as i5 onforceable. 
9.7 Construction. Singular and plural forms, as the case lhay be. oftbe terms defined 
in Article I above, Or of the capitalized tertn$ defmed elsewhere inthis Ag:reC1Ilen~ have ';: 
correlative meaning$. Arry defined tarm thm t¢;lates to .a, document inolude~ within its definition: 
any amendments. modifications. renewals. restatements, extensions, supplements or substitutions 
that may heretofore have been or that may hereafter be executed in accordance with the terms 
thereof and as may be pennitted by this Agreement. 
" , 
9.8 Headioi:S. The section and other headings contained in this Agreement are for . I: 
reference pmpOSCB only and shall not be decmed to be a part of this Agreement or to affect the ;;,:: ' 
meaning or interpretation of this Agreement. :utr 
'!';f~:ii . 
9.9 Govemin~ Law; SkIYice QfPmcess. The -validity, meaning and effect ofthis :1~Jl;:+'i t 
Agreement shall be determined in accordance with the laws oftbe State ofIdaho. The parti~l!'A: 
hereby agree that delivery or mailing of any process or other papers in the manner provided iii!U! i. 
Section 9.4 above, or in such other manner 3!l may be permitted by law, shall be v(lUd and t'" : ~; . ,.' , 
. .., ,,~ , ... ,, ' 
sufficient service thereof. ::,' t : i .: .. 
. , ,i.:~",p;:' .. . 
;-' ,';I~~iJi~li '; , 
- 15 - .. " i:SS7:;· , 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND ' 
Wdl0:9 S8-9&-g 
. ~~ :. 
Ii 
05 / 28/ 95 11:15 'a'Z06 587 2308 CAIRN CROSS ~017 
9.10 Entire Agreement. '11:ri:t Agreement, including the exhibits and schedules and 
ancillary docwnents expressly referred to herein that fonn a part ht~Qf, constitute the ontire 
agreement of the parties concerning the matters referred to herein and supersede all prlor 
agreements and understandings, oral or written, all ofwruch are hereby superseded and canceled. 


















Bill of Sale 
Form of Company's COUILSel's Opinion 
Airplanes 
Allocation of Redemption Price 
Financial Statements 
Litigation 
Financial-Compliance Levels and RatiO!; 
9.12 Execution in Cmmterpmis. This Agreement may be executed in any number of 
counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be deemed an original) and 
such counterpart together shall constitute ono instru.m.ent. 
DATED the first day entered above. 
COMPANY: AlA SERVICES CORPORATION 
By: _____________________ ~_ 
ItS: _____ __ 
-SHAREHOLDER: . REED J. TAYLOR 
207Bl OC.M44 
- 16 -
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND 
WdG O: 9 SG-9G-S :)"9 1NdS 
,:'" 
.. O!s/25 / 960 11:15 'a.206 51)7 2308 CAIRNCROSS f4]018 
ExhibitB 
STOCK. PLEDGE AGREEMENT 
This STOCK PLEDGE AGREEMENT is entered into as of • 1995, by and . 
between AIA Services Corporation. an ldaho Cozporation ("Pledgor"), and Reed J. Taylor 
("Secured Party") . . Capitalized terms Used in this Agreement ,and not otherwise defined shall 
have the meanings given to them in the Redemption Agreement (as defined below). 
RECITALS 
A. Pledgor and Secured.Party we parties to thai: certain Stoo ede.til.ption . . 9-
Agreement, da.ted as of , 1995 (the ·'RedemptionAgmom t'J, pursuant to whio}if .' 
Pledgor will redeem 613,494 shares ofits Common Stock held by Se:e eel Party in exohange for
J 
in part, a Promissory Note of even date herewith in the principal amoUn: of $6.000~OOO (the '.: 
'~ote"), Pledgor and Secured Party are also parties to that certaln • Agreement (the ". 
Awcement")~ that certain Consulting Agreement (the "Consulting Agreement,) 
and that oertain Noncompetition Agreement (the "Noncompeut1()n Agreement'), all of even date '. 
herewith. ., 
B. 1!t;niversa Life lnsurance Company~ an Idaho domestic insurance company w~11 ~ . 
C"Univergel')~ Farmers Health Alliance Administrators, Inc., an .):::' J~ corporation ~.if? . 
("Farmers"), and AlA Insurance, Inc., an Idaho corporation ("AIAl"), al.'o whully owned (Je... lrdt eJ"') 
subsidiaries of Pledgor. , J.tl~/rt; 
C. As a condition of Secured PartY's entry into the Redemption Agreement, Secured 
Party bas required that Pledgor pledge all of the shares of capital. stock of each ofUmverse, 
Farmers and A1Al) and any other shares of capital stock dIstributed to ple~or b~ Universe, .~ . ". 
~~tl1""!!".lY' the "Shares') as Security for ~~Liolliiii:>.,, : : 
Pl[~ll¥:lIg @#r t};e 'RBdMijjtioR Agte~ f rr n~ d4.tt- &I};.:Y-he. 
D. Secured Party desires, and Pledgor agre<!s to grant to Secured Party. as security ,'., . 
" f 
for the Secured ObHgfltions (as defined bduw) and on the terms and conditions heteinafter set " 
forth, a security interest in all right, title andlntQ'C'St of Pledgor in the Pledged Collateral (as ,:' ,.:. 
further defined he1Clw), including, but not limited to, the Shares. 
'i't';: ~ AGREEMENTS 
" ,~ii!r <;! .. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, and fur Qth~r;!': 
good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby aoknowledgedd. 
the .... .,...Hes agree as follow!I! i'>' i;;>:: . 
~u ,~<' ! 
- 1 -
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1. Seeured Obligations 
(collectively. the "Secured Obligations"). 
2. Pledge 
As c~llateral security for the payment and performance in full ofllie Secured Obligati6ns~ 
Pledgor hereby. pled!ies. assigns; 1rtnwfet~; delivers and grants to Secured Patty a security interest 
in all right! title and interest of Pledgor that pte~ently exists 01' tha.t hereafter may arise in, to arid 
lmder Ci) the Shares and aU rights and privileges ofP1edgor with re~ct thereto, (ii) all c~h! \ . : 
dividends, noncash dividends. stock dividends, interest, cas~ instruments and oilier property :;; . 
from time to time received, receivable or otherwise wstributed in respect of or in exchange fOf: 
any or all of the Shares, (iii) all !Jubscr:1ptions, warrants, options and any other riahts issued uPhn: 
or in connection with 1he Shares, (iv) any additional shares of capital stock ofllie issuers ofllie . : 
ShfiI'C:l5 hereafter issued, (v) any and aU certificaoos or other instrument or docUlllents representirlg 
any oftbe foregoing. and (vi) all cash and non-cash proceeds of the foregoing (all such property. 
collectively, tbe <'Pledged Collateral'? . . 
3. I Representations and Warranties 
.. 01*-,b ~\ Pledgor represents and WlIITants to, and agroos with, Secured Party as follows: 
U qvV- \ . \ 3.1 Title. The Shares include all of the issued and ollf;Stttnding {'.apital stock of each of; , 
UniVefS Fanners, and AlAI. The Shares are legally and beneficially oWned by Pledgor on tm; : :,,' ' 
date her of: :free and clear of a111iens, encumbrances, drums or demands arising through Pledgor/.i 
whatsoever (other than the security interest created hereby and the lien of First Interstate Bank ot ... 
Idaho, NA ("First Interstate") upon the capital stock ofUnivel'5e (the "First Interstate Lienj).':(;ll 
of the Shares were duly aufuorizcd and validly issued, and 1.11:e fully paid and nOIla.')sessabJe. . 'Ii.' • . 
; ' .' ~ . 
3.2 Power and Authority. Pledgor llas all requisite power and authority and.fulll~, .. 
right to execute. deliver and p~lform all QfPlcdgor's obligations under this A2J:"eelIlent and to}~n: i ; ! 
pledge and grant a &ecurity interest in the Pledged Collat~;ral in the manner and for the purposW!J ; 
contem.plated by this Agreement, and has the right to grant Secured party a security interestill~fi~:; 
such P1edged CollateraL ~bject to the rights of First Interstate in the stock ofUnlversc. · )i~L:.; 
3.3 Execution; Binding Contract. This Agreement bas been duly executed and::~~;;IT! .. 
delivered by Pledgor and constitutes the legal, -valid and binding obligation of 'Pledgor, ·!~fd,: 
enforceable against Pledgor in acc.ordance with its te01~ :t::Jl:',: 
( hU£ftC~IUf'h ~t~r*~J,~:: 
~ rJ 1 .). [){!.. 9k,J<.. . '!; 
~~~! ~'£7~ 
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3.4 No Violation. Tho pledg of and the grant ofa security interest in the Pledget, 01·;fO.k. .. /1};:; 
for the purpos¢ contemp.laied by this AgreClIlcut does "7 ~':'::'':,'''D, 
not. and will not (i) violate any law, e, regullrtloIl, order. judgment, settlement agreement or .. ;',;; 
decree (including, without limitation any ofthe'ioregoing arising out of any regulatory ~tivity 
of':any ,tnsurance tegu1e.mry aiency gov~enta1 authCJrity of any state) applicable to Pledgor , 
or (ii) result in or require the crtmtio or imposition of (except as granted to Secmed party by this 
Agreement) any lien, security intere ,encumbrance or right of athers of any nature upon" or with . 
respect to, any of the Pledged Coll aL 
3.5 Protection ofSeCW*i Interest. To Pledgor's knowledge. tho Pledged CollatemI is 
not su.bject to any option, agreement assessment, charge or other contractual restriction of any 
nature that mi t •.. . d la or otherwise affect the pledge of the Pl~died Collateral 
heIeund~.[ 0 the sale or disposition 0 the Pled~ed CoUmer unlu~nt hereto by Secured Party. 
Pledgor will.no s or emu my len or encum ranoe of any narute, other than thoso granted 
to Secured Party and the First Intef!:rt.:rte Lien. to attaeh to the Pledged Collateral. Pledgor will 
fully and punctwilly ~rfonn any duty required of it in conn~ction with the Pledged Collateral 
d win 1lotta1.re any aetion that will impair. damage or destroy Secured Party1g rights with 
respect to the Pledged Collateral. Pledgor will remain the sole shareholder of all of the 
outstanding capital stock ofUruvefse, Fanners and AW. and Pledgor will not pennit Universe, fr{ 
1"1 ·'~!'H~~~ 
Farmers or AIAI to issue any additional capital stoc)( and any attempt to issue additio. nal shares., .' ....... " .', 
of such capital stock shall be in-valid., L. CVk.J-- (ik"tJ-- t\tllJ .~c.ki {); r ~ t ' .. ",r ,It\'.i-~11lWr~!pt; 
\". I .. n . D e)." ~~ In 11 e,tU,t.h 
4. Delivery of Pledged Collateral v~ '1D F-e.rA.:, ..," \,/1 ', 
I? Il.l>t- le..!>~(U'ld... . 
Pledgor agrees to deliver to Secured Part)' on the date oftllis Agreement all instruments. 
and stook certificates pertaining to the Pledged Collatt:ral now owned. except for those Shares of 
Universe in the pos3cssion of First lntcrntnte and subject to the First Interstate L1c:Jl (the ~'F.irst 
Interstate Shares H), and to deliver to SlICufed Party promptly upon :receipt all i.n.st.Tmnents and , 
stoc:k certificates pertaining to the Pledged Collat~ra1 acquired in the :fhture. Without)imitingthe 
foregoing. jfPledgor shall purchase or otherwise b¢come entitled to receive or shall receive, ill.'" 
connection with any of the Pltdged Collateral, any: (i) stock certificate. including without '. j,;,l{;", 
limitation any certificate representing a stock dividend or in connection with any increase or IL:; , 
reduction of capital, reclassifica.tion, merger, consolidation. sale of assets, combination of shili:e~~ 
~ stock split, spin-off', split-off. split-up or liquidation; (li) option, warrant, or right, whether as all! , 
Y, i \ \,.,\-- uti'- addition to or in substitution or in exchange for any of its securities, or otherwise; (iii) dWiQoJ.id ' 
fJ)!ltI'(; IV r ~stributiO'l'i pa:yable in ~ QF prefJ8ftj'. iB:eIueliBs t>¢(;ufitie; l~sueQ."13y o~ thfID. H'nivm;~' , 
(fy , L E:.iImlU"s Q£ ALAJ, or ~ any certificate representing the First Interstate Shares, then Pledgor shan 
acc:ept it in trust for Secured Party and shall immediately deliver it to Secured pany in the exact: , 
form received, with Pledgor>s endorsement When necessary. or appropriate stock powers duly';:' 
eKecuted in blank to be held by Secured Party aa part of the Pledged Collateral. Pledgor lihall· 
deliver to Secured Party on the d~e Qfthis Agreexnellt jnstructions, in f'01:m and "',,!-"L~.~ll,",,,, 
acceptab1~ tn Secured Party. signed by Pledgor and First Interstate, requiring' -,',.-: ",,,, 
, representing the First Interstate Shares be delivered promptly nnd directly to Shlll'eh.older 
the satisfaction of any obligations secured by the Fitst Interstate Shares, and prohlbitihg any! '., 
action which would inerease thoJrunount of Pledgor', indebtedness to First Intcrsta1e, .. 'iI.A' 
\ rt1n~ 3 ',;;;',;; 
- ~ c. :l.F.'~;., ...'.'r... '. 
"(II',"\:) 1"'f"',}1IJlI 
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5. Assignments 
, J (lJOOu'J Contemporaneously with the signing of this Agreement, Pledgor shall deliver to Secured 
A 1t,eP'-/ party Assignments Separate from Certificate ("Assisnments"), in the form attacl1ed M 
\\.l. ,.ri1\ Exhibits A-l~ A-2 and A-3 to this Agreement. covering aU the Shares. Such AsSignment<;, shw.l 
ll7f' - be endorsed in blank by Pl¢d&or before delivery to Secured Party. Secured Party may not use 
I.}vt./ $'I.l,ch Assignments to transfer the Pledged Collateral except in realization on i~ security interests 
~\, in ilil;.': Plooged. Collateral after the occurrence, and during th~ continuance, of a DeiauIt (as ' 
d.e:fmed in Section S hereof). . ' 
~{ 
6., Pledgor's Voting Right$ 
; i 
So long as no Default under this Agreement has OCCUlTed and is conrlnutn~~ Pledgor shaH 
be rntitled to exorc:i.!'Je any voting rights incident to the Pledged Col1aternl, subject to any 
restrletion on such voting rights containl!d herein or in the Redemption A~eement. Upon the 
occurrence and continuation of it Default, Pledaor's right to exercise suoh voting rights shall 
immediately cease and terminate and all voting rights withrespect to the Pledged Collateral shaIJ 
rest solely and oxclusively in Secured party. The furegoing sentence shall constitute and grant to 
Secured party an irrevocable proxy coupled with an interest to vote the Pledged Collateral U1X!h 
the occurrence and continuation of such a Default. and any officer ofUnive.1'$('l, Farmers~ f]f ,J. , 
A1Al, as the case may be, may rflly on written not1ca from Secured Party RS to the existence of tt, ' .,,' 
Default and Secured Party's right to vote such Pledged Collateral. ' ,.:,it·, i 
7. Appointment (If Secured party 
Pled~or hereby designates and appoints SecuriUl Party its true and lawful attorney 
power irrevocable. for it and in iOi nmne, place and stead, nat a Default on tbis 
AJ[eement shall have oeourred, to ask., demand. receive, , .. ',' '.', ' 
an amounts that may be or become due or payable to;Pledgorwithrespect 
Collatera11 and in Secured Party's sole discrclion to file any claim or take any action or 
proceeding in its owp. name or in the runneofPledgor, that Secured Party deems necessary or . 
desirable in order to carry out the provisions oftbis Agreement and to accompJish the purposes, ~ 
IlereoL Nothing in this Agreement shall obligate: Secured Party to perform any duty, covenant or 
obligation required tv bt; pt:rformed by Pledgor,in connection with the Pledged Collateral. ,; 
8. Default 
Anyone of the following events shaH constitute a default by Pledgor under this 
Agreement (a "Default")! 
O~ / 2S / 95 11:18 CAIRNCROSS ~ :; 
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~rv-w ~ D~\W' Cot\lJ";~of>-~~~,t ' (b) D achofanyreprcscntatio~ 'wmranly, t~nno!conditioncontainedin this .~. If: :~jIE'· Agreemen which brea continues after notice and a thirty (30) day OP~ortwlity to cur::~:c..{ ' :flt, . c~r~~~~; 
(c) Failure of Pledgor fully Md timely to perform and observe any) terms, ' : <ii:t : . . i \'f~if{' . 
conditions and provisions contained i!l the Note, ~ C.AItMlt!lue ..... ,-imt, the Security . ~! ;' . , " ; i;';;F,~~ 
A€7~ement. or the Stock Redemption Agreement, or is ElBY otbar ~moat Qr agIlNmewt , , :JJ.t:.':j'::';J;j~: , ' 
between P1e~ger and Seemod Pan;y relating to the iale, rcdtmljluml. tz:amfe.r Q;{ other dispositi.pD. ' ; ',~r'(;/ ';" ,:~>\; , 
o , .. ' ",:' ; " :=;: apPlicab:~:~'::7~ll::::~::=:'=~:~gedr 
M~ (e) issoJUtJOn.l<nnlnatJOIl of existenco, imIoIvency or bankruplCy of Pledgor 
~ or any of.i~~SubGidiarie, r appointment of' a receiver to take p¢s$ossion of any of the Plc:dgcd ~ j 
Collateral. w~J....,~~klM.kn.J4, ~C{tW~ 1~IN iJUt.. 
:aluLo(J-.~. P/edJut dllCt~ ~~"~.t)~kr l ' 
~"Lb, 11 t.it rf {.tit. Poi;!... ~f .l~ ~U,A.L<..- ,. 
1.'4/n~(lUL9 a..'fltlr . 
9.1 General. In the event of a Default by Pledgol' under this Agreement. Seemed 
9. Remedies 
Party may, at its election and in its sole discretion, without further notice of such electiOllaIId i " .. . 
without demand upon Pledgor, do anyone or mote of the following~ . ; . 
. ; :~ 
r· ··· 
(a) Declare the SecUl'td Obligations immediately due and payable. 
(b) Sell all or any part ofthe Pledged Colla~l at public auction or private i ' : . .. 
::t ~ sale in accordance with the laws oftbe United States or other applicable law, tor cash or credit 
~:v..\o.f: rk the election of Secured Party, Pledgor to be credited wIth thf' amounts of any such , 
tM1-.~ when the cash proceeds are actually received by Secured I:arty. Under , ' 
tL' .p...l Secured Party be required to expedite or delay sale of all or any pm of the 
(J.,l t . ~ J.~ due to prevailing or expected conditions in the market for guch Pledged Collateral. Bach . ., 
~w ~ purchaser at My such sale shaH hold the property sold absolutely free trolll any claim or right on ~ 
~j'{J'J the part of Pledgor, and Pledgor hereby waives (to the extent pemritted by applicable law) all ,.1 ": . . . 
~\ ~ rights of redemption, stay and/or appraisal which it now has or may at any time in the future have 
o f - \yo ~ under any rule of law Of statute now existing or hereafter enacted. Secmed Party shall not be 
tfp ' 6 obligated to make any sale of Pledged Collateral.regardless of notice of sale havini been given. 
(i.- v;J Secured Party may adjourn any public or private sale from time to time by announcement at th~,. 
o (p fir I time and place fixed therefor, and such sale may, without:further notice. be made at the time arid 
("" place to which it was so adj oumed. 
;# ~ 
~ 
(c) Exeroise rut of the rights and remedies available under the Uniform 
f'..llmmercial Code as enactad in the applicablejurisdieti(}n or under other applicable law. 
. ; . ~ : . 
9.2 Agent, For the purposes set forth below, Pledgor doe$ hereby iIT~vo~blJ IJ.l~"''''~~. 
constitute, designate and appoint Secured Party (and any agent which may he designalfd by .· 
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Secured Party) as Pledgor's true and lawful attorney-in-fact and agent. In the t..'1Ient of any 
Defuult by Pledgor umieI" this Agreemen; such agent shall have full power and authority ;for and 





; -·. l,: 
Universe. Fanners, ~ or any other issuer of the Shares, to the name of Secured Parly, or any .(1 J). , ' ;: 
purchaser fr().tn or nomme~ of Se¢tlt'w, pmy. ~ (.{.~ ~ ~f ~ . 4 .I't,,- : . 
, _ C-J WJw~!~ .... JJ 
9.3 Sale of Pledged Collateral. Pledgor recognizes ~ Secured Party'may sell all or ,~ j 
any part of the Pledged Collateral pursuant to Section 9.1 above, as and whenapplieai')le by '" , . 
means of ono or more private sale~ to 8. remicted group of purchasers who will be obligated to 
agree, among other things, to acquire such sectlrities for their own account. for investment arid 
not with a view to distribution or resale~ Pledgor acknowledges that any such priva1e sale or, ', : 
sales may be at places and on terms less favorable t~ the sellc:rthan if sold at public sales,and,r ' ., 
agrees that such private sales shall be deemed to have been made ill a commerCially , " . ' , 
manner, and that S~ured party has no obligation to deJay 1h~ sale ofany such securit)-'for 
period of time necessary to permit Universe, Farmers, AIAI. or any o:ther igsu~ of the , .' " , 
V- W- ~giBter such ~ec~tic:!'I ~orpubliCl s~e under arty llppl,icab16 securities IaW:i Q[ , '. • ' •• :, ;; , ' 
(J ~% event any notice 15 reqUlred to be glven to Pledgor With .r:spect to any sueh. sale 6r dlSPOSltio~of 
Ct ' ( any of the J?ledged Collateral, ten (10) calendar days notice of any 3UCh action shall be deemed to 
k \ .r/.. be a sufficient and oommercially reasonable nfltice. 
{\Q lILW'/ 
~tJ. 9.4 Liability ojSeC1Jred Party. Neither Secured Party nor any employee, attorney., 
accountant, l.mderwriter or other agent of Secured party shall be liabJe for any action taken or ' 
omitted to be taken in connection with this Agrgement, except for its or their own recklessness or 
wiIlftd misconduct. Secur"d party shall not be liable for any claims, demands, losses or damages 
made, claimed or suffered by Ple<t,gor, except any that may be caused by Secured Party's 
recklessness or willful misconduct. Pledgor shall reimburse Secured Party; on demand, for all , : 
costs and expenses illcurred by Secured PartY In connection with the administration and , 
enforcement of this Agreement iWd for all costs and ~xpmses of the enforcement,oftbis 
Agr~en:umt, and agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Seemed Party and the othetpe'rsons " 
Ilatned l;tbove from and against any and allliability incurred in cOIlllection with this ' " 
unless such liability is due to their gross negligence or wi11fu1 mkcondu.ct. ., (~ .) ':Yi:!m~'.fJ"· 
~~erU 
10. Substitution and Release of Security 
In the event 
~n-n"'Tofwhicb.~ Six Million Dollars 
average interest rate reasonAbly approximate to the projected 
same period under the Note, thon SeCUred Party will allow 
the Pledged Collateral, provided that the following "n.,n.,~"~,rl 
. " ; 
(a) 
Secured Party; 
The bonds are issued by the U.S, JOVprnmeJ[ll or an obligor approved by '; 
(b) 
-f 
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